140 Cal. App. 87 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1934
The defendant was charged, by an information filed in the Superior Court of Fresno County, with the crime of murder. Upon arraignment he entered a plea of not guilty and was tried before a jury which returned a verdict convicting him of manslaughter. A motion for a new trial was denied. The defendant then perfected this appeal from the judgment and from the order of the trial court denying his motion for a new trial.
The grounds upon which appellant relies for a reversal of the judgment and order denying his motion for new trial are as follows: 1. That the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment in that it does not sufficiently show that appellant Pete Aguilar, while driving the automobile which caused the death of Lucius powers, Sr., was intoxicated. 2. That the court erred in admitting into evidence a statement made by Pete Aguilar taken shortly after the accident. 3. That the court erred in refusing to give instructions requested by the defendant. 4. That the court erred in giving certain instructions offered by the prosecution.
It appears from the evidence that one Lucius Powers, Sr., was, on the fourth day of September, 1933, at about the hour of 5:30 o’clock in the evening, operating an automobile in a northerly direction on U. S. California Highway No. 99, and that when he was at a point on said highway approximately two miles north of the city of Fowler his car collided with an automobile being driven in a southerly direction by the defendant Pete Aguilar. The point of impact was on the left front wheel of each automobile. At the place over which the two cars were being driven the highway is divided into three traffic lanes. The cars came together in the easterly one.
Both Powers and the defendant were, shortly after the collision, taken to the emergency hospital in Fresno. Powers died from injuries received in the collision some three or four hours later. The defendant was removed to the county hospital, where he remained for a period of approximately seven days.
Both sides agree that the case revolves around the question as to whether the defendant was under the influence of in
Dr. Dahlgren of the emergency hospital testified that when he first observed the defendant shortly after he was admitted to the hospital, there was a smell of alcohol on his breath and his speech was “slurring in character”. When asked if the injuries to his nose, knee and hand were serious, the doctor replied, “I don't believe sufficient to produce that type of speech.” The doctor testified that in his opinion the defendant was under the influence of liquor to the extent that his mental control and co-ordination of speech were interfered with.
At the county hospital, on the evening of the accident, the defendant was observed by Dr. Ginsburg and found to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor. At the trial the doctor stated that in drawing his conclusions he took into consideration the defendant’s injuries and did not deem them sufficient to give rise to the symptoms which the patient was exhibiting but rather thought the symptoms indicated intoxication.
The witnesses Chess and Tyson testified that at the scene of the collision they did not notice anything unusual about the demeanor or actions, speech or appearance of the defendant, and that in assisting him from his car they did not smell alcohol on his breath. Other witnesses testified to the effect that the defendant had not been drinking within two or three hours immediately preceding the collision.
There was testimony to the effect that a specimen of defendant’s urine, taken the day following the collision, showed that alcohol in the amount of two per cent was present. But without considering this testimony and without consider
On the night of the collision, while the defendant was at the county hospital, the following statement was taken: “Q. What is your name! A. Pete Aguilar. Q. Where do you live, Pete? A. I live at Eeedley. Q. Working down there? A. With my brother down there at the pool hall at. Eeedley. Q. Tour brother is down there? A. Yes, I was working, with him. Q. Working with him today? A. All the time; not today; all the time. Q. How far out of Eeedley does he live, Pete? A. What? Q. How far out of Eeedley does your brother live? A. He lives just in the same lot, out in the back. Q. Same what? A. In the same lot. Q. Same lot? Q. Yes. Q. In the town or outside of town? A. In town. Q. In town? A. Yes. Q. I see. When did you leave Eeedley today, Pete? ' A. I was leaving Eeedley—let me see—about 2—2:20, I believe. Q. 2:20? A. Two and something. After 2, anyway. Q. Where did you go when you came to town? A. I was down—coming downtown in Fresno, and I was going back to home when I had a wreck. Q. You had been in Fresno and were going home? A. Yes. Q. How much did you have to drink in Fresno, Pete? A. Not very much. Q. How much? A. I had the same God damn drink there where I was over there. Q. What were you ¿prinking, wine? ... A. I don’t like wine very much. Q. You don’t. What do you like? A. I like whiskey, you know. Q. You like whiskey. Is that what you were drinking today, Pete ? A. Drank about two glasses down there before I came down here, over there. I come down to the hospital because I was—some girl there. Q. Where did you go? Where did you say you went to see the girls? A. Well, I tried to see one girl here at the hospital. Q. Here at the hospital? A. Yes. Q. Yes. A. So I figured after while I might go home. Q. You didn’t go to see the girl? A. No. After that I figured I might as well go home. Q. Did you have a shot before you started home? A. No. Q. You didn’t?' A. No. Q. What were you drinking— whiskey, Pete? A. Yes. I had one more shot there. Q. Where? A. I had two over at Eeedley; I had one more here. Q. Two at Eeedley and one here? A. Yes. Q. Of
There is no evidence that the statement was ever read over to or signed by defendant, but we do not understand that objection was made to it on that ground. At the close of the testimony of Mr. Adams, shorthand reporter, the district attorney offered in evidence the above statement
