*1
Miсh 732
v ADKINS
PEOPLE
2).
(Calendar
6,
Argued
No.
June
82333.
Docket Nos.
19, 1989.
Decided December
by jury
Recorder’s
in the Detroit
was convicted
Kenneth Adkins
Ford, J.,
possession
Court,
robbery and
armed
B.
Geraldine
felony.
during
court
of a
The
the commission
of a firearm
Michigan
actually spent in
granted
time
credit for
spent
and federal
jails
incarcerated
Ohio
but not for time
jails prior
of unrelated offenses.
convictions as a result
to his
Livo,
Maher, P.J.,
(McDon-
Appeals,
R. C.
J.
and
The Court of
J.,
dissenting
part),
concurring
part
reversed
and
ald,
curiam, concluding
per
unpublished opinion
that the trial
an
of credit to which the
the amount
court had miscalculated
28.1083(2),
769.11b; MSA
entitled under MCL
defendant was
though
holding
had been incarcer-
the defendant
and
that even
offenses,
Michigan
entitled
unrelated
outside of
for
ated
Michigan
placed,
authorities
the time at which
to credit from
pursuant
placed,
him
to the
or hold on
could have
a detainer
or
Agreement
he was incarcerated
on Detainers while
Interstate
88132).
(Docket
people appeal.
No.
in those facilities
Riley
Boyle, joined by
opinion by
Chief Justice
Justice
In an
Brickley
Supreme
Griffin,
Court held:
and Justices
require
does not
sentence credit statute
Section lib of the
spent
for time
incarcerated
that a defendant receive credit
jurisdictions,
free on bond
for offenses committed while
other
sought,
the time that a
for the offense for which credit
could have been entered
detainer or hold either was or
jurisdiction
where
authorities
granted
is to be
for
Such credit
defendant is to be sentenced.
sentencing only
prior
where it is as
to
incarcerated
being
being
unable
of the defendant
denied
a result
imposed.
for which sentence
furnish bоnd for the conviction
provides that whenever a
statute
1. The sentence credit
References
2d,
Law 547-550.
§§
Am Jur
Criminal
Right
under sentence of
for time served
to credit on state sentence
specify in
separate jurisdiction
state court fails
where
court of
that
regard. 90
408.
ALR3d
People v Adkins
person
is convicted of a crime and has been incarcerated
because of
denied or
unable
furnish bond
conviction,
offense which results in
sentence credit is to
offense,
regard
time served
to that
regard
not with
to other unrelated convictions. The fact that a
*2
jurisdic-
hold or detainer —an indication to the authorities in a
custody
charges
tion which has
of a defendant that there are
pending
jurisdiction
in another
and that the authorities from
jurisdiction
would like to be notified before release—is
placed
prisoner
purposes
on a
is irrelevant for
of the sentence
credit statute. It does not convert
served
the first
jurisdiction into time served for the
offense
which the
requesting jurisdiction.
defendant is later convicted in the
fact that such a hold or detainer has been entered does not
requesting jurisdiction gain
mean that the authorities in the
something
defendant,
custody
akin to constructive
of the
nor
longer
solely
does it mean that the defendant is no
incarcerated
jurisdiction.
because of the unrelated offense in the other
Rather,
jurisdiction
it means
authorities in the
agreed
has
of the defendant have
not to effect release
holding jurisdiction.
without notice to the
case,
2. In this
the time the defendant
Ohio and
prisons prior
custody Michigan
federal
to his release into the
being
authorities was not as a result of his
denied or unable to
post bond for the offenses of which he was later convicted in
Michigan, but was for the offenses of which he had been
jurisdictions.
Michigan
convicted
those
Whether
authorities
against
did or could have entered a detainer or hold
him while
jurisdictions
he was incarcerated in those
is irrelevant
purposes
determining
the amount of sentence credit to which
he is entitled under
lib. While the Court of
erred in
ordering defendant’s sentence credit recalculated to include
credit for time served after a detainer or hold was or could
against him,
prosecutor
appeal
have been entered
did not
part
granting
of the Court of
decision
the defen-
request
dant credit for time served after the
to transfer was
entered,
actually
requiring
recalculation
defendant’s
sentence credit
to include time served after the hold was
entered.
