People v. AdamsPeople v. Adams
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Holbrook
Lead Opinion
Defendant appeals as of right his jury conviction of one count of kidnapping,
The Davis-Frye rule, adopted from People v Davis,
Before reviewing the laboratory procedures, an understanding of the structure of the dna molecule is necessary. The molecule is a double helix, shaped like a twisted ladder. Phosphate and deoxyribose sugar form the rails of the ladder. Four chemical bases—Adenine (a), Cytosine (c), Guanine (g), and Thymine (t)—lie next to each other on the sugar links аlong the sides of the ladder. Each A always bonds with a t on the other side of the ladder, and each c always bonds with a G on the other side of the ladder, so that the possible base pairs on the ladder are a-t, t-a, c-g, and g-c. The base pairs are connected by a hydrogen bond, such that the bonds form the rungs of the ladder. There are approximately three billion base pairs in one dna molecule. Although no two human beings have the same sequence of base pairs (except for identical twins), we share many sequences that create common characteristics such as arms, legs, fingers, and toes. The sequences of variation from person to person are known as polymorphisms. They contain different alleles, which are alternate forms of a gene capable of occupying a single location on a chromosome. Polymorphisms are the key to dna identification because they create the individual characteristics of everyone and are detectable in laboratory testing.
As described in the lower court proceedings, testing for dna identification involves several procedures. Cellmark Diagnostics is the company that did the laboratory testing in this case. The preliminary procedure is extracting a dna molecule from a cell. This can be accomplished by a protein enzyme, proteinase, and a soap breaking the cell membrane. Organic solvents are used to separate the dna from protein, carbohydrates, and lipids.
The next step in the process is electrophoresis, which separates the different sizes of dna.
After separating the dna by size, the two strands of the double-helix dna are denatured. A solution of alkali separates the dna, like opening a zipper or splitting the rungs of the ladder. The single strands of dna are then transferred onto a nylon membrane. The process of transferring the dna from the gel to the nylon membrane is known as "Southern blotting,” named for the person who originated the technique, E.M. Southern. In fact, the first six steps in the process, from the cutting of the dna by the enzyme to the making of the autoradiogram (discussed below), are sometimes referred to as Southern blotting.
The results of the autoradiogram are then interpreted by examining the bands to determine if they match. This process, as well as the statistical analysis, was explained in People v Axell, 235 Cal App 3d 836, 847; 1 Cal Rptr 2d 411 (1991):
Essentially the bands on the autorad from the victim’s, suspect’s, and crime scene evidence samples are "eyeballed” to see if they match within a certain measurement. If a match is declared, the likelihood that a match is unique must be determined. A match is said to occur if the sizes and number of the detected dna fragments in various lanes are indistinguishable within a permissible degree of error. To calculate the permissible degree of error, Cellmark uses "resolution limits” as a unit of measurement to ascertain the "bin” or frequency at which an allele occurs in the population data base.
To make a statistical evaluation of the data obtained from a dna typing, it is necessary to know how frequently in the population a band of a certain size will be found, a question answered according to the principles of population genetics. Each probe recognizes a pair of bands—one fromeach parent. The probability of the combination of two particular bands recognized by one of the probes is calculated by multiplying the product of the frequencies of the two bands by two. The probability of the band patterns from all four loci is determined by multiplying the products from all four loci. This is known as the "product” or multiplication rule.
The validity of this procedure presupposes that each fact observed, and entering into the calculation, is random аnd independent of the others, or adjustments are made for deviations from conditions known as "Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium” and "linkage equilibrium.” The Hardy-Weinberg principle is an algebraic equation that describes the genetic equilibrium within a population, assuming random mating. A homozygote is an individual who has inherited the same allele (or same length allele) from both parents. If the incidence of homozygosity far exceeds the expected frequency of that condition, then the data base population is not in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. [Citations omitted.]
For a further, more detailed explanation of the dna identification process and statistical analysis, see People v Castro,
At the pretrial hearing in this case, the preliminary examination testimony of Doctor David Houseman was incorporated into the record. Dr. Houseman is a professor of molecular biology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He reviewed Cellmark’s procedures at their laboratory. He testified that Southern blotting was applied worldwide in the diagnosis of genetic conditions such as cystic fibrosis, muscular dystroрhy, and Huntington’s disease. He stated that the test was generally accepted in the scientific community as reliable.
