PEOPLE v RAJPUT
Docket No. 158866
Michigan Supreme Court
Decided January 24, 2020
Syllabus
Chief Justice:
Bridget M. McCormack
Chief Justice Pro Tem:
David F. Viviano
Justices:
Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
Richard H. Bernstein
Elizabeth T. Clement
Megan K. Cavanagh
This syllаbus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
Reporter of Decisions:
Kathryn L. Loomis
PEOPLE v RAJPUT
Docket No. 158866. Decided January 24, 2020.
Nadeem Y. Rajput was convicted in the Wayne Circuit Court, Qiana D. Lillard, J., of second-degree murder,
In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal and without hearing oral argument, held:
1. Jury instructions cannot exclude a defendant’s theory of self-defense if evidence exists to support it. In this case, the trial court committed legal error when it denied defendant’s requested self-defеnse instruction on the basis of the proposition that a defendant who claims that another person committed the homicide is not entitled to a self-defense instruction. The opinion in Droste was inapposite because the defendant in that case did not claim that the principal acted in self-defense. Furthermоre, the Court of Appeals engaged in improper fact-finding when it held that defendant and Haus were the initial aggressors and could have fled. Defendant argued that he did not seek out the victim to harm her but rather to question her regarding the identity of the shooter and the reason for the shooting. According to defendant, people in a red Malibu had previously shot at a vacant home next to his home. Additionally, the Court of Appeals failed to identify any evidence supporting its theory that defendant could have fled at the time he and Haus confronted the victim. Defendant argued that the victim had a gun, and the police did find a gun in the front seat of the victim’s car. Regardless of the merits of this defense, whether defendant and Haus were the initial aggressors or could have fled were issues for the jury to decide because defendant presented sufficient evidence to satisfy his burden of proof on self-defense. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals еrred by affirming the denial of defendant’s requested self-defense instruction.
2. MRE 401 provides that relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. MRE 402 provides that all relevant evidence is generally admissible. In this case, the Court of Appeals erred by finding Carr’s testimony irrelevant. Carr’s testimony was relevant because it addressed a material issue—the issue of self-defense. In particular, it addressed whether the victim had reached for the gun found in her сar as defendant and Haus approached her. And Carr’s testimony had probative value because it had some tendency to make it more likely that the victim reached for a gun when instructed by Clay to “shoot, shoot” and that Haus responded in self-defense. Finally, because the Court of Appeals made an improper factual finding that defendant and Haus were the initial aggressors and could have fled, it also erred by finding Carr’s testimony irrelevant for this reason.
Reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals.
©2020 State of Michigan
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NADEEM YOUSAF RAJPUT, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 158866
Michigan Supreme Court
FILED January 24, 2020
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
We consider whether defendant, Nadeem Yousaf Rajput, was entitled to his requested self-defense instruction and whether the triаl court erred by refusing to admit testimony related to defendant’s theory of self-defense.
On May 7, 2016, defendant was driving his vehicle with another man known only as Haus. At the same time, the victim, Lakeisha Henry, was driving a red Malibu with her boyfriend, Dewayne Clay, as a passenger. The Malibu approached defendant’s vehicle,
and two individuals in the Mаlibu fired gunshots at defendant and Haus. No one was injured. Rather than immediately confront the Malibu after it drove off, defendant and Haus first returned to defendant’s home. Soon after, however, they left and went in search of the Malibu. By the time they found it, the victim was the sole occupant. Defendant and Haus chased the Malibu, evеntually trapping it, and then approached the Malibu on foot. An argument ensued, and multiple gunshots were fired, resulting in the victim’s death.
At trial, defendant argued that Haus had shot the victim but that Haus had done so in self-defense when the victim reached for a gun in her vehicle. Defendant requested that a self-defense instruction be reаd to the jury, but the trial court denied his request, citing People v. Droste, 160 Mich. 66; 125 NW 87 (1910), for the proposition that a defendant who claims that another person committed the homicide is not entitled to a self-defense instruction. Defendant also tried to admit testimony from Pierre Carr, the brother of Clay, to support his self-defense theory. Carr testified at an investigative-subpoena hearing that Clay had arrived at his house on the day of the shooting and called the victim on the phone as she was being chased. According to Carr, Clay told the victim to “shoot, shoot.” The trial court refused to admit the testimony, finding it irrelevant. The jury convicted defendant of second-degree murder,
curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 25, 2018 (Docket No. 339117), p 5. The Court of Appeals also held that Carr’s testimony was irrelevant. Id. at 5-6.
We reverse the Court of Appeals’ holding that defendant was not entitled to his requested self-defense instruction and that Carr’s testimony was irrelevant, and we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of this opinion.
⁂
The first issue is whether defendant was entitled to his requested self-defense instruction. “If supported by the evidence, defendant’s theory of the case must be given.” People v. Hoskins, 403 Mich. 95, 100; 267 NW2d 417 (1978), citing People v. Reed, 393 Mich. 342, 350; 224 NW2d 867 (1975). And “[o]nce a defendant satisfies the initial burden of producing some evidence frоm which a jury could conclude that the elements necessary to establish a prima facie defense of self-defense exist, the prosecution bears the burden of disproving the affirmative defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Dupree, 486 Mich. 693, 712; 788 NW2d 399 (2010). The sufficiency of the evidence of a defendant’s self-defense theory is “for the jury to decide under proper instructions . . . .” Hoskins, 403 Mich. at 100. Those instructions cannot exclude the theory of self-defense “if there is evidence to support [it].” Reed, 393 Mich. at 350. We review the trial court’s determination that the jury instruction was inapplicable for an abuse of discretion. Dupree, 486 Mich. at 702. “A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” People v. Duncan, 494 Mich. 713, 723; 835 NW2d 399 (2013).