Cavanagh
joined
Lеvin,
by
Archer,
Justice
Justices
concurring, stated that while sentence credit for the time the
jurisdictions
defendant was incarcerated in other
for offenses
committed while he was free on bond for the offense for which
required
he now seeks credit is not
and that that
conclusion
supported by
(1985),
People v
Affirmed in — — — Detainers Credit Interstate Law Sentence Criminal Unrelated Offenses. require that a does not credit statute lib of the sentence Section spent in other incarcerated for time receive credit defendant bond for the jurisdictions, while free on offenses committed sought, the time that a detainer for which credit is offense have entered or could been or hold either was jurisdiction defen- where the authorities sentenced; granted for time is to be such credit dant is to be sentencing only it is as a where incarcerated being unable to furnish denied or result of (MCL imposed for which sentence for the conviction bond 761.11b; 28.1083[2]). MSA Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. J. Frank O’Hair, Prose- General, D. Caruso, cuting Attorney, John Solicitor Baughman, Timothy Chief, A. *3 Appeals, Larry Training L. Research, and and Prosecuting Attorney, for Roberts, Assistant people. Morman for the defendant.
Arthur Lee question the Court The before J. Boyle, Michigan’s statute, MCL sentence credit whether 28.1083(2), requires that a defendant 769.11b; MSA in other incarcerated for time receive credit jurisdictions, he was committed while for offenses he seeks for which the offense free on bond for or hold credit, that a detainer from the time such against him entered or could have beеn either was jurisdiction the defen- where authorities hold that statute We dant is to be sentenced. require such cir- credit under does not cumstances. v Adkins op
I February 10, Adkins was arrested on Defendant charged robbery, 1983, MCL and with armed possession 28.797, firearm 750.529; MSA of a during felony, 750.227b; MCL the commission of a 28.424(2). posted February 14, MSA He bond on custody pending trial, 1983, and was released from September 6, 1983. When which was scheduled appear trial, his bond the defendant failed capias respondendum issued. was revoked and a ad thereafter, October, 1983, in Soon in an was arrested Ohio for unrelated offense and charged receiving property. stolen He was county jail incarcerated in an Ohio for that offense July 28, 1983, 26, 1984, until when begin October custody he was released into federal serving separate in a sentence for the conviction during court, Ohio, his of inter- federal transportation property. The state of stolen defen- placed peniten- initially dant was the federal Michigan, tiary Milan, but was later trans- facility ferred, October, 1984, federal Haute, Terra Indiana. Michigan
He was returned to on November robbery 1984, to stand trial on the armed felony-firearm charges. He of both was convicted July July 11, 1985, offenses on and sentenced on years twenty-five 26, 1985, to thirteen to for the robbery plus mandatory conviction, two- armed felony-firearm year term for the offense. question the extent to this case concerns which the defendant is entitled under our sentence 28.1083(2), statute, 769.11b; MCL MSA *4 Michigan for his convictions for sentence credit and federal time incarcerated Ohio property jails as a result of the unrelated stolen gave judge The trial the defendant credit offenses. 732 433 Mich spent Michigan jails, actuаlly time for the days is, his arrest and the three between the time Novem- release on bond and for between 26, 1984, when the defendant was returned ber July 26, authorities, and the federal state 1985, when he was sentenced. appeal, concluded that the Court of
On the amount of the trial court had miscalculated was entitled under credit to which the defendant § though The Court held that even the defen- lib. Michigan dant had been incarcerated outside of offenses, he was entitled to credit unrelated Michigan from the time at which placed, authorities placed, pursuant to the or could have Agreement on Detainers MCL Interstate (iad), 4.147(1) seq., seq.; detainer, or 780.601 "hold,” et et MSA in those on him while he was incarcerated facilities.1 the fact
We leave2 determine whether placed prosecution could have a detainer brought defendant, him or hold on the or back did, trial in this earlier than it in fact stand state entitles him to sentence credit under lib could taken. the time such action have been
ii
Michigan’s
statute,
769.11b;
credit
MCL
28.1083(2), provides:
MSA
any person is
Whenever
hereafter convicted
any
any
crime within this state and has served
jail prior
because
to furnish bond for the offense of
denied
unable
convicted,
imposing
which he is
the trial court
grant
specifically
sentence shall
ber
sentencing. Recently, Prieskorn, 327; (1985), provide NW2d this Court undertook to explanation lengthy history, pur- a rather pose, of the application of this statute in the context multiple of a defendant’s incarceration for unre- decided, lated offenses. We language оn the of clear basis Legislature statute, "[t]he sought, enacting give statute, a criminal right any presentence defendant a to credit for time served 'for the offense of which he victed,’ con- upon p any Id.,
and not other conviction.” 341. We remain convinced of the correctness of that conclusion.
