PEOPLE‘S INSURANCE COUNSEL DIVISION v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
No. 60, Sept. Term, 2011.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Jan. 25, 2012.
36 A.3d 464
WILNER, J.
The Commission stated that “[i]n making the decisions set forth in this Order, we have sought to balance the interests of [Verizon] with the interests of its customers and our State as a whole.” CWA says that
At any proceeding before the Commission, a party, including a public service company, may “present evidence[] and present argument[.]”
For all the foregoing reasons, we shall affirm.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE APPELLANT.
J. Van Lear Dorsey, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, and Jeffrey L. Shelton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondents.
Bryan D. Bolton (Michael P. Cunningham of Funk & Bolton, P.A., Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondents.
Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, GREENE, LAWRENCE F. RODOWSKY, (Retired, specially assigned), IRMA S. RAKER, (Retired, specially assigned), ALAN M. WILNER, (Retired, specially assigned) and PAUL E. ALPERT, (Retired, specially assigned), JJ.
WILNER, J.
We granted certiorari to determine whether the Maryland Insurance Commissioner properly approved a filing by Allstate Insurance Company and Allstate Indemnity Company (collectively Allstate) giving notice of its intent to cease writing new property insurance policies in certain geographic areas of the State. In a memorandum and order filed on his behalf by an Associate Deputy Commissioner, the Commissioner concluded that the filing was subject to administrative review under Maryland Code,
In an action for judicial review filed by petitioner, People‘s Insurance Counsel Division (PICD), a unit within the Office of the Attorney General, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City affirmed both aspects of the Commissioner‘s ruling. On PICD‘s appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court judgment, but its conclusion as to
BACKGROUND
“An insurer may not refuse to issue or renew a contract of ... homeowners insurance ... solely because the subject of the risk or the applicant‘s or insured‘s address is located in a certain geographical area of the State unless:
(1) at least 60 days before the refusal, the insurer has filed with the [Insurance] Commissioner a written statement designating the geographic area; and
(2) the designation has an objective basis and is not arbitrary or unreasonable.”
Title 27 of the Insurance Article deals generally with unfair trade practices in all lines of insurance. Subtitle 5, of which
“(1) An insurer or insurance producer may not cancel or refuse to underwrite or renew a particular insurance risk or class of risk for a reason based wholly or partly on race, color, creed, sex, or blindness of an applicant or policyholder or for any arbitrary, capricious, or unfairly discriminatory reason.
(2) Except as provided in this section, an insurer or insurance producer may nоt cancel or refuse to underwrite or renew a particular risk or class of risk except by the application of standards that are reasonably related to the insurer‘s economic and business purposes.”
On February 13, 2006, Allstate filed with the Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA) a new underwriting rule stating that, from and after April 10, 2006, due to “catastrophe management actions,” it would no longer write new homeowners insurance policies on properties lying within one mile
Allstate agreed to delay the effective date of the new rule until MIA had an opportunity to review it. Thereafter, MIA posed a number of questions to Allstate regarding the filing, which Allstate answered. On May 31, 2007, MIA advised Allstate that it had reviewed the filing under
The hearing was conducted by the Associate Deputy Commissioner (who, for the sake of convenience, we shall refer to as the Commissioner) on December 13 and 14, 2007.2 Three
Most of the evidence presented at the hearing came from the testimony, some of it pre-filed, of three expert witnesses called by Allstate—Robert Newbold, an expert in computer modeling employed by Applied Insurance Research, Inc. (AIR), Ryan Michel, an Allstate actuary, and David Chernick, an expert in actuarial science employed by Milliman, Inc.—along with documents supporting their testimony.
At the hearing, Allstate sought to establish, and, in the view of the Commissioner did establish, several sequential propositions. The first was that managing catastrophic risk presents a unique challenge to insurance companies, for at least two reasons, one dealing with the distribution of the risk and the other dealing with the ability to measure the risk. As to the first, Mr. Michel explained that, for many types of insurance, risk is diversified. The more policies that are written, the less the overall risk in any particular event. Catastrophic risk is different, he said—the more insurance written in a specific area that may be subject to a catastrophic event, the greater
With respect to the ability to measure the risk, Mr. Newbold, in his pre-filed testimony, explained that natural catastrophes can cause devastating damage to homes and businesses. Because such occurrences are rare, however, historical loss data is scarce, making it difficult to estimate losses. From 1900 to 2004, he said, there were only 163 hurricanes that made landfall in the United States. Moreover, given the changing landscape of insured properties, even the historical data that exists has limited usefulness. Rules of thumb based on previous loss experience constitute an inexact approach that may either understate the risk, leaving insureds vulnerable to loss, or overstate the exposure, resulting in an inflated cost.
