On rеhearing. Does the possession of two spoons, which arc parts of narcotic injection kits, from the scrapings of which a forensic chemist was able to detect a minuscule amount of heroin, constitute the known possession of the narcotic itself 1 This is the principal question in this appeal.
*120 Defendant-appellant Oscar Aguilar and codefendant James Aguilar were charged with the possession оf heroin in violation of section 11500 of the Health and Safety Code. They were also charged with three prior felony convictions. Each entered a plea of not guilty and denied thе prior convictions. Trial was by the court, each defendant and all counsel having waived trial by jury. Defendant Oscar Aguilar was found guilty and two of the prior felonies alleged were found to be true. Codefendant James C. Aguilar was found not guilty. Probation was denied and defendant was sentenced to the state prison for the term prescribed by law, which sentence was ordered “to run concurrently with any time owing on parole.”
Immediately following the arrest of appellant in the driveway of a motel the officers conducted a search of the motel room оccupied by him and his brother. Two brown paper-wrapped packages were found underneath a bed. Upon the officers’ discovery of these packages, appellant stated, “There is nothing in there but an outfit.” The packages contained hypodermic needles, spoons and eye droppers. In a conversation with Sergeant Virgin, appellаnt stated that he was “hot” (meaning addicted to narcotics) ; that he had done well for a year on the Naline program, but that he had met a fellow who “turned him on again.” He had been using narсotics for more than one month “real heavy.” He related that he was “running” from his parole officer, and that he and codefendant had moved into the motel that day.
William King, a forensic chemist, testified that he examined “debris” (scrapings), found on each of the two spoons discovered in appellant’s motel room, and in his opinion the debris contained heroin.
On pеtition for rehearing, court-appointed counsel urges that the Legislature intended to separate the crime of possession of narcotics paraphernalia used for unlawfully injecting a narcotic (Health & Saf. Code, § 11555), a misdemeanor, from the more serious offense of possessing the narcotic itself (Health & Saf. Code, § 11500), which it classified as a felony; that the evidence in this case showed appellant and his brother, codefendant, had possession of two used narcotic kits, which they freely admitted; that this is the only offense they are shоwn to have committed and that to permit evidence of minuscule, unrecognizable scrapings from parts of the kits to be used as evidence of possession of narcotics thwarts thе purpose of the Legislature in establishing the *121 two classes of offenses. Undoubtedly, under the evidence presented in this case appellant could have been prosecuted for the lesser offense, but with the presence of a detectable trace of the narcotic on the spoons he was prosecuted for possession of heroin.
Appellant maintains the People’s evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to convict him of possession, because the amount of heroin found was infinitesimal. “The eases hold that the statute [Health & Saf. Code, § 11500] does not require the possession of any specific quantity of narcotics. [Citations.] ”
(People
v.
Anderson,
In
People
v.
Marich,
In
People
v.
Salas,
Appellant contends that the instant case is clearly dis
*122
tinguishable from eases where the People’s evidence disclosed a smаll quantity of narcotics but in a recognizable state. In such a situation other evidence showing that the particular defendant was a user of narcotics or was otherwise familiar with the nature of the substance has been held sufficient to cast doubt on his disclaimer of knowledge of the possession of the substance. Thus, in
People
v.
Jones,
Likewise, in
People
v.
Marich, supra,
In
People
v.
One 1959 Plymouth Sedan,
All of these cases are clearly distinguishable from the faсts in the instant ease. Here, we may infer from the evidence that heroin in powder form had first been liquefied and the resultant emulsion drawn from the spoons by means of the hypodermic needlеs and used for injection purposes. What remained in the bottom of the spoons was residue which was in a completely different form from that of heroin powder. The crystalline incrustations on the spoons could remain in that state indefinitely, long after actual use of the spoons for injection purposes. Appellant's answer upon the finding of the packages in whiсh the narcotic kits were discovered, “There is nothing in there but an outfit,” was no doubt an accurate reflection of what he really believed. Any nonscientifically trained person, albeit an addict, observing the spoons, likewise would have been unable to detect the presence of heroin since neither powder nor liquid remained. It is not scientific measurement and detection which is the ultimate test of the known possession of a narcotic, but rather the awareness of the defendant of the pres
*123
ence of the narcotic. Guilt or innocеnce on a charge of illegal possession may not be determined solely by the skill of the forensic chemist in isolating a trace of the prohibited narcotic in articles possеssed by the defendant. As forensic science, measuring devices and techniques improve, smaller and smaller amounts of residue are required for the chemist to detect the presenсe of the narcotic. The presence of the narcotic must be reflected in such form as reasonably imputes knowledge to the defendant. Reasonableness is defined in
In re Hall,
A conviction for possession of a narcotic requires evidеnce of defendant’s awareness of the presence of the narcotic or of facts from which such awareness or knowledge may be inferred. (See
People
v.
Gory,
Accordingly, we conclude that under the circumstances of this case, where the narcotic was imperceptible to the human eye and its presence, qualitatively and quantitively, could be detected only with the aid of a forensic chemist and laboratory, the evidence is not sufficient to sustain a conviction of known possession of the narcotic.
For these reasons the judgment is reversed.
Jefferson, J., and Kingsley, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied January 29, 1964.