A Prieskorn, In the defendant was free on bond awaiting drug-related charges trial on two when subsequently he was arrested and convicted driving with a revoked license. He was sentenced ninety days jail to After defendant was for this traffic violation.
serving fifty-one days sentence, of that
charged drug with a third offense. Eighteen days pled guilty drug later he to the first charge exchange for dismissal of the other two. sought sixty- The defendant then credit for the days nine plea. he had incarcerated to his Appeals granted Court eighteen days credit after his "arrest” jail charge. while on the third affirming Appeals decision, the Court of we initially conflicting interpre- noted lower court many appeared § lib, tations of of which to turn policy considerations, on various or some notion of judicial policy fairness. We cautioned that such 433 Mich Opinion op the Court Legis- generally province decisions were regarding lature, made its decision which had adopting lib, and that our language merely apply of that function was statute in order intentions. Legislature’s effectuate the 339. language Ultimately, concluded statute the sentence credit *6 credit requires permits nor sentence neither cases, us, where a defen- such as the one before following charges entry of dant is released on bond arising and, disposition pending from one offense as a charges, subsequently incarcerated of those of- charges arising out of an unrelated result of fense or circumstance former case for that and then seeks credit period latter of confinement. [Id., p 340.] language §in lib on the
We based this conclusion referring prior to "be- to time served for to furnish bond cause of denied or unable . . . .” We he is convicted the offense of which reasoned: Legislature that convicted intended Had given for all time sentence credit defendants served regardless sentencing day, prior to presentence confinement purpose for which served, conditioned and it would not have time served "for entitlement to credit to limited the offense is convicted.” of which [the defendant] [Prieskorn, p 341.][3] interpretation Relying lib, af- on this to Court of not firmed the decision of the primary purpose We found in Prieskorn that " possible 'equalize far as the status of statute was to crеdit indigent financially accused with the well-circumstanced and less ” Id., p 340 who can afford to furnish bail.’ status of the accused (citing People Pruitt, [1970]). App 513; 179 NW2d v Adkins the fifty-one days for
grant being charged his with the third to that offense. We concluded drug of his inability time because "did not serve he now [drug of which bond for post offense] Id., 343.4 convicted.” stands Prieskorn view, clearly implicated In our charged initially here was this case. The defendant released on bond and then robbery with armed his trial and conviction of trial. Prior pending arrested and con- charge, the defendant was victed, serving sentences two other began two unrelated stolen property jurisdictions, for part The defendant now seeks credit offenses. served, it was though clearly even property the unrelated stolen convic- served under of his inability and not because tion sentences robbery сharge the armed of which post bond for convicted. eventually he was facts, it would seem to be a rela- Under these application of Prieskorn tively straightforward is entitled to no credit the defendant here say in the Ohio and federal facili- for the time served The Court of these unrelated offenses. ties *7 however, declined to follow Prieskorn Appeals, v case. on its recent decision Relying this Ranson, (1986), 157; Mich 395 271 App 153 NW2d the Court concluded that Prieskorn does not apply on the defendant placed by a "hold” was where being he is jurisdiction authorities in the where imprisoned elsewhere for sentenced while was People Adkins, unpublished v unrelated offense. an curiam, 2, decided December 1987 opinion per (Docket 88132), op, p 8. It reasoned that slip No. 4 however, open, question whether the defendant was We left the eighteen days that that to credit for the served between even entitled prosecutor appealed charge plea, the had not and this since Prieskorn, supra, p 344. decision. 732 can no the placed, hold is such a once solely because incarcerated said to be longer offense. unrelated the that a found case,
