*203 Opinion
By jury trial appellant was convicted of first degree murder (with the special circumstance that the murder was committed in the course of robbery), multiple counts of robbery, and attempted murder. He was sentenced to prison for life without possibility of parole.
Appellant raises two contеntions: (1) that his challenge to the jury panel on constitutional grounds was erroneously denied and (2) that сertain jury instructions requested by appellant were erroneously rejected. Finding no merit to these contentions, we affirm.
Jury Panel
Because of this county’s large area and population, the Supеrior Court of Los Angeles County is divided into 11 judicial districts. (Gov. Code, §§ 69641, 69643, 69645; L.A. Super. Ct. Rules, rule 300, § 1.) Code of Civil Procedure section 203 specifically provides: “. . . In addition, in the County of Los Angeles no juror shall be required to serve at a distance greater than 20 miles from his or her residence.”
Appellant was tried at the San Fеrnando courthouse of the North Valley District. He brought a motion to quash the jury panel on the theory that the panel was underrepresentative of Blacks and therefore denied appellant his constitutional right to an impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. (See
Taylor
v.
Louisiana
(1975)
Mr. Raymond Arce, court administrator and director of jury services for the Los Angeles County Suрerior Court, testified that his office interprets the 20-mile distance limit based upon mileage actually traveled by jurors driving to the courthouse. The Black population within 20 actual driving miles of the courthouse was 2.4 percent; the percentage of Blacks who appeared for jury servicе was 2.9; and therefore no underrepresentation of Blacks was shown.
Appellant’s expert witness, Professor Edward W. Butler of the University of California, Riverside, testified that the Black population in census tracts within a 20-mile “radius” of the San Fernando courthouse, “as the crow flies,” is 8.8 percent. Appellant contends that if the 20-mile distance in Code of Civil Procedure section 203 were interpreted as a radius, as the crow flies, then appellant made a prima facie showing that the jury panеl at the San Fernando courthouse was not a fair cross-section of
*204
the community under
Duren
v.
Missouri
(1979)
Instructions
Part of the evidence against appellant was testimony of an accomplice. The court fully instructed the jury, in the language of approved CALJIC instructions, on testimоny of an accomplice, credibility of witnesses, prior inconsistent statements, the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt. Appellant submitted his own requested instructions on these issues, based upon quoted language in appellate court cases involving prior inconsistent statements of an accomplice or the reasons why accomplice testimony shоuld be viewed with distrust. The trial court properly refused appellant’s instructions on the ground that the issues wеre fully covered by the CALJIC instructions given. (See
People
v.
Kaiser
(1980)
The judgment is affirmed.
Boren, J., and Hastings, J., * concurred.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied February 17, 1988.
Notes
Thus appellant’s issue, which is solely how the 20-mile limit should be measured, is not the same as the issues currently pending in the Supreme Court in
People
v.
McDonald
(1987)
“Whenever an accused has committed аn offense, it will nearly always be possible, simply by enlarging the area from which the venire is drawn, to obtain different mixes of social/ethnic viewpoints and economic classes on a jury panel. Hоwever, it is practically necessary to limit the area of draw in some arbitrary manner, even thоugh such limitation obviously restricts or alters jury composition.”
(O’Hare
v.
Superior Court, supra,
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.