I. BACKGROUND
After what can only be described as an extremely abusive and traumatic childhood,
However, less than three months later, in April 2013, a second wardship petition was filed by the DA alleging that appellant had committed grand theft ( Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c) ) and had received stolen property (
While appellant was pending disposition on all three of these petitions, the San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department (Probation) filed a report pursuant to section 241.1 (CASE report) recommending that appellant-a current juvenile court dependent-be made a juvenile court ward pursuant to section 602. In addition to appellant's history of delinquency, the CASE report described appellant's extensive history of behavioral referrals in the school setting, including issues with extortion, fighting, class disruptions, absenteeism, and truancy. Appellant-whose most recent report card reflected a grade point average of 0.33-was described by his Dean of Students as "out of control" and a "safety issue." At the dispositional hearing in August 2013, appellant was placed on juvenile probation under section 725, subdivision (a). Thereafter, appellant made significant progress while on probation, allowing his case to be dismissed in November 2014, earlier than expected.
Unfortunately, only four months later, on March 16, 2015, a fifth wardship petition was filed by the DA alleging that appellant, now 17 years old, had committed second degree robbery ( Pen. Code, § 211.) Appellant was detained in juvenile hall. Although appellant's court appointed special
A contested jurisdictional hearing with respect to the fifth petition was held on April 14 and 15, 2015, at the conclusion of which the juvenile court sustained the allegation of second degree robbery. Thereafter, the court amended the sixth petition to include an allegation of attempted first-degree robbery ( Pen. Code, §§ 211, 664 ), and appellant admitted that allegation in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts. On April 22, 2015, Probation filed a CASE report recommending that appellant be declared a juvenile court ward. The related dispositional report recommended wardship and out of home placement. An April 27 CASA report, in contrast, recommended that appellant remain a juvenile court dependent.
Due to the juvenile court's decision to treat appellant as a ward pursuant to section 241.1, appellant's dependency jurisdiction was terminated on June 2, 2015, one month shy of his eighteenth birthday. However, on July 8, 2015, appellant filed a motion under sections 388 and 778 asking the juvenile court to modify its previous dispositional order to set aside its wardship determination; reinstate him as a dependent pursuant to section 300; and grant his request for non-wardship probation pursuant to section 725. Appellant argued that Probation had been unable to place him in out of home care before he turned 18 and that the Agency could provide services that were unavailable through Probation. The DA filed an opposition, and, after hеaring on July 27, 2015, the juvenile court denied the modification petition with prejudice. Several days later, on July 30, a different juvenile court judge implemented the prior court's commitment order, sending appellant to Log Cabin Ranch (Log Cabin) until age 19.
Appellant filed an additional notice of appeal with respect to the juvenile court's denial of his modification petition. By order dated September 2, 2015, we consolidated appellant's two appeals for briefing, argument, and decision, and the combined matter is now before us for resolution.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Dual Jurisdiction Issues
The bulk of appellant's complaints stem from his disagreement with the juvenile court's decision to treat him as a juvenile court ward rather than retaining his status as a dependent minor. As we recently had occasion to summarize: "A child who has been abused or neglected falls within the juvenile court's protective jurisdiction under section 300 as a 'dependent' child of the court. In contrast, a juvenile court may take jurisdiction over a minor as a 'ward' of the court under section 602 when the child engages in criminal behavior. [Citations.] As a general rule, a child who qualifies as bоth a dependent and a ward of the
Pursuant to section 241.1 : "Whenever a minor appears to come within the description of both Section 300 and Section 601 or 602, the county probation department and the child welfare services department shall, pursuant to a jointly developed written protocol ..., initially determine which status will serve the best interests of the minor and the protection of society. The recommendations of both departments shall be presented to the juvenile court with the petition that is filed on behalf of the minor, and the court shall determine which status is appropriate for the minor." ( § 241.1, subd. (a) ; but see § 241.1, subd (e) [authorizing development of a written county protocol to allow for a minor's designation as a dual status child under specified circumstances].) Here, appellant takes issue both with San Francisco's Protocol for Implementation of Welfare & Institutions Code section 241.1 (variously, Protocol or San Francisco Protocol) and with the juvenile court's status detеrmination made pursuant to that Protocol and section 241.1. We address each argument in turn.
1. Validity of San Francisco Protocol
As stated above, in order to address potential dual status situations, the probation department and the child welfare department in each county are required to develop a joint written protocol designed to "determine which status will serve the best interests of the minor and the protection of society." ( § 241.1, subd. (a).) The purpose of the protocol is to ensure both "appropriate local coordination in the assessment" of minors and "the development of recommendations by these departments [i.e., child welfare and probation] for consideration by the juvenile court." (Id. , subd. (b)(1).) A valid protocol must require, at a minimum, consideration of the following eight factors when making the necessary assessment: (1) the nature of the referral; (2) the age of the minor; (3) the prior record of the minor's parents for child abuse; (4) the prior record of the minor for out-of-control or delinquent behavior; (5) the parents' cooperation with the minor's school; (6) the minor's functioning at school; (7) the nature of the minor's hоme environment; and (8) the records of other agencies that have been involved with the minor and his or her family. (Id. , subd. (b)(2).) In addition, a protocol must include "provisions for resolution of disagreements between the probation and child welfare services departments regarding the need for dependency or ward status." (Ibid. )
Section 241.1 requires that, pursuant to a protocol, consideration be given to the above-described eight factors when assessing a minor. The statute does not demand, however, that the assessment be in writing. ( § 241.1.) Rule 5.512, in contrast, requires the preparation of a "joint
Rule 5.512 additionally mandates that "[t]he joint assessment report must contain the joint recommendation of the probation and child welfare departments if they agree on the status that will serve the best interest of the child and the protection of society, or the separate recommendation of each department if they do not agree." (Rule 5.512(d).) Finally, "[o]nce the reсommendations of both departments are presented to the juvenile court, it remains for the court to 'determine which status is appropriate for the minor.' ( § 241.1, subd. (a) ; see rule 5.512(g) [court must make a determination regarding the appropriate status of the minor and must state its reasons on the record or in a written order].)" ( M.V. , supra ,
For instance, the Protocol establishes the Juvenile Court Committee for Assessment and Status Evaluation (CASE) for purposes of undertaking the assessment required by section 241.1. CASE is comprised of three individuals, representatives appointed from Probation, the Agency, and the City Attorney's Office. (Protocol for Implementation of Welfare & Institutions Code, § 241.1 (January 2008) < http://www.sfsuperiorcourt.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/1861% 20Protocol% 20for ¨Implementation% 20of% 20Welfare% 20and% 20Institutions% 20Code% 20Section2¨4
While acknowledging that the San Francisco Protocol "does not provide for disclosure of internal disagreements," the Attorney General asserts that it does specify a reasonable method of resolving conflict as mandated by
Appellant additionally claims that the designation of the City Attorney's representative as the tie-breaking third member of CASE is improper because both section 241.1 and the related court rule contemplate collaboration solely by the probation and child welfare departments when making status recommendations. (See § 241.1, subd. (a) ; id ., subd. (b)(1) [purpose of protocol to ensure "the development of recommendations by these departments [i.e., probation
Appellant further maintains that the Protocol is improper to the extent it requires supervisory personnel to make assessment determinations. (See Protocol, § 2 at p. 1 [Probation representative appointed to CASE must "hold the position of supervising supervision probation officer, or above"; Agency representative must "hold the position of section manager, or above"]; see also id ., § 4(c) at p. 2 ["The case-carrying probation officer and case-carrying child welfare worker shall
Finally, appellant finds fault with the San Francisco Protocol to the extent it improperly limits the input required for adequate assessment. As mentioned above, one of the underlying purposes of section 241.1 is to ensure that "juvenile court judges will have the maximum information necessary to make decisions based upon the needs of the child, the family, and society." (See Assembly Report, supra , at p. 2.) However, the Protocol does not allow for input from a minor's CASA or delinquency attorney at CASE meetings and limits the participation of any dependency attorney to five minutes.
Not all of appellant's arguments are persuasive. For instance, nothing in state law prohibits supervisory staff from making status assessments pursuant to section 241.1, and it does not appear unreasonable to place authority for these often difficult decisions on senior personnel who have broad experience over many cases; who may be more likely to engage in a reasoned analysis precisely because they are less emotionally invested in each particular case; and whose ultimate determinations are less likely to negatively impact a case-carrying worker's continuing relationship with the minor. In other instances, appellant
We do, however, find the Protocol's tie-breaking procedure to be quite troubling. Not only does such a process appear to fly in the face of the requirement thаt status disagreements between the probation and child welfare departments be reported to the juvenile court, but it also grants ultimate authority for the status recommendation to an unaffiliated third party with no expertise or framework for decision-making. Such an arbitrary process inspires little confidence that the resulting recommendation will accurately reflect "which status will serve the best interests of the minor and the protection of society."