In this the defen- detainer, against hold, was entered or the prosecution iad when under the dant for request its officials federal by informed 24, on granted, October custody was temporary under concluded, sentencing credit Thus, it 1984.5 compact, congressionally the interstate sanctioned The is a iad disposi orderly encourage expeditious and purpose the of which is "to prisoner] against charges [outstanding a determi [the] . . . tion of proper any based on untried and all detainers the status of nation of i.) (Article indictments, complaints.” It establishes informations speedy may prisoner the by demand procedures disposition (art either a pending against member state charges him in another prisoner custody m), may trial of a state obtain or a member (art iv). in another state incarcerated upon filing triggered only of a provisions iad are by "requesting” from the "send- state with authorities "detainer” charges pending against state, ing” the defendant Appeals indicating that there are untried requesting The United States Court state. 329, Dixon, Circuit, States v 592 F2d in United for the Sixth (CA 6, 1979), 332, described a detainer n 3 prisoner a simply serving the institution in which notice filed with a sentence, prisoner advising to face is wanted a elsewhere, requesting charges pending custo- criminal releasing notify filing jurisdiction dian to generally process Filing prisoner. informal a detainer is an authority рrisoner any person to take a who has can be done Furthermore, lodged against custody. a detainer remains into prisoner Ridgeway any taken on it. without action (CA 946; 6, 1977), States, 436 US cert den 558 F2d United (1978). 2850; States v See also United 56 L Ed 2d 98 S Ct (1978).
Mauro,
340;
1834;
reasoning further, step one however, concluding should given credit not only the time at which the placed, hold was but actually from the time it could have been placed. Presumably, this time would coincide with roughly prose- when the cution learned of the defendant’s incarceration requested Ohio could have his return to Michi- gan.
The Court of Appeals cited a number of lower
court
in support
decisions
of this contention. See
Turner,
v
People
646;
130 Mich
344
App
NW2d 34
(1983); People v
Coyle,
104
App 636,
Mich
647-648;
(1981),
305
275
NW2d
lv den 415
(1982);
Mich 851
Ranson,
People
supra,
v
J.,
(Maher,
dissenting).
v
Major,
See also
106
App 226;
Mich
307
(1981) (Cynar,
J.,
NW2d 451
dissenting).
It ac-
however,
knowledged,
a split within its ranks on
issue,
and cited a number of decisions which
conclude that a defendant
is entitled to credit for time served after a
placed.
hold is actually
See
People Ranson,
v
supra; People
Shipp,
Mich
610;
App
(1985),
On appeal ap- should have tends that Court v People "actual hold” rule described plied the argues Ranson, supra, while credit from the time properly granted placed. parties Both the hold "could have” been there- agree Appeals, Court seem fore, our some conclusion Prieskorn "inapplicable” situation. We dis- extent not a require now hold lib does agree, and from the time hold grant court to sentence credit explained placed. have As either was or could been presen- is to where such time is jail only tence time served denied or as a result of the offense of which unable to furnish bond "for is convicted.” People v Adkins Opinion oр the Court
B important It is to note that each cases Appeals, exception by cited the Court of with the People supra, Ranson, v was decided before our adopting early decision in Prieskorn. The decision upon rule, the "could have” which each of the supra. Coyle, relies, later cases Coyle, the defendant was in at the Detroit House of Corrections when a warrant was issued charge breaking for his arrest on a ing. and enter- attempt place There was no a hold on the defendant until more than a month after issued, warrant was which time defendant had *10 facility. been transferred from that He was eventu- ally "arrested” several months later while in the custody Department’s of the Detroit Police armed robbery division. The defendant was then released pending breaking on bond ing charge. trial on the and enter- bond, While frеe on the defendant was arrested charge. jail on another unrelated He was held in without bond on that until offense he was sen- breaking entering tenced for the and offense. The Appeals Coyle, lib, Court of § credited under with spent both the time at the Detroit of House Cor- police rections in the of the Detroit robbery armed division after the first warrant put issued and the authorities "could have” a hold spent jail him, on and the time in after his arrest subsequent on the unrelated offense. doing, Coyle substantially
In so the Court relied interpretation on an earlier of lib People Chattaway, App 18 Mich Chattaway (1969). NW2d a involved 538; 171 defendant who was arrested for two distinct and post unrelated He crimes. was unable to bond for first, the and thus no bond was set for the second. 433 Mich the Court not held that in that case The Court to sentence defendant entitled was the plea prior jail eventual to his the time respect offense, the trial to first granted him, he was but that also court had entitled to credit for (i.e., that the same plea) sen- he was to his first when plea second, unre- his eventual tenced for lated offense. Chattaway if the credit
