People v. Adams

Sep 1, 2026
D084606

Xavier Akeem Adams appeals the order denying his Penal Code1 section 1172.6 petition to vacate his March 2011 conviction for first degree murder. He claims the trial court erred by assuming that the fact that he had received weapons training from the Marine Corps essentially obviated the need to consider fully the evidence that his age of 19 years at the time of the killing prevented him from forming the mental state required for felony murder. But our review of the record reveals that the court made no such assumption and that it fully considered Adams‘s age-related evidence. Because the governing substantial evidence standard of review does not permit us to reweigh the evidence to reach the conclusion Adams desires, the order denying his petition must be affirmed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2009, Raphael Ramey recruited Adams, a fellow active duty Marine, to confront Charles Williams over his delay in delivering a Chevrolet Impala he sold to Ramey. Using knives Ramey bought while with Adams the day before the murder, the men fatally attacked Williams in his repair shop in August 2009. The assailants were arrested the next day after being observed getting into the victim‘s car, which they took from the shop when they failed to find the keys to the Impala.

Although Ramey initiated the altercation and was responsible for most of Williams‘s injuries, Adams admitted to stabbing him once in his torso and once again in the back of his neck. For Adams‘s part in the killing, a jury in March 2011 convicted him of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and found true the special circumstances that he committed the murder while engaged in the commission or attempted commission of (1) a carjacking (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) and (2) a robbery of keys (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).). Jurors also found true that he used a dangerous or deadly weapon within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). Adams, who was 19 years old at the time of the killing, was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction plus a one year term for the weapon enhancement. We affirmed the judgment in December 2012.2 (People v. Adams (Dec. 6, 2012, D059954) [nonpub. opn.].)

The jury in Adams‘s case was instructed on multiple theories of first degree murder, including felony murder. As this theory then applied, a person who committed or attempted to commit one or more of certain enumerated inherently dangerous felonies—including carjacking and robbery (former § 189)—was guilty of first degree murder if a killing resulted, regardless of whether the homicide was unintentional or committed by a codefendant. (People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241, 247–248.) Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which became effective on January 1, 2019, limited the felony murder doctrine to defendants who were either (1) the actual killers, (2) intended to kill, or (3) were major participants in one or more inherently dangerous underlying felonies (which still included carjacking and robbery) and acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3; § 189, subd. (e).)

In addition to modifying some of the requirements for a murder conviction, the bill also added section 1172.6, which since January 1, 2022 has allowed a person convicted of felony murder under the old law to petition the sentencing court for relief on the theory that the conviction could not be obtained under current law.3 (See Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2; § 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Upon a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause and, absent a waiver or stipulation by the parties, hold a hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1).) At the hearing, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder under the law as it presently exists; otherwise, the murder conviction will be vacated and the petitioner will be resentenced “on any remaining counts in the same manner as if the petitioner had not previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater than the initial sentence.” (Id., subd. (d)(1)–(3).)

In July 2023, Adams filed a section 1172.6 petition that prompted the court to issue an order to show cause. The People argued that Adams would be guilty of first degree felony murder because there was no reasonable doubt that he (1) was a major participant in the carjacking and robbery who (2) displayed a reckless indifference to Williams‘s life.4 (§ 189, subd. (e).)

Adams countered that he could not have known Ramey‘s plan beforehand, could not have stopped the attack once it began, and he was there merely to have his codefendant‘s “back.”

Adams offered the additional argument that his age prevented him from forming the mental state of reckless indifference. He based his contention on a “brief summary of research on adolescent development” prepared by Dr. Kristina J. Malek for his case. According to Malek, “adolescents are attracted to immediate rewards, have more difficulty assessing the risks and consequences of their behavior, … are less able to regulate their emotions in stressful situations[,] tend to rely more on their peers[,] and have difficulty resisting peer influence.” Although Malek neither interviewed Adams nor offered any opinions as to his case, he contended her summary established that, at 19 years old, he could not have been “subjectively aware” his actions on the day of the murder embodied a reckless indifference to human life.

The court denied Adams‘s petition after finding that the People had established the elements of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The court recognized that Ramey was not always clear about his intentions toward Williams leading up to the altercation.5 But, the court reasoned, Adams knew immediately before they entered the shop on the day of the

murder that things were going to “get serious” and “ugly” because he and Ramey were “armed with knives“; Ramey was “really mad“; and, while standing outside just before the fatal confrontation, Ramey said that the victim was “not going to be able to walk out this door ... anymore.” The court went on:

“What does Mr. Adams do? … He shuts the door. He stands at the door and he witnesses Ramey repeatedly stabbing the victim. The victim is fighting for his life. The victim at one point tries to stand up off the floor. Mr. Adams, what does he do? He runs over behind the victim and stabs his knife in the victim‘s neck pushing that blade into his head. He also stabs him in the back. … So there‘s just no question that he had an extremely important role in being a guard at the door and then assisting with the stabbing.”

In reaching this conclusion, the court referred to Dr. Malek‘s report and “acknowledge[d] that Mr. Adams was 19, was young, was impulsive ... .” But the court also believed “there were too many opportunities to act here. Too many times when he realized this was going terribly wrong, where morally he should have done something under these circumstances as opposed to getting involved in the stabbing.”