The attorney-general- contends that the statement did not amount to a confession of guilt and therefore no foundation was necessary for its admission in evidence, but, he contends, even if it were considered as a confession the only preliminary proof necessary to lay the foundation for its introduction in evidence would be to show that there were no threats, promises or inducements made which would cause the defendant to make the statement. The record shows that the statement was made without any previous inducement, promise or offer of leniency in punishment, or by reason of any duress, intimidation or threat. While the statement was being taken, the defendant was lying on the dressing table with a bandage over his head. He spoke with broken English -but apparently understood- everything that was asked him. There is no intimation of persistent questioning as there was in the case of People v. Gow, 23 Cal. App. 507 [138 Pac. 918], cited by counsel, nor is there any evidence of the defendant being frightened or unwilling to answer. To the contrary, it appears that he was quite willing and inclined to talk. Under such circumstances it is our opinion that the statement was a voluntary one and that the trial court did not err in allowing it to be received in evidence. While it might be better practice when taking statements of this kind to inform the party of his right to remain silent and of the fact that his statement may be used against him, the failure to affirmatively instruct the party does not affect the admissibility of the statement, especially where, as here, the statement was not made as testimony or under conditions which necessarily required such specific instructions. (People v. Booth, 72 Cal. App. 160 [236 Pac,
Respecting the question put to Dr. Ginsburg, and his answer, we are of the opinion that no damage resulted by their inclusion in the statement as received in evidence, for the reason that Dr. Ginsburg testified independently to the same effect, that in his opinion the defendant was intoxicated when he was brought into the hospital. Furthermore, the question and answer being made in the defendant’s presence and along with the rest of the statement, the defendant could have, if he desired, commented on them. In effect the answer of the doctor amounted to an accusation that the defendant was intoxicated, and since the defendant did not make any comment we must assume he did not desire to dispute the statement of the doctor.
The fact that the defendant may have been injured or was under the influence of intoxicating liquor when he made the statement does not affect its admissibility where the character of the statement clearly indicates that he was not so injured or so much intoxicated as to be unconscious of the meaning and effect of his words. (People v. Farrington, 140 Cal. 656 [74 Pac. 288]; People v. Ramirez, 56 Cal. 533 [38 Am. Dec. 73]; People v. Egan, 133 Cal. App. 152 [23 Pac. (2d) 1042].)
Complaint is made that the instruction given by the court upon the issue of intoxication was too narrow in its import. Appellant contends that his proffered instruction should have been given, especially the following portion: “ . . . that the public or persons coming in contact with him could readily see and know that it was affecting him in this respect and was reflected in his walk, acts and conversation . . . ”, and he cites the case of People v. Dingle, 56 Cal. App. 445 [205 Pac. 705], in support of his contention. The instruction which was given is as follows: “ ... any person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor within the meaning of this statute if intoxicating liquor has so far affected the nervous system, brain or muscles of the driver of an automobile as to impair to an appreciable degree his ability
Appellant further contends that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on excusable homicide and thereby deprived the defendant of the benefit of his defense as to accident and misfortune. A review of the record does not disclose any evidence on which such an instruction could be based and therefore the court’s refusal to so instruct was not prejudicial.
The court also refused to give an instruction proposed by defendant which he claims was offered pursuant to the authority of People v. McGrath, 94 Cal. App, 520, at 524 [271 Pac. 549]. His proposed instruction was: “In determining whether or not the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, you are to consider only the mental and physical condition of the driver, that is, his ability to operate his car and not to the manner in which the car is being actually driven nor the result of its operation. ’ ’ The instruction was properly refused. In the first place, the rejected instruction does not follow the authority cited, and, secondly, the rule announced in the McGrath case, with respect to the ability of the driver to operate his car, is covered fully by other instructions given by the court.
Finally it is contended that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the burden of proof as to every link in the chain of evidence necessary to a conviction is borne out by the prosecution. This contention must fail for the court did instruct the jury that the state had the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the court also advised the jury that “it is essential in the chain of evidence relied upon each fact be established to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt”. The
The judgment and order are affirmed.
Barnard, P. J., and Jennings, J., concurred.
A petition by appellant to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on August 20, 1934, and the following opinion then rendered thereon:
The petition for hearing is denied. In denying said petition we withhold our approval of the statement in the opinion that under section 112 of the California Vehicle Act the* crime of driving an automobile by any person upon a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is not defined as a felony.