The
Court reasoned
construed,
result "would
not so
statute were
right
by an accused
to trial
chill exercise
person
defendant,
than
who, like
faces more
charge,”
may
into
since he
be "forced”
one untried
charges
guilty
pleading
or another of
one
sentencing
running
get
clock
order
sentencing
Id.,
rule.6
from our concurrent
benefit
argu-
prosecution’s
rejected the
542. The Court
the defendant should not be entitled
ment that
on
for the second crime
the same credit
"
furnish
not
'denied or unable to
since
”
concluding
offense,
stat-
bond’
person to sentence credit
ute "entitles a convicted
regard
why
he was denied
to the reason
without
pp
Id.,
542-543.
unable to furnish bond.”
seemed to de-
As we noted
there
Chattaway
reasoning
velop
line of
from the
(1964).
378;
Carey,
6 In re
bond, reasons unrelated to his financial status and the case in which he is seek- ing credit, is nevertheless entitled to credit in that Chattaway and, situation, case in a in all other pending Coyle Prieskorn, cases as well. 337. one such case. Coyle grant
Not did the Court in the defen- breaking entering dant credit for the for time served for a second and unrelated offense granted bond, after his release on it him credit for breaking entering sentence from the time put the authorities "could have” a hold on him. It thought by waiting to arrest him until he was acquitted charge of the initial for which he was in police, prosecution оf the Detroit Chattaway was able to "circumvent” and frustrate purpose of the concurrent rule. It further reasoned that a defendant should not days prison suffer additional result of delays administrative or otherwise— —intentional arresting Coyle, supra, pp him. 646-647. granted specifi- Prieskorn, however, We leave in cally propriety reasoning.7 to address the of such opinion What nothing case, resulted from our in that if repudiation else, was a clear of Chatta- way’s teachings. particular, In this Court rather soundly rejected Chattaway position Court’s "unnecessary the credit statute avoids chill- ing right by crediting of exercise of the to trial” spent awaiting trial which would have been person pled guilty, Chattaway, if avoided had supra, p 542, as an unwarranted extension of plain language §of lib: fact, appeal upon leave to in Prieskorn the lower
court’s certification that its decision was in conflict with Coyle, supra. pp 332-333. *12 433 Mich the of Court find them- who may for defendants It offenses, multiple unrelated incarcerated selves one of plead guilty some of to to the motivations imposi- the charges the to accelerate is desire
the tion benefit, to much as order of sentencing Michigan’s concurrent possible, from ingredient given defendant’s a But law. motivation derives with peculiar the facts from charges facing multiple is which think, not, limiting appli- confronted and to those cir- credit statute cation of the sentence it is by its We think described terms. cumstances clear that to statute, Legislature sought, by the right to credit for give a criminal defendant a upon "the offense of presentence time served any to Judicial obedience he is convicted.” legislation incidentаlly, in- language may, of the motivating coincidentally, have the effect deed defendant, charged multiple offenses is who posted for one offense and was who has bond released, second who is incarcerated for a but offense, proceed right his trial and waive get case in order to plead first guilty running on that conviction while clock awaiting disposition of the offense for which final bond, an or final resolution of unre- he is denied However, "hold” or "detainer.” that motiva- lated change language the statute tion does not judicial applying not be excuse and should statute extend. to which it does not situations pp Emphasis [Prieskom, supra, 341-342. added.] Prieskom, under again, both We concluded legislative intendment language the literal lib, is entitled to sentence a defendant § a result of denied only for time served as of which he to furnish bоnd "for the offense unable reaffirm our conclusion today.8 We convicted.” supra, Chattaway disapproval of the Our literally in which it is not extension of lib to situations Court’s applicable is evident: Adkins application case, it in this
As for Prieskorn’s
holding in Prieskorn
to see how our
not difficult
precludes
espoused by
adoption
rule
our
Appeals, granting
*13
served
credit for time
of
Court
placed. To
or could have been
a hold was
after
holding
squarely
begin,
the
on
rests
that Court’s
large
progeny,
Coyle
and thus to
in
and its
result
Chattaway.