Mr. Newbold observed that, because of the lack оf reliable information, it has become standard practice for insurance companies to use catastrophe models to anticipate the likelihood and severity of potential future catastrophes before they occur. Those kinds of models can be used to address such questions as where future catastrophes are likely to occur, how big they are likely to be, how often they are likely to occur, what level of loss a company can expect to incur in each year over a long term, and the probability of incurring a large loss in the current year. Many insurance companies, he said, find catastrophe models “to be essential tools for decision making regarding risk selection, ratemaking, underwriting, risk transfer, loss mitigation and portfolio management.”
Mr. Newbold listed a number of advantages to computer modeling:
- It was able to capture the effects on catastrophic loss distribution of changes over time in population patterns, building codes, amounts insured, and construction costs;
- It provides a complete picture of the probable distribution of losses rather than just estimates of probаble maximum losses;
Because simulation models can be tested more easily than other approaches, it leads to greater stability in estimating expected annual losses; - It provides a means to determine the impact of new scientific information; and
- It provides a framework for performing sensitivity analyses and “what-if” studies.
Mr. Michel confirmed some of that testimony. He noted, in regard to pricing, that he does look at historical data but that, for major catastrophes, there was only 100 years of data, which was too small a base to perform a credible loss analysis. By using computer models, they can get 100,000 years of simulated loss experience, which is good not just for Statewide pricing but also for loss characteristics related to hurricanes down to the ZIP Code level. About 10 years earlier, he said, Allstate began using the computer models created by AIR because it provided that level—100,000 years—of simulated loss information.
Mr. Newbold described how the model actually works. We need not recite all of the technical details. The model simulates hurricanes from the genesis point to the point where they no longer generate 40 miles рer hour of wind speed. For each simulated year, it determines the number of landfalls that will occur that year, which is checked against the historical data, and, using a probability distribution, determines the location of landfall. Hurricane severity, he said, depends principally on five variables—minimum central pressure, the radius of maximum winds, the forward speed, the angle at which the storm enters the coast, and the track of the storm after landfall—and values are determined for each of those factors. In essence, that aspect of the model estimates the force to which structures in the subject areas will be exposed.
A second phase of the model estimates the damage likely to be suffered. AIR experts developed mathematical functions that describe the interaction between buildings and their contents and the local intensity to which they are exposed. These “damageability relationships,” incorporating well-docu-
The model is updated annually. The one used by Allstate in this proceeding was Model 7.0, which is used in 28 States, including the entire Eastern Seaboard.
The decision by Allstate to cease writing new property insurance policies in Hurricane Bands 4, 5, and 6 was based on the AIR model. Allstate took the top 5% of events from the AIR model and calculated “damage ratios” for each ZIP Code in the State (as well as in contiguous States). The damage ratio is the amount of annual loss per $1,000 of insurance. Thus, if the expected annual loss is $100 аnd $1,000 of insurance is in force, the damage ratio would be 0.1. Each ZIP Code was assigned to one of six Hurricane Bands based on its damage ratio. The bands were designated so that (1) they comprised contiguous ZIP Codes, (2) the variances between the ZIP Code damage ratios within the band were minimal, and (3) there was maximum variance between the ZIP Codes in the band and those outside it. Allstate then calculated the average modeled loss for a $300,000 home (excluding deductibles) by band and the loss per $1,000 of coverage for the average home in each band as compared to the ratio for the entire State, which it characterized as the “damage ratio relativity.”