The prosecution first presented at the hearing
The prosecution next called Doctor Michael Imperiale as an expert witness. Dr. Imperiale is an assistant professor of microbiology and immunology at the University of Michigan. He uses the Southern blotting technique in studying cancer-causing viruses. After reviewing Cellmark’s protocols and visiting their laboratory, Dr. Imperiale stated that Cellmark’s procedures conformed to his laboratory’s standards regarding Southern blotting.
The next expert presented by the prosecution was Doctor George Herrin, Jr. His entire hearing testimony is not included in the lower court record provided to this Court. Nevertheless, Dr. Herrin, the dna unit supervisor at the Georgia Forensic Laboratory and former staff scientist at Cellmark, testified at trial that the kflp test was generally accepted in the scientific community.
The final expert called by the prosecution to testify at the hearing was Doctor David Ginsburg, who is employed at the University of Michigan medical school as a molecular biologist foсusing on the genetics of bleeding disorders. He routinely uses the Southern blotting technique in the laboratory. Dr. Ginsburg also observed Cellmark’s method of operations and reviewed their protocols. He concluded that the Southern blotting technique
Defense counsel then called an expert witness, Doctor Robert Sever. Dr. Bever is an associate director at Genetic Design, Incorporated, a paternity testing lаboratory. He is familiar with and has performed the Southern blotting technique. He also stated that the dna identification as performed by Cellmark is generally accepted within the scientific community as reliable.
All the expert witnesses testified that dna identification is generally accepted in the scientific community. These witnesses were unquestionably disinterested and impartial experts in this particular field. People v Young (After Remand),
Defendant in this case acknowledges that gel electrophoresis is a generally accepted scientific method, but protests that the forensic application of the method is invalid. He raises the problem of crime-scene contamination. He also mentions the scarcity of dna samples from the сrime scene that limits the availability of repeated testing.
We do not require scientific tests to be infallible, but only that reasonable certainty follow from them. People v Barbara,
We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the prosecution established that dna identification testing is generаlly accepted in the scientific community as reliable. Given the overall acceptance of the technique in other jurisdictions, we hold that trial courts may take judicial notice of the reliability of dna identification testing. Woodall; Jakobetz. Nevertheless, before a trial court admits the test results into evidence, the prosecutor must establish in each particular case that the generally accepted laboratory procedures were followed. See Barbara, p 415; People v Lucas,
Defendant argues that the statistical analysis of the dna identification testing is inadmissible at trial. He questions the notion of the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium, contending that populations fail to randomly mate because identifiable subpopulations tend to mate within their own ethnic community because of economic forces and lack of
Defendant’s contentions are inconsistent with the testimony presented in the lower court. Dr. Ginsburg testified that he was familiar with the gene and allele frequency computations of Cell-mark and thought they were valid. He stated that their calculations tended to be conservative. The markers Cellmark uses are highly polymorphic, meaning that the results of the testing include numerous possibilities of alleles. Consequently, the possibility of an independent match of bands can be calculated to a high degree of probability. Defendant’s expert witness, Dr. Bever, did not question the validity of Cellmark’s computations, but only stated that he would be more confident of the results if Cellmark used a larger database. Notwithstanding this concern, one expert testified that a statistical analysis can be recomputed using the latest available database without repeating the Southern blotting procedures.
The defendant fails to persuade us that the admission of dna identification evidence will lead to an improper trial by mathеmatics. In People v Collins, 68 Cal 2d 319;
Some courts of other jurisdictions have ruled that dna identification evidence is admissible at trial, but have then refused to allow into evidence thе statistical analysis of the testing because the databases were shown to have not been in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. Cumin, pp 225-227; Caldwell, pp 289-290; State v Pennell,
Turning to the issue concerning the defendant’s sentences, we agree with the defendant that the trial court failed to articulate sufficient reasons for departing from the sentencing guidelines range. Under the principle of proportionality, we review the defendant’s sentences to determine whether they are proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender. People v Milbourn,
In this case, the sentencing guidelines recommended a minimum range of six to fifteen years for the kidnapping conviction, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment for
Convictions affirmed, sentences vacated, and case remanded for resentencing in accordance with the principle of proportionality.