reasoning
As ex-
of
on the
extent
clearly
plained earlier,
in Prieskorn
our decision
Chattaway,
importance of both
limits the
cases—
clearly rejected
"lib-
its later-described
because we
Coyle,
interpretation
because,
lib,
and
of
eral”
recognizing
explicitly
it
the conflict between
while
decision
the lower court’s
decision.
the latter court’s
affirmed
rejection
Ultimately, however,
of both this
our
panel’s
rule,
the alternative
have”
"could
panels
other
of
hold” rule discussed
"actual
inability
to
from our
Court of
equate
results
sentencing,
time served elsewhere
entered, with time
after a hold has been
even
a defendant
is later
for the offense of which
placement
view,
of a
In
the mere
convicted.
hold or detainer
our
prisoner
on a
indication
—an
jurisdiction
which has cus-
the authorities
charges pend-
tody
ing
that there are
of the defendant
against
jurisdiction,
and that
him in another
jurisdiction
would like to
the authorities from
many
credit has been
In
of the cases in which
regard
whether
the credited time was served
without
anything
having
of which
to do
the "offense
[the
reasons
convicted,”
of
has afforded
the Court
is
defendant]
rеlief
language
sentence credit statute
not because the
of the
it, but,
"unnecessary
following Chattaway,
to avoid
commands
chilling
trial,”
losing
right
"the
or to avoid
of exercise of the
[Michigan’s]
concurrent
[law].”
benefit of
Face,
(1979).
435, 441;
App
entered does requesting jurisdiction something gain akin to custody” defendant; nor does "constructive longer incarcer- no the defendant it mean solely offense of the unrelated because ated other simply
jurisdiction. the au- means that It jurisdiction has thorities the agreed him not to release have "holding” jurisdiction, and to the without notice will upon re- authorities him to such turn over have, quest. has, or could short, a hold whether is irrelevant entered determining purposes the defen- much time how *14 he is of which the offense served "for dant has convicted.”9 view, by supported, our indication in our This conclusion perhaps even not entitled to credit was that the defendant Prieskorn for the driving prison after eighteen days the offense in for he offense, drug jail which was the third he had been “arrested” eventually plea stated: part the first offense. We of his dismissed as Appeals granted the defendant We note driving days eighteen under the served in this case for credit 1982, September the date he was between
violation sentence offense, Septem- marijuana delivery charged and the third 9, 1982, 27, 1982, pleaded guilty to the March he the date ber charge delivery tion sentence under the traffic convic- time served —all therefore, and, for which unrelated to the offense prosecutor has not the in this case. Because he was convicted decision, portion we cross-appealed of the Court supra, p [Prieskorn, respect to that matter. action with take no 344.] language was not implication is that defendant of this The clear entitled sentence running any of his to the time served to credit for lapsed Only that sentence had after for the traffic offense. serving presentence "for the to be defendant be said could the offense of which ultimately] convicted.” [was Adkins the in Prieskorn that admitted much as We as Chattaway it concluded when was cоrrect Court involving give multi- in cases that failure "chilling” may ple effect have a offenses unrelated right See to trial. of his exercise on a defendant’s pp found, however, that such ante, 745-746. We language change stat- "do not concerns language p Prieskorn, 342. . . . .” ute changed in that decision since our has not statute interpretation. does our case. Neither