This data was presented in the following form:
| Homeowner Band | Average Damage Ratio | Average Hurricane Loss/$300,000 Home | Damage Ratio Relativity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Band 2 | 0.202 | $ 60.60 | 0.65 |
| Band 3 | 0.275 | $ 82.50 | 0.88 |
| Band 4 | 0.442 | $ 132.60 | 1.42 |
| Band 5 | 2.323 | $ 696.90 | 7.47 |
| Band 6 | 4.155 | $1,246.50 | 13.36 |
| Grand Total | 0.311 | $ 93.30 | 1.00 |
What the data from the model thus shows is that the average damage expected in Band 4 for a $300,000 home will be 1.4 times that in the State at large. In Band 5, the damage for such a home will be nearly 7.5 times that in the State at large, and in Band 6, it will be more than 13 times that for the State as a whole.
Mr. Michel and Mr. Chernick both opined that the designation of Hurricane Bands 4, 5, and 6 had an objective basis within the meaning of
Mr. Chernick stated that Allstate could not manage its Maryland catastrophe exposure simply by purchasing reinsurance. In light of the amount of reinsurance that would be needed, given Allstate‘s significant market share, Allstate would need a consortium of 15 to 20 reinsurers, but there is not the capital available to purchase that amount of insurance. After Katrina, the cost of reinsurance soared. In addition, he pointed out that reinsurance is negotiated and purchased on an annual basis, and the market was unstable. “There is no guarantee,” he said, “that reinsurance is going to be available, especially for a company Allstate‘s size, especially at the layers we are talking about here ...” Finally, he observed that the cost of reinsurance would have to be reflected in Allstate‘s рremiums, which would require rate filings and extended regulatory proceedings.
The only witness produced by PICD was Anthony Grippa, an actuarial consultant in Florida. Mr. Grippa admitted that he had no experience whatever in catastrophic models. The Commissioner accepted him as an expert in actuarial science but would not allow him to express any opinion with respect to the model that formed the basis of Allstate‘s amended filing. Mr. Grippa agreed that the designation of the various hurricane bands had an objective basis but contended that the designation was arbitrary or unreasonable because of “the absence of any quantifiable goal in implementing the filings and the absence of any quantitative analysis with respect to the tools.” When asked to elaborate, he said that the goal is catastrophic risk reduction and there was “no measurement that I have seen that compares catastrophic risks to some benchmark, some surplus, some premium fund.” He added that the decision not to write new policies in the designated areas was unreasonable “because there is no showing that it is reasonable.”
When asked about the tools to reduce risk, Mr. Grippa identified four—no new business, non-renewal of existing policies, reinsurance, and higher deductibles—but, when asked which of them, in his opinion, Allstate should have used, he declined to choose, claiming only that Allstate should have shown some reason for the tool it selected. He later agreed that damage ratios were a legitimate means of drawing distinctions between areas of risk and that it was an appropriate actuarial measure to consider variances within the bands and between the bands, as Allstate had done.
Rejecting Allstate‘s contention that
Noting that
In considering whether Allstate had met its burden of showing compliance with both statutes—the third basic issue—the Commissioner addressed a number of points made in PICD‘s post-hearing submission, the principal one being that Allstate had failed to produce statistical evidence showing why cessation of new business would accomplish its economic and
The Commissioner‘s ultimate findings were that (1) the process used by Allstate to arrive at its business decision produced an underwriting decision that is reasonable and supported by reliable data, (2) it therefore complied with
DISCUSSION
Issues; Standards of Review
PICD, the petitioner before us, agrees with the Commissioner that
In Insurance Com‘r for the State v. Engelman, 345 Md. 402, 411, 692 A.2d 474, 479 (1997), we confirmed that “a final order of the [Insurance] Commissioner must be upheld on judicial review if it is legally correct and reasonably supported by the evidentiary record.” We added that, out of deference to agency expertise, “we are required to affirm an agency‘s findings of fact, and its application of law to those facts, if
Application of INS § 27-501(a)
The question of whether
Whether that statute applies and, if so, how it should be interpreted, are questions of law, and, although an agency‘s interpretation and application of a statute that it administers ordinarily is given considerable weight by reviewing courts, the court must make the ultimate legal determination. Thomas v. State Retirement, 420 Md. 45, 54-55, 21 A.3d 1042, 1047 (2011); Grasslands v. Frizz-King, 410 Md. 191, 204, 978 A.2d 622, 629 (2009); AT&T v. Comptroller of Treasury, 405 Md. 83, 92-93, 950 A.2d 86, 92-93 (2008).
