PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN v. ERICK ROSEAN ALLEN
No. 343225
October 1, 2019
Monroe Circuit Court LC No. 17-243894-FH
FOR PUBLICATION
Before: BECKERING, P.J., and SAWYER and CAMERON, JJ.
CAMERON, J. (concurring).
This case poses a straightforward question: are parolees entitled to receive credit for the time they serve in jail under
Jail credit is governed by
Whenever any person is hereafter convicted of any crime within this state and has served any time in jail prior to
sentencing because of being denied or unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted, the trial court in imposing sentence shall specifically grant credit against the sentence for such time served in jail prior to sentencing.
Therefore, the plain and unambiguous language of
However, in People v Idziak, 484 Mich 549; 773 NW2d 616 (2009), our Supreme Court held that the jail credit statute does not apply to parolees.
More specifically, the Idziak Court held the following:
[W]e hold that the jail credit statute does not apply to a parolee who is convicted and sentenced to a new term of imprisonment for a felony committed while on parole because, once arrested in connection with the new felony, the parolee continues to serve out any unexpired portion of his earlier sentence unless and until discharged by the Parole Board. For that reason, he remains incarcerated regardless of whether he would otherwise be eligible for bond before conviction on the new offense. He is incarcerated not “because of being denied or unable to furnish bond” for the new offense, but for an independent reason. Therefore, the jail credit statute,
MCL 769.11b , does not apply. [Idziak, 484 Mich at 562-563.]
In other words, the time a parolee serves in jail before being sentenced on a new offense can only be credited against the balance of the parolee’s remaining prison sentence—never to the sentence of the new offense that actually caused the defendant to be incarcerated in jail. The Idziak Court’s rationale for not applying the jail credit statute for parolees is based on the notion that parolees are always considered to be under the jurisdiction of the Michigan Department of Correction (MDOC); and, when parolees are arrested for a new offense, they automatically resume serving the balance of their prison sentence. See Idziak, 484 Mich at 564-565. Thus, the Idziak Court reasoned that any time parolees are incarcerated for a new offense, they are incarcerated not because they were “denied or unable to furnish bond” for the new offense of which they are convicted, but instead because they have actually resumed serving their prison sentence. See id. at 566. Under this framework, a parolee is continually serving his or her sentence until he or she has fulfilled the maximum sentence or is discharged from parole.1
The prosecution’s argument that defendant is entitled to partial jail credit under
In practice, this means that jails will not release parolees with a parole detainer regardless of whether the parolees have furnished the bond necessary for their release. The prosecution argues that when a parole detainer is placed on a parolee, the jail credit statute simply does not apply because the parolee is being held in jail on the parole detainer, not “because of being denied or unable to furnish bond.”
However, as this case demonstrates, the MDOC does not always choose to place a detainer when a parolee is arrested for a new offense. In this case, the MDOC chose not to immediately place a detainer on defendant when he was arrested for committing a new offense while on parole. Instead, the MDOC opted to allow defendant the opportunity to complete a drug rehabilitation program. Because the district court issued defendant a personal recognizance bond, defendant was released from jail the following day, and he began participating in the program. However, after defendant missed several court dates, the district court issued a warrant for defendant’s arrest. Defendant was rearrested and served an additional 15 days in jail that was, according to the prosecution, “for no other reason than his inability to furnish bond.” Defendant eventually posted bond and was released from jail to again participate in drug treatment. He was arrested less than a week later because he tested positive for cocaine. The MDOC placed a parole detainer on defendant the same day, and it remained in effect until the
Although not addressed in Idziak, there is a considerable difference between MDOC arrest warrants issued under
time of defendant’s sentencing.4 On appeal, the prosecution “concedes . . . that [defendant] is entitled to [17 days of jail credit] as there was no parole detainer at that time and [defendant] was being held solely because he could not furnish bond.”
While I believe that the prosecution’s argument is entirely consistent with the plain and unambiguous language of the jail credit statute, I must concur with the majority that Idziak’s holding allows no room to apply
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
Notes
A prisoner violating the provisions of his or her parole and for whose return a warrant has been issued by the deputy director of the bureau of field services is treated as an escaped prisoner and is liable, when arrested, to serve out the unexpired portion of his or her maximum imprisonment. The time from the date of the declared violation to the date of the prisoner’s availability for return to an institution shall not be counted as time served. The warrant of the deputy director of the bureau of field services is a sufficient warrant authorizing all officers named in the warrant to detain the paroled prisoner in any jail of the state until his or her return to the state penal institution. [
MCL 791.238(2) .]