5 Utah 598 | Utah | 1888
The defendant moves tbe court to quash the alternative writ of mandamus issued in this case. It is alleged in the petition that the relator, S. C. Haller, was entitled to receive from the territory the fees due him as a witness before the grand jury; that the defendant, the auditor of the territory, refused to audit them, for the reason that a statute made it the duty of a court commissioner to audit and pay the claim; that said law purports to have been approved March 8, 1888; but that the same in fact was not passed or approved until the 10th day of that month; and that the session of the legislature expired by limitation, at 12 o’clock, midnight, on the 8th day of the month. The defendant moves the court to quash the writ, because the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. An act amending section 1852 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, in force December 23, 1880, declares that the sessions of the legislative assemblies of “the several territories of the United States shall be limited to 60 days’ duration.” It appears that the 60 days in this case expired on March 8th. After the expiration of the 60 days, the legislature had no power to pass any bill, nor had the governor any power to approve such bill. The date of the passage and approval of the bill must be ascertained by the court. The court must take judicial notice of the evidence of the passage and approval of legislative enactments. No issue of fact as to the passage or approval of them, or as to their date, can be made upon which the parties may offer evidence. "Whenever such a question arises, the court, in deciding the issue, should take judicial notice of such facts as it may properly consider. The evidence of public laws should be preserved in public and permanent records. The facts upon which their existence depends should be accessible to all, because all are required to . know them, in order to make their transactions and their conduct conform to them; and such records should be preserved until the time has passed during which reference to them may be necessary. The authenticity of laws should not be intrusted to the memory of individuals. There
Tbe case of Gardner v. Collector, 6 Wall., 499, is cited in support of tbe proposition tbat tbe court may look back of tbe statute book, and tbe original engrossed bill on file in tbe office of tbe secretary of state, and even beyond tbe journals kept by tbe two bouses. In tbat case tbe president omitted tbe year in attempting to give tbe date of bis approval of tbe act questioned. Two propositions were insisted upon — First, tbat tbe president alone could m'ake tbe record to show tbe date of bis approval; second, tbat if such record was defective in respect to tbe year, no resort could be bad to extrinsic evidence to supply tbat defect. Tbe court held tbat no provision of tbe constitution and no act of Congress imposed on tbe president tbe duty of affixing a date to his signature of a bill, and tbat tbe court might look to tbe date of tbe filing of tbe bill “in tbe office of tbe secretary of state, and tbe journals of tbe House of Bepresentatives showing tbat a message was received from tbe president January 6,1862, stating that on tbe 24th day of tbe preceding month be had approved the bill.”
These extrinsic facts were not received to contradict a record made by tbe president, because be bad made none as to tbe date, nor to suppty a record tbat be was required to make, because tbe law did not impose such a duty upon him. In tbe opinion tbe case of Fowler v. Peirce, supra, was cited in support of tbe proposition
In tbe case of Berry v. Railroad Co., 41 Md., 446, tbe bill, as it passed tbe legislature, extended tbe time for the completion of tbe road mentioned in tbe act for five years from tbe 1st day of January, 1875, but as it appeared in tbe printed statute book, tbe extension was for five years from tbe 1st day of January, 1870. The question was’ ought tbe court, in its investigations, to look behind tbe
The plaintiff also contends that tbe naming of tbe court commissioners in the act was an attempt to. appoint territorial officers contrary to section: 1857 of the Revised Statutes of the United 'States. That section is as follows: “All township, district and county officers, ■ except justices of the peace and general officers of the militia, shall be appointed or elected in such manner as may be provided by