After considering the textual language and the legislative history of
There are three strands to Allstate‘s argument. First, it complains that PICD never mentioned
We need not dwell long on Allstate‘s first argument, which was effectively dealt with by the Commissioner. Although PICD did not mention
As noted, both the Commissioner and the Court of Special Appeals examined the legislative and judicial history of
“Where the words of a statute are ambiguous and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, or where the words are clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but become ambiguous when read as part of a larger statutory scheme, a court must resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia....”
In Insurance Commissioner v. Allstate Ins., 268 Md. 428, 302 A.2d 200 (1973), this Court was presented with orders of the Commissioner requiring two insurers to renew individual automobile policies that they had declined to renew based on their insured‘s driving record. The Commissioner had concluded that the non-renewals on that ground were arbitrary,
The legislative response to that decision was swift. In its next (1974) session, in addition to rewriting the statute to repudiate this Court‘s decision, the General Assembly included in the bill, in the form of “Whereas” provisions, a very clear expression of its intended public policy. After reciting what the Court had done, the Legislature declared, in relevant part:
“That the general welfare of the Pеople of Maryland in the vital area of insurance requires that all underwriting decisions of insurers ... with regard to both eligibility and acceptability of applicants for insurance and insureds, be made solely on the basis of reasonable application to relevant facts of underwriting principles, standards and rules that can be demonstrated objectively to measure the probability of a direct and substantial adverse effect upon losses or expenses of the insurer in light of the approved rating plan or plans of the insurer then in effect ...”
and that the general welfare of the People
“is insufficiently assured and inadequately promoted merely upon a showing by insurers ... that their underwriting decisions are made without reasons based in whole or in part upon such irrelevant considerations as race, color, religion or creed, sex, national origin or place of residency and the like.”
1974 Md. Laws, ch. 752 (Emphasis added).
To implement that policy, the Legislature added to
The main thrust of Allstate‘s argument, which found favor in the Court of Special Appeals, is that, even if the forms of prohibited discrimination are broad, they apply only to the refusal to renew or underwrite “a particular insurance risk or class of risk,” which, in St. Paul, this Court held had reference to individual applicants or policyholders or classes of applicants or policyholders. There is, unquestionably, language in the St. Paul opinion that facially supports that argument. We think, however, that St. Paul was dealing with a different set of facts and a different problem and that some of the language the Court used to support its decision in that case does not mandate the result Allstate seeks here.
By the early 1970s, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company had become the predominant supplier of medical malpractice insurance in Maryland, insuring over 85% of the physicians practicing in the State. In 1973, it sought a 59.7% rate increase, but had to settle for an increase of 45.9%, effective January 1, 1974. Within a few months, it sought another increase of 48%, which was denied in May 1974. One month later, it announced that, effective January 1, 1975, it would cease writing any medical malpractice policies in the State. No existing policy would be renewed and no new ones would be written.
On a complaint by one of the insured physicians, the Commissioner, acting under what was then
St. Paul‘s argument was that
The Commissioner‘s view, we noted, would lead to absurd results. It would mean that “no insurer could ever refuse to offer any category of insurance to an individual applicant, even though it had previously never underwritten such coverage” and that every insurance company writing any business in Maryland would be required to write medical malpractice policies. Id., at 141, 143, 339 A.2d at 297-98. The Court‘s ultimate holding was that St. Paul had made a business decision to withdraw from an entire line of insurance and had not discriminated against either an individual physician or a class of physicians, and, for that reason,
That is not what we have before us now. Allstate was not proposing to cease writing homeowners’ insurance in Maryland. It intended to remain very active in that market, including properties that it currently insured in the designated geographic areas. What it determined to do was to refuse to underwrite new business in those areas, which quintessentially constitutes discrimination against a class of applicants—the class being homeowners who live in the designated areas but
Unlike
What is less clear is the scope of the requirement that the designation not be “arbitrary or unreasonable.” If that language is interpreted broadly, it could well include, in the context of examining geographic designations, not just what is in
We can find nothing in either the texts of the two statutes or in their respective legislative histories to suggest an intent on the part of the General Assembly to give an insurer desiring to discriminate against insureds or applicants on a geographic basis a free pass to violate the prohibitions in
Although not precisely articulated as an insufficiency of evidence, the thrust of PICD‘s complaint is essentially that. The Division argues first that, in order to prove that its decision not to write new homeowners policies in the designated areas was reasonably related to its economic and business purposes, as required by
Crumlish involved a decision by an insurer to cancel an automobile liability policy because the insured had two accidents within two years. The notice stated that the insured was 2.93 times as likely to have another accident within the next year as a driver with no prior accidents. At a hearing
The Court of Special Appeals did not need to reach that issue, because it concluded that the Commissioner‘s order was deficient for other reasons, but, in dicta, the Court made clear that conclusory statements that the standard at issue has the required relationship are insufficient. Rather, the insurer must produce facts showing (1) the statistical basis for the asserted relationship, (2) the validity of the statistical evidence, and (3) the direct and adverse effect the asserted increased risk would have on losses and expenses in light of the company‘s current approved rating plan.
