The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee, In the Interest of M.C., Minor Child-Appellant, And Concerning, V.C., Respondent.
No. 86CA0708.
Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. II.
Sept. 10, 1987.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 8, 1987.
Certiorari Granted (People) Feb. 22, 1988.
We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to that court to be returned to the Industrial Claim Appeals Office for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.
ERICKSON and MULLARKEY, JJ., do not participate.
Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Timothy E. Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for petitioner-appellee.
David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Victor Reyes, Deputy State Public Defender, Pueblo, for minor child appellant.
M.C. appeals the order of the district court denying his Crim.P. 35(c) motion to vacate an illegal sentence. We affirm.
At age seventeen, M.C. admitted the allegations of a delinquency petition that asserted he had been in possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, and he was adjudicated a delinquent child. Prior to the dispositional hearing, he turned eighteen, and, pursuant to
M.C. subsequently filed a Crim.P. 35(c) motion alleging that this sentence was illegal and a violation of his right to equal protection of the laws because the maximum possible penalty an adult could receive for committing the same act was a $100 fine. The court denied the motion and this appeal followed.
We reject M.C.‘s contention that the sentence imposed represents a denial of equal protection in that it differs from the maximum penalty that an adult may receive for the act of possession of less than one ounce of marijuana.
The right to equal protection under the law guarantees that all parties who are similarly situated will receive like treatment by the law. People in Interest of D.G., 733 P.2d 1199 (Colo.1987). Accordingly, the first prerequisite to a meritorious equal protection claim is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects similarly situated groups in an unequal manner. In re Eric J., 25 Cal.3d 522, 159 Cal.Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549 (1979). That is not the case here.
In spite of the fact that M.C. was eighteen at the time of the dispositional hearing, he was only seventeen at the time he committed the act complained of and therefore was a child subject to the provisions of the Children‘s Code. See
Merely because the General Assembly has decided that eighteen would be the age after which an individual‘s actions would be considered those of an adult does not change the fact that when M.C. committed this act, he was seventeen and was, therefore, subject to the different treatment the General Assembly has determined is appropriate for children who commit acts, which if committed by an adult would be crimes.
The fact that children who are adjudicated delinquent and adults who are convicted of crimes are not similarly situated is evident when provisions of the Children‘s Code are compared with provisions of the Colorado Criminal Code. For example, the expressed philosophies of sentencing an adult under the criminal code are very different than those to be applied when disposition of a delinquent child is being considered. See
The Children‘s Code‘s sole emphasis is on rehabilitating children, assisting them in becoming responsible and productive members of society, and preventing them, while at an impressionable and vulnerable age, from becoming criminals. See
Finally, a delinquency adjudication is a status determination as opposed to the conviction of a crime. The status of being a delinquent child is the same for all children so adjudicated, irrespective of, and without relation to the specific acts committed. A child adjudicated as delinquent is not a criminal, and the disposition of such child is designed only to modify his behavior to such an extent that he no longer qualifies for delinquent status.
It is true that the General Assembly has provided dispositional alternatives for children such as M.C. who are eighteen years of age or over at the time of their dispositional hearing but who have been adjudicated delinquent for an act committed prior to their eighteenth birthday. See
Therefore, we hold that juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent and adults who are convicted of crimes are not similarly situated even when the disposition of a juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent occurs after his eighteenth birthday.
We are fully aware that this holding is not in accord with People in Interest of A.L., 713 P.2d 934 (Colo.App.1985). There, A.L. was found by a jury to have committed the act of unlawful possession of not more than one ounce of marijuana, a class two petty offense if committed by an adult. See
While our holding in the instant case may seem to impose a harsh result when applied to circumstances such as were present in People in Interest of A.L., supra, we point out that within the children‘s code there are means available to juveniles to challenge the propriety of the court‘s dispositional order. Further, we note that when
Finally, even were we to accept M.C.‘s argument that these classifications are similarly situated and that, because probation implicates a liberty interest, the state must have a compelling interest to justify the classification, his equal protection claim would, nevertheless, still fail. To us, it is obvious that the State‘s interests relative to preventing delinquent children from becoming adult criminals are indeed compelling ones. Hence, the different treatment accorded juvenile offenders does not violate constitutional precepts requiring equal protection. See
Accordingly, the order denying M.C.‘s motion is affirmed.
KELLY, J., concurs.
TURSI, J., dissents.
TURSI, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The disposition in this matter was entered on March 27, 1986. On December 12, 1985, this court vacated a similar disposition entered by this trial court in People in Interest of A.L., 713 P.2d 934 (Colo.App.1985). Not only was the holding of A.L. binding upon the trial court, it was well reasoned and the authorities cited therein were persuasive.