People v. AcostaPeople v. Acosta
—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Ira Beal, J.), rendered October 19, 1993, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of two counts of robbery in the second degree and one count of assault in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to concurrent terms of 5 to 10 years, 5 to 10 years and 2V2 to 5 years, respectively, unanimously affirmed.
The total amount of time chargeable to the People, from defendant’s arraignment until the commencement of trial, was only 141 days, and therefore his CPL 30.30 speedy trial motion was properly denied.
The period from November 5, 1992 to November 30, 1992 was properly excluded as a reasonable delay resulting from defendant’s motion practice, including a reasonable post-decision preparation period, ten days of which were requested by defendant in any event (see, CPL 30.30 [4] [a]; People v Green,
The motion court, relying on the parties’ submissions, correctly found the period from November 30th to December 18th to be excludable as an adjournment at defendant’s request, and defendant has not produced any evidence to the contrary to permit appellate review (see, People v Kramer,
The record demonstrates that the period from January 8, 1993 to January 19, 1993 was correctly excluded as an adjournment on consent, in which defendant participated in the choice of date (see, People v Smith,
The period from February 4th, the date on which the People filed a certificate of readiness, until February 23rd, is excludable except for the five-day period from February 4th to February 9th, the requested adjourned date. The fact that the prosecutor subsequently requested adjournments or was not ready for trial on certain dates does not invalidate the statement of readiness (see, People v Robinson,
Defendant’s contention that the certificates of readiness filed on March 29th and April 29th were illusory is rejected for the reasons previously discussed. However, contrary to the People’s argument, the motion court correctly charged the People with the six-day period from May 12th to May 18th. The parties agree as to the includability and excludability of the remaining periods, and thus the total amount of time chargeable to the People is 141 days.
Defendant’s suppression motion was properly denied. The police officer’s observation of defendant’s running out of a nightclub and periodically putting his hand in his waistband while looking back at his two pursuers, whom the officers recognized as bouncers from the club, and who were yelling, “grab him, grab him,” provided reasonable suspicion to stop and detain defendant (see, People v Hammonds,
We have reviewed defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Concur — Lerner, P. J., Nardelli, Wallach, Williams and Saxe, JJ.