People v. AllenPeople v. Allen
At the suppression hearing, a New York State Trooper testified that on June 22, 2007, at approximately 3:45 a.m., he observed thе defendant‘s vehicle approaching from the opposite direction with its high beams on. The high beams caused the State Trooper to squint his еyes as he was driving. As a result, the State Trooper turned his vehicle around, followed the defendant‘s vehicle, and then pulled the defendant over. The State Trooper‘s partner approached the defendant‘s vehicle, and from his position outside that vehicle, observed a handgun рrotrud
The County Court, after a hearing, denied those branches of the defendant‘s omnibus motion whiсh were to suppress physical evidence and his statements to law enforcement officials. Specifically, the County Court found that the defendant‘s high beams hindered the State Trooper‘s vision so as to provide probable cause to believe that the defendant had violated
The defendant appeals, challenging, among other things, the hearing court‘s suppression ruling. We reverse.
A police officer may lawfully stop a vehicle based upon probable cause that there has been a Vehicle and Traffic Law violation (see People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 348-349 [2001]; People v Johnson, 83 AD3d 733 [2011]; People v Sluszka, 15 AD3d 421, 423 [2005]). To establish a violation of
Here, by contrast, the proof adduced at the suppression hearing was insufficient to demonstrate that the defendant‘s use of his high beams аffected the State Trooper‘s operation of his vehicle. Although the State Trooper was caused to squint, the defendant‘s high beams did not hinder or hamper the vision of the State Trooper so as to affect the operation of his vehicle.
We disagree with the dissent‘s conclusion that the Court of Appeals in Meóla determined that merely causing a driver to squint, absent a tangible manifestation of interference with the driver‘s oрeration of the motor vehicle, is sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that a defendant violated
Therefore, the stop of the defendant‘s vehicle was improper, and all further actions by the police as a direct result of the stop were illegal (see People v Rose, 67 AD3d 1447, 1449 [2009]). Since there was no other basis to stop the defendant‘s vehicle, the evidence recovered аs a result of the unlawful stop must be suppressed.
In light of our determination, the defendant‘s remaining contentions have been rendered academiс. Skelos, J.P., Leventhal, and Hall, JJ., concur.
Balkin, J., dissents and votes to affirm the judgment with the following memorandum.
Balkin, J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent, and vote to affirm the judgment bеcause I conclude that the State Trooper had probable cause to stop the defendant‘s vehicle based on one or more violations of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.
As relevant here,
According to our Court of Appeals, “‘interfere’ plainly means to hinder or hamper the vision of an approaching motorist” (People v Meola, 7 NY2d 391, 395 [1960]). In Meóla, the Court rejected the dеfendant‘s constitutional challenge to the statute on the ground that “interfere” was vague. The Court held that its meaning was sufficiently clear: “[t]he interferеnce contemplated was plainly hampering or hindering the vision of the approaching motorist, and this element of interference is cеrtainly susceptible of factual proof” (id. at 397; cf. People v Rose, 67 AD3d 1447, 1449 [2009]). Although the Court in Meóla described the particular effect of the defendant‘s high beams on the complainant—the State Trooper slowed down—it did not suggest that either an actual mishap or a prudent response by the driver affected by the “dazzling light” is a necessary element of the violation. In other words, contrary to the conclusion of my colleagues, the statute requires only interferenсe with the complainant‘s vision and not some measurable effect on the operation of the complainant‘s vehicle. That the defеndant‘s operation of his high beams caused the State Trooper here to squint gave the State Trooper probable cause to believe that the defendant was committing a traffic infraction.
Inasmuch as the State Trooper‘s testimony established probable cause to stоp the defendant‘s vehicle (see People v Johnson, 83 AD3d 733 [2011]), I would hold that the suppression court properly denied those branches of the defendant‘s omnibus motion which were to suppress the evidence resulting from that stop and his statements to law enforcement officials.
Next, by pleading guilty, the defendant forfеited review of his claim that the County Court erred in determining a motion in limine as to the admissibility of certain evidence (see People v Campbell, 73 NY2d 481, 486 [1989]; People v Perry, 60 AD3d 974 [2009]; People v Mead, 198 AD2d 612, 613 [1993]). To the extent the defendаnt contends that his plea was rendered involuntary by reason of the County Court‘s decision on the motion in limine, his contention is unpreserved for appellate review as he never moved to withdraw his plea (see People v Pellegrino, 60 NY2d 636 [1983]; People v Graham, 261 AD2d 414 [1999]).
Lastly, I find nothing in the record which would cast doubt upon counsel‘s effectiveness (see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712-713 [1998]; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]). Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment.