188 N.Y. 478 | NY | 1907
Lead Opinion
The court is of opinion that the publication set forth in the indictment is improper, intemperate, unjustifiable and highly reprehensible, nevertheless it is not "indecent" as that word is employed in section 317 of the Penal Code.
The definitions given by the standard lexicographers are not controlling in deciding its legal signification; many meanings as used in ordinary conversation are also irrelevant.
Section 317 of the Penal Code is found in chapter VII, headed as follows: "Indecent Exposures, Obscene Exhibitions, Books and Prints, and Bawdy and Other Disorderly Houses."
Section 317 opens as follows: "§ 317. Obscene prints. 1. A person who sells, lends, gives away or shows, or offers to sell, lend, give away, or show, or has in his possession, with intent to sell, lend, or give away, or to show, or advertises in any manner, or who otherwise offers for loan, gift, sale or distribution, any obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting book, magazine, pamphlet, newspaper, story paper, writing, paper, picture, drawing, photograph, figure or image, or any written or printed matter of an indecent character;"
It is clear from the manner in which the legislature has *480 used the word "indecent" that it relates to obscene prints or publications; it is not an attempt to regulate manners, but it is a declaration of the penalties to be imposed upon the various phases of the crime of obscenity. The word "indecent" is used in a limited sense in this connection and falls within the maxim ofnoscitur a sociis.
The judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the opinion of the majority of the court, that the article complained of does not fall within the provisions of section 317 of the Penal Code, under which the defendant was indicted, which section makes it a misdemeanor to sell, give away or show any "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting book, paper or picture," etc. That the article is a scurrilous and vile attack on a large and respected body of Christian clergymen is unquestionable. That it is "indecent" from every consideration of propriety is entirely clear, but that is not the indecency condemned by this section of the Code. The preceding section punishes indecent exposure of person, the next section the sale of articles for indecent or immoral use. The chapter in which all the sections are found is entitled "Indecent exposures, obscene exhibitions, books and prints, and bawdy and other disorderly houses." From the context of the statute it is apparent that it is directed against lewd, lascivious and salacious or obscene publications, the tendency of which is to excite lustful and lecherous desire. That such is not the effect of the publication is clear from the fact that my brother who writes the dissenting opinion publishes it in full, and I am entirely certain that did he believe the tendency of the article was lecherous and salacious, he would find no justification for its publication in the fact that the majority of the court, from whose decision he feels constrained to dissent, entertain a contrary view. In the English case cited by my brother no part of the improper publication is reproduced, but the report is confined to a statement of its general character. I regret that the publication should appear in the reports of *481 this court, not because I deem it lewd, but because I feel that the reports of this court should not be made the means of perpetuating a scurrilous and wanton slander on any class of the community. This is an example of the extent to which sectarian religious animosities may lead a weak and disordered mind, for it is mere charity to consider such to be the character of the writer of the production. Since, however, the article is to appear, I may challenge its comparison with many that have been published attacking the Mormon church. Surely, publications as to that church have gone far beyond the article now before us. It is no answer to say that the Mormons, while they practiced polygamy, were justly subject to such strictures. The truth or falsity of the writing has no bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant under this section of the Code. If the charges contained in this article had been made, not against a class but against a single individual, and that individual a layman, not a clergyman, it would, doubtless, if false, have been a gross libel. But it would not be contended that if true it was indecent and should subject the party writing it to the penalties prescribed by the Code.
It does not necessarily follow that the defendant is amenable to no punishment. The charges in the article being against a whole class, no single individual could maintain an action for libel against its author (Sumner v. Buel, 12 Johns. 475), but not so, however, as regards a criminal prosecution for libel. The foundation of the theory on which libel is made a crime is that by provoking passions of persons libeled, it excites them to violence and a breach of the peace. Therefore, a criminal prosecution can be sustained where no civil action would lie, as for instance, in this very case, where the libel is against a class (Sumner v. Buel, supra; Palmer v. City of Concord,
Dissenting Opinion
The defendant was indicted for selling and exposing for sale certain printed matter of an indecent character. The publication was in a newspaper called "The Gospel Worker." By section 317 of the Penal Code it is made a misdemeanor to sell, or to have in possession, with intent to sell, or to publish, any written or printed matter of an indecent character.
The defendant demurred to the indictment on the ground that it did not state a crime. The demurrer was sustained at the trial court and at the Appellate Division and the People have appealed to this court. The decision under review is to the effect that the paper referred to in the indictment and set out at length is not of an indecent character and, therefore, not within the statute. In this respect I think the courts below were clearly in error, since, in my opinion, it would be difficult to compose any writing more indecent and more immoral. It is so indecent that, in my opinion, it is unfit to appear upon the records of this court and it would not appear as a part of this opinion except for the contention at the bar and in the court itself that it isnot indecent. Of course, if it is not, then I must be in error in supposing that it is unfit to appear in the records of this court. Therefore, we must allow the writing to speak for itself; and here it is:
"N.L.A. EASTMAN." *485
If this paper is not of an indecent character and within the prohibition of the statute, then it is impossible, as I think, to conceive of any printed matter that would be. It would seem to be a work of supererogation to argue, or to cite authorities, in support of the proposition that a writing so vile and nasty as this appears to be is of an indecent character; but since there appears to be some difference of opinion on the point, whether the writing is indecent or not, I will add that no court has ever held that such a publication could be anything but indecent, at least all the decisions, as I understand them, hold that such a paper is an indecent publication.
Judge ANDREWS, in People v. Muller (
In reading this statute there may be some danger of falling into the error of construing "indecent" as synonymous with *486 "lewd, lascivious," etc., used in connection with it, but an examination of the language of the section, from its appearance in the original Code of 1881 to the present time, clearly discloses that the word does not necessarily have any reference to morals. The prohibition is against an "obscene or indecent" publication.
In Reg. v. Hicklin (L.R. [3 Q.B.] 360) the defendant was charged with misdemeanor for selling a book entitled "The Confessional Unmasked; showing the depravity of the Romish Priesthood, the iniquity of the Confessional and the questions put to females in Confession." COCKBURN, C.J., writing the opinion sustaining the charge, says: "The very reason why this work is put forward to expose the practices of the Roman Catholic Confessional is the tendency of questions, involving practices and propensities of a certain description, to do mischief in the minds of those to whom such questions are addressed, by suggesting thoughts and desires which otherwise would not have occurred to their minds. If that be the case between the priest and the person confessing, it manifestly must equally be so when the whole is put into the shape of a series of paragraphs, one following upon another, each involving some impure practices, some of them of the most filthy, disgusting and unnatural description it is possible to imagine. * * * We have it, therefore, that the publication itself is a breach of the law." It would seem to be impossible to distinguish that case from the one at bar.
In Steele v. Brannan (L.R. [7 Com. Pl.] 261) the question was involved as to the defendant's guilt for having dealt in printed matter purporting to be extracts from works of Roman Catholic divines and casuists on the subject of the confessional. A conviction of misdemeanor having been had before a police magistrate the case came on review to the Common Pleas. The appellant's counsel asked: "What effectual remedy is there in the hands of persons wishing to suppress a system which they conceive to be pernicious, except to expose the tendency of such a system?" To this BOVILL, C.J., *487 answered: "There is no doubt that all matters of importance to society may be made the subject of full and free discussion, but while the liberty of such discussion is preserved, it must not be allowed to run into obscenity and to be conducted in a manner which tends to corrupt the public morals. The probable effect of the publication of this book being prejudicial to public morality and decency, the appellant must be taken to have intended the natural consequences of such publication, even though the book were published with the object referred to by counsel. * * * Discussions offensive to public decency and of a depraving tendency are not privileged."
In United States v. Bennett (16 Blatchford, 338), Judge BLATCHFORD refers with approval to the language of Judge CLARK in charging the jury in the Haywood case as follows: "A book isindecent which is unbecoming, immodest, unfit to be seen. A book which is obscene, as I have said to you before, or lewd, or lascivious, or indecent, in whole or in part, or in its general scope or tendency, in its plates or pictures, or in its reading matter, falls within the scope of the prohibition of the statute."
Judge DANIELS, in People v. Muller (32 Hun, 209), says: "The statute has not particularly described what, within its intent and purpose, should be considered obsene or indecent. But as these words are words of well known significance, it must have been intended by the legislature, in the enactment of this law, to use them in their popular sense and understanding. * * * And as the statute has given this general definition of the character of the acts constituting the offense, it must necessarily have been designed that the drawing, picture, photograph or writing should be exhibited to and observed by the jury for them to determine as a matter of fact, in the exercise of their good sense and judgment, whether or not they were obscene and indecent. * * * The question in all of these cases must be, what is the impression produced upon the minds by perusing or observing the writing or picture referred to in the indictment, and one person is as competent to determine that as another." *488
The only question presented by the demurrer in this case is whether the writing in question is, as matter of law, not indecent. In all the cases where the question has arisen it was held that the writing or picture must be submitted to the jury to decide whether in fact it was indecent or not; that the words used in the statute are in themselves descriptive, to be taken and understood in the popular sense and that upon such a question the opinion of one person is just as good as that of another. This court is asked to hold, as matter of law, that the writing, upon reading and inspection, is not an indecent publication. That, as it seems to me, is a question of fact which must be determined by the jury, under proper instructions. The character of the writing, its tendency and effect, is a question that one person is as competent to decide as another, and hence it cannot be said, as matter of law, that it is not within the prohibition of the statute.
In United States v. Bebout (28 Fed. Rep. 522) the defendant was indicted under a Federal statute against "publications of an indecent character." The trial judge in charging the jury defined the term "indecent" as something "not decent; unfit to be seen or heard." He then said: "There is a test which has often been applied and approved of by the courts in this class of cases to determine whether the publication is obscene or indecent within the meaning of the statute before referred to. It is whether the tendency of the matter is to deprave and corrupt the morals of those whose minds are open to such influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall. Under these definitions, whether the matter set out in the indictment was obscene or indecent, is a question of fact for you to determine."
I am, therefore, unable to concur in the views of the majority. It is true that my brethren have considered it necessary to denounce the publication in question upon almost every conceivable ground of impropriety, except the ground which presents the only question before the court, that it is an indecent publication within the statute. The paper has been characterized by very harsh names that do not, in the *489 least, solve the only question presented by the appeal. Having arrived at the conclusion that it is not an indecent publication, it is of very little consequence what else it may be. The important feature of the case is that, notwithstanding the conceded iniquity found in the writing, the defendant, by what appears to me to be a very strained and artificial construction of his act, is allowed to escape punishment; nor is the situation helped very much by the suggestion that the paper is a criminal libel and that the public prosecutor should have indicted the defendant for that crime instead of the one charged in the indictment. The defendant is not injured very much by the suggestion that he has published a libel instead of an indecent paper; since we all know that he may now be protected by the Statute of Limitations from any prosecution on such a charge.
The judgment should be reversed and the demurrer overruled.
EDWARD T. BARTLETT, VANN, HISCOCK and CHASE, J., concur with per curiam opinion, and CULLEN, Ch. J.; HAIGHT, J., concurs with O'BRIEN, J.
Judgment affirmed.