Here, after summarizing appellant's past involvement with both Probation and the Agency as well as his mental health needs, the CASE report recommended that appellant be declared a juvenile court ward. The dispositional report filed by Probation described the details of his two current offenses; summarized his prior history with both Probation and the Agency; detailed appellant's problematic educational history; noted his first IEP referral at the age of four due to delays in speech, social skills, and motor
On the other side of the coin, appellant's CASA filed an eight-page report with the court which detailed his extensive history with appellant; summarized thе current services appellant was receiving from his dependency team; noted that appellant has been steadily addressing his significant history of childhood trauma; stated his belief that it would be extremely detrimental to appellant if his relationship with that team was severed; described appellant's personality and positive connection to his guardian and half-brother; indicated that he (the CASA) was allowed to attend, but not participate in, appellant's CASE meeting; observed that appellant's detention with people that he does not trust has had an observable deleterious effect on his well-being; and strongly recommended that appellant be maintained as a dependent so that he could retain the support of his existing team as he completed high school and transitioned to adulthood. In addition, while appellant's contested dispositional hearing was pending, a neuropsychological assessment was completed at the request of appellant's defense attorney and filed with the court. This evaluation exhaustively discusses appellant's history and level оf functioning, including his ongoing need for special education services, and concludes that appellant "has serious mental health issues, cognitive deficits and severe abandonment issues. He will need close supervision, structure, appropriate academic interventions and psychotropic and therapeutic mental health interventions to help improve his behavior, mature his decision-making, and desist from conduct that results in legal problems." The evaluator recommended out of home placement in a setting that could provide mental health care, educational interventions for his special education needs, behavioral interventions, and continued contact with his current support team.
Thereafter, at the contested hearing on May 26, 2015, six witnesses testified in support of maintaining appellant as a juvenile court dependent. Specifically, appellant's current therapist Dr. Hicks testified that he was treating appellant, in particular
Appellant's CASA testified about his relationship with appellant, appellant's positive personality traits, and the progress appellant had been making prior to his arrest. As in his written report, he argued it was very important that appellant retain his current treatment team. Sean Cochrun worked with appellant's half-brother and had provided substance abuse counseling for appellant beginning in September 2014. He testified that progress in treatment is not always linear and that the services appellant had been receiving were working. Appellant's legal guardian testified that it took her 13 years to gather appellant's current team оf service providers and opined that, if his support team changed, it would be like starting over because appellant does not respond well to change. Moreover, if he does not like the staff he is working with, it won't do any good. She believed appellant could stay out of trouble if he stayed on his medication with his current support team. Finally, appellant, himself, testified about his strong connection to his treatment team and stated that taking his medication while in custody was helping him. He wanted to change and believed that he could.
The court also reviewed a written statement from appellant, positive letters from current teachers in juvenile hall, a letter from his dependency attorney recommending continued dependency, and a short letter from Dr. Hicks summarizing his testimony. Nevertheless, after argument, the juvenile court declared appellant to be a juvenile court ward. In doing so, the court opined as follows: "I believe Aaron should be placed out of home. At age 17 Aaron is in a transitional period into adulthood, and since 2012, as is reported, he has been slowly spiral[ing] out of control. [¶] This is a very important period in your life, Aaron, and probably the last chance for the Court to assert some influence over you on rehabilitation from crime. [¶] Now, while I agree that the team that's been working with Aaron has been a positive influence on Aaron, probably saved him from some even more serious crimes, I'm not convinced that Aaron will not benefit from a different approach, such as a structured environment where he can [hone] in on his dreams and apply what he's learned from his team, that he's trusting of other adults and himself. And if Aaron were the good, kind child that everyone said he was-and I have no reason to doubt that he is not-then he would have enough foundation to accept changes that are inevitable, and also to accept the consequences of his own conduct and behavior that brought him into the criminal justice system in the first place."
