Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of possession of less than twenty-five grams of cоcaine, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v); MSA 14.15 (7403)(2)(a)(v), and was sentenced to four to eight years’ imprisonment. He appeals as of right his conviction and the sentencing court’s scoring of Offense Variable (ov) 8 and оv 16. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that his conviction of possession of a controlled substance following the civil forfeiture of his car, $32, $17 in food stamps, and a wristwatch pursuant to MCL 333.7521
et seq.;
MSA 14.15(7521)
et seq.
violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States Constitution, US Const, Am V, and the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, аrt 1, § 15. We disagree. The double jeopardy provisions contained in the federal and state constitutions are intended to protect citizens from suffering multiple punishments and successive prosecutions for the
*398
same offense.
People v White,
Defendant claims that his criminal conviction following the civil forfeiture of his property pursuant to statute violated his right to be free from multiple punishments. In support of his argument, defendant relies upon
United States
v
Ursery,
*399
Given the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in
Ursery,
we believe the test
2
to be applied to the instant case, involving a criminal conviction following a civil forfeiture under MCL 333.7521
et seq.-,
MSA 14.15 (7521)
et seq.,
is whether dеfendant has presented the “clearest proof” indicating that the forfeiture is “so punitive in purpose or effect” that it is equivalent to a criminal proceeding. Becausе forfeitures under MCL 333.7521
et seq.-,
MSA 14.15(7521)
et seq.,
are in rem civil proceedings, see
In re Forfeiture of $18,000;.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in determining that he voluntarily consented to the pоlice search of his automobile and in refusing to suppress evidence found in the automоbile. On appeal, defendant concedes that he consented to the search, but argues that his consent was involuntary because it was given while he was in police custody
*400
and, therefore, was the product of coercion. We disagree. The evidence indiсates that after defendant got out of his car at the officers’ request, he was patted down for weapons and asked if there were any drugs or weapons in the car. Defendаnt then consented to a search of his car and was placed in the back of the patrol car. On the basis of the foregoing, it is clear that at the time he consented to thе search, defendant was merely the subject of a Terry
3
-type stop and frisk. The United States Supreme Court has noted that
Terry
stops are not inherently coercive in nature.
Berkemer v McCarty,
Finally, defendant challenges the scoring of оv 8 and ov 16. We find that these claims must fail and the scoring decisions must be upheld because there was evidence to support the scores.
People v Haacke,
Affirmed.
Notes
Michigan's forfeiture law pertaining to cоntrolled substances, MCL 333.7521
et seq.;
MSA 14.15(7521)
et seq.,
is modeled after its federal counterpart, 21 USC 881, the statute at issue in
Ursery.
See
In re Forfeiture of $5,264,
We rеcognize that this Court has previously discussed civil forfeitures under this same statute and applied a slightly different test in
People v Hellis,
Terry v Ohio,