Notes
Electrophoretic typing of dried bloodstains has gained general scientific acceptance for reliability and is admissible in criminal trials where adequate safeguards have been implemented. Gistover, pp 53-54.
In Schwartz, pp 426-428, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the dna identification test results were inadmissible because the laboratory, Cellmark, did not comply with the quality control standards published by thе FBI’s Technical Working Group on dna Analysis Methods and the California Association of Crime Laboratory Directors. In this case, however, Dr. Herrin testified that while these guidelines provided good suggestions, they do not have any relevance to the reliability of the testing.
See Hoeffel, The dark side of dna profiling: Unreliable scientiñe evidence meets the criminal defendant, 42 Stan L R 465, 490 (January, 1990).
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in that portion of the majority’s opinion recognizing the scientific acceptability of dna identification testing. Further, I join my colleagues in affirming the admissibility of the dna identification testing in this case and in affirming defendant’s convictions. I dissent, however, with regard to the remand for resentencing.
The majority has acted beyond its authority in
The majority opinion contains no finding that the sentences at issue are invalid. Rather, the majority vacates the sentences and orders resentencing "[b]ecause the defendant’s sentеnces were more than three times as long as the recommended minimum term of years and because the court failed to state specifically its reasons for departing from the guidelines.” Ante, p 281.
First, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the sentencing judge did not adequately articulate his reasons for departing from the sentencing guidelines. In sentencing defendant, the Honorable Fred M. Mester acknowledged that the sentences imposed exceeded the guidelines. However, Judge Mester stated that he was departing from the guidelines because of defendant’s extremely violent propensities, the serious danger defendant posed to the community, the heinous nature of the multiple crimes committed, and the extreme suffering inflicted upon the victim. Such reasons are sufficient to justify a departure from the guidelines and for the imposition of the maximum penalty allowed by law. See People v Milbourn,
I further note that the relief ordered by my
The second reason my colleagues give for vacating the sentences is that the sentencing guidelines have been exceeded. However, departure from the guidelines is not itself a reason to vacate a valid sentence. Recently, in People v Redman, supra, we affirmed sixty- to ninety-year sentences, sentences out of the guidelines range, for first-degree criminal sexual conduct and kidnapping convictions, holding that the sentences recommended by the guidelines Were disproportionate to the heinous nаture of the offense. Similarly, I find the sentences recommended by the guidelines in the present case disproportionate to both the seriousness of the offense and the background of the offender.
As noted by the sentencing judge, defendant is an exceptionally dangerous individual who has no respect for authority and no sense of morality. At sentencing, defendant remained defiant and unrepentant, turning his back to the judge while his sentences were pronounced. At the conclusion of the hearing, defendant made the following rebelliоus vow:
The defendant: I’ll be back.
Approximately a month before the present criminal episode, defendant committed substantially similar acts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, kidnapping, and armed robbery in Macomb County. According to the presentence report, these prior offenses "involve[d] several identical elements to our instant case.” Specifically, defendant, while armed with a knife, abducted a woman,
The facts in the present case are equally as horrendous and have been aptly described by the prosecutоr as follows:
This case presented a situation embodying a woman’s worst fear: abduction and brutal rape by an armed stranger—the fear of violent death and the violation of one’s most intimate and private being. A knife was held to the victim’s throat. She was forced to endure the pain and humiliation of forced sexual penetration—both oral and vaginal. The horror she was forced to endure will last as long as she lives.
Additionally, I note that the abduction occurred in a Kmart parking lot shortly before the victim was to pick up her husband at the airport. During the kidnapping, defendant used his knife to cut the victim’s face and both of her hands. Defendant repeatedly held the knife at the victim’s throat and before the rape threatened to slash her between the legs. The victim was thoroughly terrorized and convinced that she was going to die.
Defendant was convicted of three high-severity felonies: first-degree criminal sexual conduct, armed robbery, and kidnapping. Each offense is separately punishable by a sentence of up to life in prison. After thoroughly reviewing the record, I find defendant’s sentence of life imprisonment for his kidnapping conviction and sentences of 70 to 150 years for his convictions of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and armed robbery proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offenses and the offender. Accordingly, I would affirm.
Defendant’s brief contains a reference to an alleged violation of the doctrine of People v Moore,