PICD contends that this Crumlish dicta governs the analysis required under
In 1998, the General Assembly addressed the issue directly by adding to
That is what the Commissioner did in this case. We already have summarized the testimony given by Messrs. Newbold, Michel, and Chernick that, given the paucity of historical data, insurers throughout the country have found sophisticated computer modeling to be a more accurate predictor of when, where, and how often catastrophic hurricanes will strike particular areas of the country, including Maryland. They described in significant detail how the particular model used by Allstate was devised and tested, what factors it took into account, and how the meteorological conclusions translated into reliable damage estimates. This was not a Crumlish situation. PICD had the opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses, and it did so. The Commissioner found that evidence relevant and compelling, as he had a right to do, and, bаsed on that evidence, concluded that the geographic designations were reasonably related to Allstate‘s economic and business purposes and were not arbitrary or unreasonable. We find no error.
As a final note, Allstate moved to strike certain parts of the record extract and PICD‘s appendix as presenting material outside of the record in the case. PICD is admonished for doing so. As we have not relied on any of that material, there is no need to rule on the motion.
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED; PETITIONER TO PAY THE COSTS.
HARRELL, J., Concurs and Dissents.
HARRELL, J., concurring and dissenting.
History shows again and again
how Nature points out the folly of Man.
Blue Öyster Cult, Godzilla (1977)
In the real Maryland, the real Allstate decided not to write new homeowner‘s insurance policies in nearly one-third of Maryland because of unsubstantiated fear of a hypothetical force of nature, a Category 2 or greater hurricane making landfall in Maryland. Although my opening analogy is silly, it is so intentionally to illustrate my view that the Commissioner‘s and this Court‘s approval of Allstate‘s discriminatory decision is wrongheaded. Recorded history on the subject shows (again and again) that a catastrophic hurricane of the order of magnitude described in Allstate‘s plan justification has not made landfall in Maryland yet. The Commissioner and the Court, nonetheless, approve Allstate‘s decision to cease writing new homeowner‘s insurance policies in the artificial hurricane bands (neatly coinciding with zip-code areas) because Allstate‘s computer models predict such a hypothetical hurricane would make landfall in Maryland every 25,000 years. The basis for this decision is folly. The decision contravenes precedent, which requires insurers to justify the withdrawal of a line of insurance in less than the entire state with a statistical basis grounded in probability, not hypotheticals. The conclusions reached in the majority opinion will transform
I.
In order to reduce its exposure to risk of losses due to a catastrophic hurricane making landfall in Maryland, Allstate decided to cease issuing new homeowner‘s policies in all of St. Mary‘s, Somerset, Talbot, Wicomico, and Worchester Counties and significant swaths of Anne Arundel, Calvert, Charles, Dorchester, Prince George‘s, and Queen Anne‘s Counties. Allstate grounded its decision in hurricane prediction models, which computed a relative risk of а category 2 or higher hurricane making landfall in Maryland four times in 100,000
In 1974, the General Assembly amended then
“be made solely on the basis of a reasonable application to relevant facts of underwriting principles, standards and rules that can be demonstrated objectively to measure the
probability of a direct and substantial adverse effect upon losses or expenses of the insurer in light of the approved rating plan or plans of the insurer then in effect....”