c ultimately recognize concerned that what We case, Chatta- the Court of apparent ability way Coyle, prosecution our concurrent to frustrate prison by time in a defendant’s rule and maximize simply waiting nearly until one sentence prosecution taking steps his toward before Prieskorn, However, as we stated other offense. "does not affect sentence rule the concurrent defendant seeks is is the sentence credit the whether concurrent sеntence rule or denied. The simply Id., 342. case.” irrelevant to this provides "in rule The concurrent sentence may authority, statutory a sentence the absence of not be completion imposed to commence at expiration Carey, In re of another sentence.” (1964). 378, 380; Mich 126 NW2d applica- "plainly” had no found that the rule despite there, fact that the defendant was tion drug until well after not sentenced for the offense driving served, since commence- sentence was *15 by delayed the court ment of the sentence was not driving imposed for the until after the sentence conviction was concluded. The tence commenced as of the date defendant’s sen- actually it was only for rendered, credit he received Id., "previously that offense.” for 343. original.) (Emphasis in
Similarly, in this case defendant’s imposed sentence for after his to commence not although practi- run, as a offense had the federal begin Prieskorn, in fact matter, it did not cal as served. had been the Ohio sentence until well after rob- for the armed Rather, defendant’s sentence bery time it was at commenced conviction for the credit rendered, received imprisoned for that offense. time he was disagree the Court of cannot We question whether this case raises that prosecution by perform duties, not its has failed to failing put defendant, on the a hold or detainer prosecute failing swiftly simply by his case but being so, the If of his whereabouts. informed after question is whether
then becomes remedy for such "misconduct.” to some entitled today. question not answer that We do only today belief, our based reflects decision Our supra, ruling our earlier on language support does not credit statute of the sentence the Court of
the conclusion run from the time credit is to in all cases placed on the have been either was or could hold requires lib itself defendant. Section a result of a defendant time served as "for the offense furnish bond or unable to denied of defendant has here, Where, which he is convicted.” his as a result of served time not post inability for which he for the offense bond credit, his incarceration seeks but because simply applicable. offense, not lib another or could have been Thus, placed fact that a hold was imprisoned likewise on him while he was *16 Adkins op Opinion determining credit purposes what of for irrelevant grant” § lib.10 under "shall trial court III Adkins case, time that prisons to his and federal in the Ohio served release this state from officials of into the had he of which offenses for the time served was been jurisdictions, a not as and in those convicted post bond or unable denied of his result felony-firearm robbery offenses and the armed for in this state. later convicted he was did this state from the authorities Whether against the or hold a detainer entered have could defendant while other poses in those he was incarcerated pur- jurisdictions irrelevant is therefore determining credit of sentence the amount § lib. under is entitled the defendant to which case erred in this The Court ordering recalculated credit sentence defendant’s detainer a time served after include credit to or hold was him. against entered have been or could appealed prosecutor not has However, granting part decision of the Court served after for time request transfer, i.e., case, in this "hold” actually Thus, the deci- wе reverse entered. was part, Appeals only hold and Court of sion of the recalcu- credit shall be that defendant’s the hold was after include time served lated to in this case. entered JJ., Brickley con-
Riley, C.J., Griffin, curred with Boyle, J._ any way however, today, seen as opinion must not be Our judge granting for time sentencing sentence credit
prohibiting a such credit it be decided offense should for an unrelated served warranted. The sentencing under our indeter discretion trial court’s 28.1072, 769.1; clearly law, would MCL MSA minate permit should the court reducing minimum sentence defendant’s appropriate. think such action 433 Mich by Levin, J. (concurring). agree majority J. I
Levin,
require
does not
the sentence credit statute1
"that
receive credit for time
a defendant
jurisdictions,
incarcerated in other
for offenses
free on bond for
committed while
credit, from the
offense for which he seeks such
or could
time that a detainer or hold either was
have been entered
him
authorities
*17
jurisdiction
sen-
the defendant
is
be
where
(Emphasis supplied.)