2. Juvenile Court Status Determination
In addition to finding fault with the San Francisco Protocol, appellаnt also challenges the juvenile court's status determination, itself, on numerous grounds. Specifically, in addition to arguing that the court's 241.1 determination was made using an invalid protocol, he also asserts that the timing of the assessment report was improper; that the report failed to include all mandated elements; that the juvenile court failed to provide an adequate statement of reasons for its decision; and that the court's determination was not sufficiently supported by the evidence. "We review the juvenile court's determination under section 241.1 for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] 'To show abuse of discretion, the appellant must demonstrate the juvenile court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a miscarriage of justice.' [Citation.] Throughout our analysis, we will not lightly substitute our decision for that rendered by the juvenile court. Rather, we must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings where there is substantial evidence to support them. [Citation.]" ( M.V. , supra , 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1506-1507,
We have already found that any inadequacies in the Protocol did not materially affect the juvenile court's status determination. Appellant's argument that the juvenile court abused its discretion by declaring him a ward without a specific statement of reasons is similarly unpersuasive. It is true, as stated above, that, pursuant to rule 5.512(g), a juvenile court making a status determination is required to state its reasons for that determination on the record or in a written order. However, the juvenile court did that here. Specifically, as detailed above, the court was clearly concerned with appellant's escalating behaviors and, in that context, determined that-despite the positive impact of his dependency team-appellant would benefit from a "different approach" that would allow for a structured environment in
Appellant next attacks the juvenile court's status determination in this matter because the CASE assessment considered by the court failed to include many of the elements mandated by statute and related court rule as outlined above. Although not argued below, the CASE report is undeniably brief and failed to include all of the information rеquired by state law. However, as we recently held in M.V. : " 'When a parent challenges an assessment report as inadequate, the reviewing court evaluates any deficiencies in the report in view of the totality of the evidence in the appellate record.' ( In re Michael G . (2012)
Appellant's final challenge to the propriety of the juvenile court's status determination involves the timing of the CASE report. The report was filed on April 22, 2015, a week after the jurisdictional hearing in this matter, although the CASE meeting at which the assessment recommendation was generated occurred on March 31, 2015. Appellant argues that the assessment report should have been prepared and filed with or before the wardship petition in this case (March 16, 2015), or, at the very least, prior to the jurisdictional hearing on April 14-15, 2015.
Subdivision (a) of section 241.1 does state that a joint recommendation regarding status "shall be presented to the juvenile court with the petition that is filed on behalf of the minor, and the court shall determine which status is appropriate." We have previously construed this statement to mean that the assessment should be presented in connection with the later petition-that is, the petition that creates the potential for dual jurisdiction. (
It is the court rule-rule 5.512-that establishes more restrictions regarding the timing of the assessment and related report. For instance, rule 5.512 states that, "[w]henever possible, the determination of status must be made before any petition concerning the child is filed" (rule 5.512(a)(2) ) and that the "assessment must be completed as soon as possible after the child comes to the attention of either department" (rule 5.512(a)(1) ). "In addition, rule 5.512 is quite specific regarding the timing for the actual assessment report: 'If the child is detained, the hearing on the joint assessment report must occur as soon as possible after or concurrent with the detention hearing, but no later than 15 court days after the order of detention and before the jurisdictional hearing. If the child is not detained, the hearing on the joint assessment must
As we noted in M.V. , however: "[A]t least one commentator has indicated that the timeframes set forth in rule 5.512(e) may be contrary to the best interests of the minor and the protection of society and therefore void as inconsistent with the intent of sеction 241.1. (See Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2013 ed.) § 3.27[2], p. 3-52, citing California Court Reporters Assn. v. Judicial Council of California (1995)
Had the juvenile court made its status determination prior to litigating the jurisdictional facts, it would presumably have assumed that they would be found true for purposes of its analysis: Otherwise, there would be no reason to even consider the dual status issue. Thus, the juvenile court would have contemplated the exact situation that actually came to pass in this case and-given the bases for its ultimate status determination (recidivism, need for a secure environment, and need to accept
As mentioned above, after disposition was completed in this matter-resulting in a declaration of wardship and referral for out of home care-appellant filed a motion under sections 388 and 778 asking the juvenile court to modify its previous dispositional order to set aside its wardship determination; reinstate him as a dependent pursuant to section 300; and grant his request for non-wardship probation pursuant to section 725.