Throughout the hearing, both Adams‘s attorney and the court referred to the fact that the defendant was an active duty Marine at the time of the killing. At one point, the court asked, “[w]hat impact does the fact that he‘s a trained Marine have on this? For me, it was a substantial factor that unlike most 19-year-old men[,] he had been trained in weapons.” Adams‘s attorney conceded that his client received “weapons” training, without elaborating, and pivoted to arguing that the salient point about this military service was that it caused Adams, who enlisted in the Marine Corps a year before the killing, to feel a misplaced sense of loyalty toward another Marine despite knowing him for just “a couple [of] months.” The court observed a few more times that Adams was a “trained Marine” in the context of either having experience with weapons or in noting that this fact made the murder even more “tragic.”

DISCUSSION

“Since 2021, ‘Courts of Appeal have recognized that “a defendant‘s youth is a relevant factor in determining whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life” ’ ” (People v. Diaz (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 545, 558), and that a 19 year old defendant may be considered a “youthful offender” (see People v. Jimenez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 994, 1007). Yet, according to Adams, the trial court “effectively” refused to consider Dr. Malek‘s evidence about the impulsivity and other psychological characteristics of adolescence because it assumed the weapons training he received in the Marine Corps “somehow overcomes or counteracts the fact that from a neurogenetic perspective an adolescent brain ... is not fully developed.” More specifically, he argues that his military training was not a permissible factor for the court to consider for any purpose, much less to avoid fully considering the impact of his age at the time of the offense.

An order denying a section 1176.2 petition is reviewed for substantial evidence. (People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951; accord People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 480 [“Whether Oliver was a major participant in the underlying felonies who acted with reckless indifference to human life is predominantly a factual question reviewable for substantial evidence“].) Under this standard, we will uphold a challenged finding when it is supported by ” ‘evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value’ ” and that, when viewed “in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” supports the conclusion that ” ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 715.) We will do so even when the evidence also supports a different conclusion, which means we neither reweigh the evidence nor resolve evidentiary conflicts. (People v. Helzer (2024) 15 Cal.5th 622, 646 (Helzer).)

We start with Adams‘s contention that his Marine Corps weapons training was not a valid factor for the court to consider in any context.6 Adams had been an active duty Marine for a year at the time of the killing and, according to his counsel‘s response to a question from the court, had in fact received weapons instruction as part of his training. The court inferred that this instruction provided Adams with knowledge about how knives could be used to inflict serious and potentially fatal injuries. For example, the court observed that Adams stabbed Williams in “critical parts of [his] body, his side and [the back of] his neck ... [¶] Not a leg, not an arm,” and that “[w]hen you go into a situation like this armed with knives and you‘re trained Marines, you are aware that weapons can be used.” These inferences—which have nothing to do with Adams‘s age or maturity—were reasonable and relevant to the court‘s analysis of whether he displayed a reckless indifference to Williams‘s life. (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 618 (Clark) [“knowledge of weapons, and use and number of weapons” are relevant to this inquiry (capitalization omitted)].)

To the extent the court implicitly made an unsupported assumption about the scope of Adams‘s weapons training, any error was harmless because there is no “reasonable probability” that it impacted the court‘s decision in light of the strength of the trial evidence. (People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 417–418, citing, inter alia, People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Simply put, whether or not Adams was a Marine did not change the highly relevant and undisputed facts that he personally stabbed Williams twice during a lengthy confrontation, that he had multiple opportunities to back out of or attempt to stop the attack, and that he neither rendered aid to Williams nor called for help after fleeing the scene. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 619–623 [“opportunities to restrain the crime and/or aid the victim,” “duration of the felony,” and defendant‘s “efforts to minimize the risk of violence during the felony” are relevant considerations (some capitalizations omitted)].)

Finally, Adams‘s assertion that the court effectively failed to consider his age and lack of maturity is refuted by the judge‘s recognition that Dr. Malek‘s summary suggested he was young and impulsive. The court‘s statement about Malek immediately followed extensive argument on this point, contradicting any suggestion that the court gave this evidence short shrift. But more to the point, “[t]he fact of youth cannot overwhelm all other factors” that go into determining whether a person is guilty of felony murder. (People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 595.) Here, the court considered all the relevant evidence—some of which supported Adams‘s arguments and some of which did not—in reaching its ultimate conclusion that Adams acted with reckless indifference to human life. The applicable standard of review does not permit us to reweigh that evidence to tip the balance in Adams‘s favor. (Helzer, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 646.)

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

Notes

1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Ramey was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole after a separate jury convicted him of first degree murder and found true the special circumstances that the murder involved the infliction of torture and that he personally used a knife in the commission of the crime. (People v. Ramey (Aug. 31, 2012, D059412) [nonpub. opn.].)
3
Certain other conditions that were met here must also exist, including that “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine,” and “(2) [t]he petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
4
The court also found that Adams was guilty of second degree implied malice murder under current law. Because the court focused mainly on whether Adams could be guilty of felony murder—as have the parties on appeal—we limit our discussion to that theory.
5
For example, at various times, Ramey told Adams that he wanted to ” ‘get’ ” and ” ‘jack’ ” Williams, that he wanted to “shoot him,” and that there were going to be ” ‘some problems’ ” if the car was not ready on time. The day before the murder, Ramey explained they needed knives because Williams could call the police if they just beat him up. On the day of the murder, Ramey stated that Williams would not be able to walk out the door if he did not get what he wanted. And right before the fatal altercation, Ramey told Adams, “[L]et‘s go in and get him.”
6
The People contend that Adams‘s argument about these remarks was forfeited for his failure to object to them during the resentencing petition. While we tend to agree, we exercise our discretion to consider the merits of Adams‘s argument, which the People fully addressed. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887, fn. 7.)