Lumbermen‘s Mut. Cas. Co., 302 Md. at 254, 487 A.2d at 274 (quoting 1974 Md. Laws 752). The preamble is an integral part of the aim of
Crumlish v. Insurance Commissioner, 70 Md.App. 182, 520 A.2d 738 (1987), expanded upon Lumbermen‘s analysis of
Because
Allstate failed to advance a statistical basis, derived from historical meteorological evidence, climate science, and/or actual claims history, that demonstrated the probability of a catastrophic hurricane making landfall in Maryland. Even if it would be difficult or lacking in some other actuarial way to make that effort, merely asserting that difficulty or impression, without making a bona fide effort to marshal the available evidence, should not be good enough to justify moving on to Allstate‘s alternative modeling approach. Allstate justified its decision based on hypothetical hurricanes, i.e., computer models based on the worst 5% of hurricanes that made landfall in North Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware, but not Maryland.6
Allstate justified its decision using the relative risk of hypothetical hurricanes and thus failed to justify its “no-write” decision for new policies and to show the current rating plan would fail to compensate Allstate sufficiently should it continue to write policies in the hurricane bands. Allstate fails also to illuminate why there is an increased risk of a catastrophic hurricane. If the science of climate change is at the bottom of its worries, Allstate does not say so. Finally, Allstate‘s decision enlarges considerably the portion of Maryland where Allstate will not write new homeowner‘s policies. Previously, Allstate excluded only those properties within one mile of the Atlantic Ocean. Allstate‘s new policy excludes properties as far inland as 60 miles from the Atlantic Ocеan (approximately one-third of Maryland), including cities such as Cambridge, Prince Frederick, and Leonardtown. Allstate should not be allowed to implement its new plan until it shoulders its statistical burden of showing probability.
The majority opinion excuses the Commissioner‘s failure to find fatal Allstate‘s lack of probabilistic evidence by distinguishing the Crumlish line of cases. It relies on Mirkin v. Med. Mut., 82 Md.App. 540, 572 A.2d 1126 (1990) and Miller v. Ins. Comm‘r, 70 Md.App. 355, 521 A.2d 761 (1987), as authority for the supposition that the Crumlish analysis is not a standing requirement applicable to every underwriting stan-
In Mirkin, the insurer cancelled Dr. Mirkin‘s professional liability insurance because he altered a patient‘s billing records, a fact discovered during a malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Mirkin. 82 Md.App. at 546-47, 572 A.2d at 1129-30. In Miller, the insurer cancelled Miller‘s professional liability insurance because he made material misrepresentations on his application for the insurance. 70 Md.App. at 361, 521 A.2d at 764. Drs. Mirkin and Miller posited that cancelling insurance because the insureds made misrepresentations is not an underwriting standard reasonably related to the insurers’ economic and business purposes. The panels of the intermediate appellate court rejected their arguments because cancelling an insurance policy because the insureds mislead the insurers is a underwriting standard incapable of objective justification, but nonetheless related reasonably to the insurers’ economic and business purposes. Mirkin, 82 Md.App. at 551, 572 A.2d at 1132 (citing to Miller, 70 Md.App. at 368-70, 521 A.2d at 768-69). The Legislature codified the Mirkin and Miller exception as
Mirkin and Miller are inapposite to the present case. Unlike Drs. Mirkin and Miller, homeowners in Southern Maryland and the Eastern Shore obviously did not act inten-
The majority opinion finds refuge (unsuccessfully, in my view) in
In the case of homeowner‘s insurance, standards reasonably related to an insurer‘s econоmic and business purpose under
subsection (a)(2) of this section, include, but are not limited to, the following and do not require statistical validation:... any other standard approved by the Commissioner that is based on factors that adversely affect the losses or expenses of the insurer under its approved rating plan and for which statistical validation is unavailable or is unduly burdensome to produce[.]
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand this case to that court with directions to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and to remand the case further to the Insurance Commissioner with further directions to vacate his decision and conduct further proceedings consistent with this concurring and dissenting opinion. Allstate should be given the opportunity, if it wishes to seize it, to produce proper evidence to justify its new plan.
36 A.3d 483
ALPHA GRAPHIC
v.
Patricia THOMPSON.
No. 112, Sept. Term, 2011.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Jan. 25, 2012.
Paul J. Orfanedes (Judicial Watch, Inc.), Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
No submission on behalf of Respondent.
Submitted before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS and BARBERA, JJ.