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court’s reason for denying defendant’s requested self-defense instruction was wrong. According to the trial court,
defendant’s claim that Haus shot the victim precluded an instruction on self-defense. But an aider and abettor is relieved of liability if the principal acted in self-defense. See People v. Pearce, 369 Mich. 692, 695; 120 NW2d 838 (1963). Our opinion in Droste is inapposite because in that case the defendant did not claim that the principal acted in self-defense. Droste, 160 Mich. at 80 (holding that no self-defense instruction was warranted when the defendant claimed that someone else had committed the homicide and the defendant had not requested a self-defense instruction). Therefore, the trial court made a legal error that amounted to an abuse of discretion.
But we also hold that the Court of Appeals engaged in improper fact-finding when it held that defendant and Haus were the initial aggressors and could have fled instead of responding with deadly force when the victim allegedly reached for a weapon. First, “an initial aggressor (i.e., one who is the first to use deadly force against the other) . . . is generally not entitled to use deadly force in self-defense.” People v. Riddle, 467 Mich. 116, 120 n 8; 649 NW2d 30 (2002). Though the Court of Appeals determined that defendant was an initial aggressor, defеndant argued that he did not seek out the victim to harm her. Instead, he testified that he pursued the victim only to find out who was shooting at him and why.
determined that defendant could have fled at the time he and Haus confronted the victim. But the Court failed to point to any evidence supporting this theory. Defendant, on the other hand, testified that the victim had reached for a gun in the car and that Haus reacted to this in self-defense; the police did find a gun in the front passenger seat of the victim’s car, which could lend support to defendant’s version of events. Regardless of the merits of this defense, whether defendant and Haus were the initial aggressors or could have fled were issues “for the jury to decide” because defendant presented sufficient evidence to sаtisfy his burden of proof on self-defense. Hoskins, 403 Mich. at 100. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the denial of defendant’s requested self-defense instruction.
⁂
The second issue is whether Carr’s testimony was relevant to defendant’s theory of self-defense. Under MRE 401, “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable” is relevant. Accordingly, evidence is relevant if it is material and has probative value. See People v. Crawford, 458 Mich. 376, 388; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). “Materiality is the requirement that the proffered evidence be related to ‘any fact that is of сonsequence’ to the action.” Id., quoting MRE 401. And evidence has probative value when it “tends ‘to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.’ ” Crawford, 458 Mich. at 389-390, quoting MRE 401. This “threshold is minimal: ‘any’ tendency is sufficient probativе force.” Crawford, 458 Mich. at 390, quoting MRE 401. Finally, all relevant
evidence is generally admissible. MRE 402. We review evidentiary decisions under MRE 401 for an abuse of discretion. See People v. Denson, 500 Mich. 385, 396; 902 NW2d 306 (2017).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, finding the evidence irrelevant.1 It found that “even if Clay told [the victim] to shoot at defendant, that does not make it any more or less likely that [the victim] actuаlly shot at defendant.” Rajput, unpub op at 6. The Court also found Carr’s testimony irrelevant “because defendant and Haus were the initial aggressors in pursuing [the victim]” and, as a result, “defendant was not justified in responding with deadly force even if we assume that [the victim] actually fired a gun at defendant at some point during the incident.” Id. We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion. Carr’s testimony was relevant because it addressed a material issue—the issue of self-defense. In particular, it addressed whether the victim had reached for the gun found in her car as defendant and Haus approached her. And Carr’s testimony
⁂
We reverse the Court of Appeals’ holdings that defendant was not entitled to his requested self-defense instruction and that Carr’s testimony was irrelevant. We remand this case to the Court of Appeals to addrеss whether the trial court’s erroneous denial of defendant’s requested self-defense instruction was harmless or whether “it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative.” See People v. Lukity, 460 Mich. 484, 496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). The Court of Appeals shall also address whether Carr’s investigative-subpoena testimony was admissible under MRE 804(b)(1) and whether Clаy’s statement to the victim was admissible either as an excited utterance under MRE 803(2) or because it was not hearsay under MRE 801(c). If the panel concludes that the evidence was admissible, it shall consider whether exclusion of Carr’s testimony was harmless or whether it is more probable than not that the error was outcomе-determinative. See Lukity, 460 Mich. at 496.
Finally, although he was charged with first-degree murder, the jury acquitted defendant of that charge. At sentencing, the trial court noted defendant’s guidelines minimum sentence range of 225 to 375 months but departed upward. In doing so, the trial court remarked that defendant appeared to be guilty of first-degree murder, not second, and suggested that the jury verdict might have been a compromise. If the Court of Appeals affirms defendant’s conviction, it shall reconsider the trial court’s sentence in light of People v. Beck, 504 Mich. 679 (2019) (Docket No. 152934); slip op
at 2 (“Once acquitted of a given crime, it violates due process to sentence the defendant as if he committed that very same crime.”).2
We do not retain jurisdiction.
Bridget M. McCormack
Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
David F. Viviano
Richard H. Bernstein
Elizabeth T. Clement
Megan K. Cavanagh