tenced.”2
agree
People
in
I also
that this Court’s decision
(1985),
Prieskorn,
327;
v
424 Mich
In I a agreed reasoning I said that "with opinion insofar as it states that Prieskorn is not an entitled to sentence credit for time served for offense committed while he was frеe on bond: 'To Legislature that the attribute to the the intention given fifty- credit in this case for the be days offense, one served under the traffic sentence case, committed while he was free on bond in this Legislature is to attribute to the afford a defendant a "free” misdemeanor —one for an intent no or could sentence of confinement need be beyond spirit It is and intendment be served.’ grant credit on a incarcerated for a the sentence credit statute felony spent sentence for time 1 28.1083(2). 769.11b; MCL MSA
2 Ante, p 734. People Adkins Levin, J. could misdemeanor ninety-day free on if he had not been not have committed Id., p 345. bond.” should not sentence
The conclusion
offense commit-
time served for an
sup-
is free on bond
while the defendant
ted
v Patter-
decisions
this Court’s
ported by
Brin-
(1974),
son,
83; 219 NW2d
392 Mich
676; 272
Judge,
Circuit
son v Genesee
(1978).3
NW2d
Patterson,
another inmate
the defendant stabbed
they
to serve a
prison
and was sentenced
where
were confined
commencing
expiration
imprisonment
at the
term
sentence
provides
utive sentence where
fender
that the defendant was not entitled
imposed
serving
stabbing. A statute
the time of the
he was
at
discretion, impose
judge may,
a consec
in his
that the
the of
is committed while
offense
penal
held
institution. This Court
is incarcerated
a
sentence
to credit on the
prison
for the
for the offense committed
arraignment
prison
and conviction of
between his
literally pro
though
statute
the sentence credit
offense even
person
is "denied
unable
vides for credit in all cases where
to furnish bond
because to
convicted,”
for the offense of which
purpose
grant
defeat the
of the statute
credit would
authorizing
judge
impose
a trial
a consecutive
is in
is committed while the defendant
where the offense
*18
prison.
Brinson,
awaiting
on
the defendant absconded while
bond
Pennsylva-
pretense charges.
trial on false
He was arrested
jails awaiting
spent thirty-eight days
Pennsylvania
nia and
extradition. This Court
son
for
held,
Patterson,
pursuant
Brin-
absconding
was not entitled to credit on the
time
sentence either
Michigan jail
in a
after his extradition
charges
pretense
Pennsylvania until his conviction on the false
pretense
following
on the false
or for time served
his conviction
thirty-eight
charges,
days spent
but that he was entitled to credit for
Pennsylvania jails
not received
for which
had
pretenses
This Court said:
the false
sentences.
grant
appropriate
of credit in
"The statute mandates
defendants, People v
circumstances and is to be read to benefit
69,
(1968),
82;
Havey,
App
I separately wrote disagreement as seeks to opinion of the insofar it with the Court it has been construe the sentence credit statute applied tions not now not in the applied Appeals factual situa- by the Court It is presented properly before us. law, appropriate to seek to enunciate rule Court, opinion of the to "be words of yet litigated cases not in the countless develop.”3
upon The common-law ment of of practices decide yet myriad factual scenarios tradition, develop- in the both in the common law and construction statutes, many of are elaborations so law, common is to developed and rules at the case at hand. appropri- We not We cannot are omniscient. case, ately, on the basis of the facts of enunci- again applicable, ate a rule opinion quite in the words of Court, presenting of the "to cases facts imagination today.”4 beyond our 3Ante, p 340. 4Ante, p 340.
[Id., pp 345-346.] in the opinion Court unpublished.4 appeal, instant case is This there- fore, could be decided an order appropriately reversing the decision of the Court of Prieskorn, Patterson, and Brinson. There citing need repeat possibly no elaborate5 on in Pries- opinion of the Court obiter dictum korn. dictum when Obiter remains obiter dictum repeated subsequent necessary in a where not case to decision.
Cavanagh Archer, concurred with JJ., Levin, J. ___ curiam, Adkins, unpublished opinion per decided Decem 88132). (Docket
ber No. opinion parsed 5 I have of the Court in the case to not instant are determine whether there elaborations.