Preliminarily, we note that appellant's argument that the Agency had an out of home placement available to it-St. Vincent's-that would meet appellant's special educational needs, is factually incorrect. Probation informed the court on July 2, 2015, that it had talked to St. Vincent's and that the potential placement had refused to accept appellant back because it believed that it was no longer a good fit for his needs. We are equally unpersuaded that the juvenile court maintained wardship due to a mistaken impression that the dependency court could no longer take appellant back because he had turned 18. While the court discussed this issue, it ultimately based its decision to deny the petition on its previous findings that appellant should participate in an out-of-home placement to continue his rehabilitation. Indeed, the court made its order regardless of whether it resulted in a higher level of care, because it believed it necessary given appellant's escalating behaviors and the danger he posed to himself and the public.
The remainder of appellant's arguments are a rehash of the evidence presented in favor of maintaining appellant's dependency status at the original dispositional hearing. The juvenile court considered all the evidence and dеtermined that wardship was nevertheless appropriate because it believed that appellant would benefit from a "different approach." And, we have already concluded that this status determination was supported by substantial evidence. The juvenile court's decision as to whether a previously made juvenile court order should be modified rests within the court's discretion and
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Second Degree Robbery: Asportation
We next consider appellant's assertion that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that he committed second degree robbery. When addressing claims of insufficient evidence in the context of a juvenile court judgment sustaining criminal allegations, "we must apply the same standard of review applicable to any claim by a criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment of conviction on appeal." ( In re Ryan N. (2001)
"Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear." ( Pen. Code, § 211.) The "taking" aspect of robbery consists of two parts-" 'gaining possession of the victim's property and asporting or carrying away the loot.' " ( People v. Rodriguez (2004)
The asportation element of a robbery allegation is satisfied when the accused exercises dominion and control over the victim's possessions through some small movement of those possessions. ( People v. Price (1972)
Thus, for instance, in Hill -the case primarily relied upon by the juvenile court below-our Supreme Court found substantial evidence of asportation where the robber took the victim's purse from her possession, moved it a slight distance from inside the car to his possession, found nothing of value in it, and returned the purse to her. ( Hill , supra , 17 Cal.4th at pp. 851-852,
In the present case, the victim testified that the minor hit him several times in the face, took his cellphone out of his pocket without permission, and held onto it until he decided to return it when the police arrived. Thus, during this-albeit brief-timeframe, the minor took possession of the phone in the victim's pocket and removed the phone into his own custody and control. Even though the minor's exercise of control and dominion over the phone was short, it was clearly sufficient under existing case law.
As a final matter, appellant asserts that the $200 restitution fine assessed against him in accordance with section 730.6 was error and was also improperly assessed twice-both at his original dispositional hearing on May 26, 2015, and at his later dispositional hearing on July 30, 2015, when his prior out of home placement order was vacated and he was committed to Log Cabin. He further claims that an administrative fee of $20 was similarly imposed twice, once at each dispositional hearing. We agree with thе Attorney General that the juvenile court's recitation of the restitution fine and administrative fee at the later hearing was merely a reiteration of the previous court order and thus only one restitution fine and one administrative fee were imposed in this case. Indeed, the minute order for the July 2015 hearing specifically states that the fine and the fee should be paid "as previously ordered on 5-26-15." However, as the Attorney General concedes, subdivision (g)(2) of section 730.6 states that "[i]f the minor is a person described in subdivision (a) of Section 241.1, the court shall waive imposition of the restitution fine." Thus, even the single restitution fine of $200 was imposed in error and must be stricken.
The case is remanded with directions for the superior court clerk to correct the minutes of the dispositional hearings on May 25 and July 30, 2015, to reflect the fact that the $200 restitution fine has been stricken. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
STREETER, ACTING P.J.
SMITH, J.
Notes
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. All rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
In his briefing, appellant also challenged his July 2015 commitment order and the imрosition of certain conditions of probation. However, by letter dated July 28, 2017, appellant's attorney acknowledged that these issues have become moot because minor was returned home in June 2016 and was subsequently committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). Under these circumstances, we decline to consider these additional claims.
Appellant was removed at birth from a 16-year-old mother with schizophrenia who exposed him to drugs in utero. Appellant's father is also mentally ill and suffered a substantial brain injury after being struck by a car when appellant was approximately 6 months old. At about that same time, appellant was returned to his mother, despite reports that she was still abusing drugs. The child then spent the majority of the next 30 months being homeless, residing in hotels where he was exposed to "scary" situations and sexual behavior. He remembers both parents hitting him. At age three, appellant's mother left him with an acquaintance and never returned. This acquaintance eventually filed for legal guardianship and has become a consistent mother figure for appellant. Appellant has an IQ оf 86, with verbal comprehension in the borderline range and impulse inhibition in the severely impaired range. He has been diagnosed with a number of mental health issues, including Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Anxiety Disorder, Depressive Disorder, Bipolar Disorder, Cannabis Abuse, and Impulse-Control and Conduct Disorder.
Rule 5.512 does not require that any records of other agencies be included in the report (cf. § 241.1, subdivision (b)(2) [requiring consideration of records in assessment] ), but instead mandates discussion of "[t]he history of involvement of any agencies or professionals with the child and his or her family." (Rule 5.512(d)(9).)
Although not part of the record below, we took judicial notice of the San Francisco Protocol, at appellant's request, by order dated January 27, 2016.
Appellant also argues that the Protocol improperly limits the information provided to the juvenile court by not allowing the attachment to the assessment report of any documents used by CASE in formulating its recommendation and by failing to allow "separate statements by the child welfare department and the probation department, each addressing whether the child or youth may have a disability and whеther the child or youth needs developmental services or special education and related services or qualifies for any assessment or evaluation required by state or federal law," both in contravention to rule 5.651. (See rule 5.651(c)(8)(i) [suggesting attachment of current IEP to joint assessment report] & (c)(16) [seeking separate statements as described above]; Protocol, § 7 at p. 3 [no documents shall be attached to the assessment report].)
Specifically, the Protocol provides: "[T]he minor's dependency attorney may be invited to attend the CASE meeting. The minor's dependency attorney may attend the first five minutes of the portion of the CASE meeting dedicated to discussing the attorney's client. The attorney may present any relevant information that might prove helpful to CASE in completing its assessment and evaluation. Upon completion of the presentation, the attorney will be asked to leave the meeting. In the event that the minor's dependency attorney is unable to attend the CASE meeting, the attorney may make a written submission for consideration.... [¶] ... Nothing in this protocol is intended to permit any other person, other than the minor's dependency attorney, to attend CASE meetings." (Protocol, § 3 at p. 1.)
We recognize that, since both Probation and the Agency have consented to the procedure outlined in the Protocol, they have essentially agreed that they will never disagree. On this basis, it could be argued that the single CASE recommendation generated in a tie-break situation is, in fact, the recommendation of both departments and thus separate statements are not required to be included in the joint assessment report. (See rule 5.512(d); see also § 241.1, subds. (a) & (b).) While perhaps analytically elegant, such a position appears to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of state law. The fact that the two departments disagreed to the extent that the tie-break procedure was triggered, the bases for their disagreement, and the position endorsed by each department all seem to be circumstances highly relevant to a juvenile court attempting to determine "which status is appropriate for the minor." (§ 241.1, subd. (a).) Yet the Protocol hides all of this information from the court.
Appellant's аrgument that the problems with the Protocol were prejudicial because an assessment in accordance with the statutory requirements "should have resulted in a determination to maintain dependency jurisdiction," thereby allowing him to maintain his treatment team and avoid felony adjudications that could "haunt him for the rest of his life," merely evinces a disagreement with how the juvenile court decided a difficult case. The question here is whether the identified error likely changed the outcome; not whether appellant would have personally preferred a different result.
Given the breadth of information available to the court in this matter, we find the recent case of In re R.G. (2017)
And, we also find R.G. 's conclusion that certain timing issues were not harmless factually distinguishable. (R.G. , supra , 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 292-293,
Both section 388 and 778 allow for the modification of a prior juvenile court order upon grounds of change of circumstances or new evidence if such modification appears to be in the best interests of the child. (§ 388, subds. (a)(1) & (d) [dependency proceedings]; § 778, subd. (a) [wardship proceedings].)
We reject thе minor's argument that the juvenile court's ruling somehow reflected a misapprehension of the law of asportation because the court misstated some of the pertinent facts of Hill . Nor do we find particularly relevant that the court at one point erroneously stated that the minor removed the cellphone from the victim's backpack instead of his pocket. Review of the entire colloquy among court and counsel makes clear that the court was aware that only slight movement is required to prove asportation and that possession of the cellphone by the minor, plus some small movement, occurred in this case. Substantial evidence supports this determination.
Because we conclude that there was sufficient asportation of the victim's cellphone to support the juvenile court's second degree robbery finding, we need not address the Attorney General's alternate argument that the minor was also an aider and abettor in his co-defendant's forcible taking of a speaker from the victim's backpack.
Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.