delivered the opinion of the court:
The appellant filed objections to the application of the collector of Fayette county for judgment against its property for taxes, sоme of which were overruled, and from the judgment rendered an appeal has been taken.
The levy for county taxes included $3000 “for printing and publishing,” and it is insisted that this item is too indefinite and embraces more than one purpose, and is therefore void. In People v. Cairo, Vincennes and Chicago Railway Co.
The county levy included $2800 to pay for the сonstruction of State aid roads, and the same objection is made to this item as was made in People v. Kankakee and Seneca Railroad Co.
Another item objected to was, $10,000 “to pay the salaries of county officers.” It is insisted that the cоunty judge, county superintendent of highways and the probation officer, whose salaries amount to $2500, were the only officers whose salaries could be paid from the county treasury. To these should be added the State’s attorney, whose salary was $2500. Besides these, testimony was introduced to show that the other officers of the county, and their salaries, were as follows: County clerk, circuit clerk, sheriff and superintendent of schools, each $2000; treasurer, $1500; janitor, $480; coronеr, $400; superintendent of county farm, $300; matron of county farm, $150; members of board of review, $600. The salaries of the county clerk, circuit clerk, sheriff and treasurer arе payable only out of fees earned and collected by them. It is true that if they do not earn and collect, from other sources than the county, feеs sufficient to pay their salaries they will be entitled to collect from the county fees for services rendered to the county to. an amount equal to thе deficiencies in their salaries if they have earned fees from the county to that amount. But the amount will not be collected as salary but as fees eаrned by services rendered, the same as fees are earned by services to individuals, and must be accounted for to the county as a part-of the earnings of their respective offices. The county may become liable to pay these fees but cannot lawfully pay the salaries of these officеrs, and cannot, therefore, levy taxes for this purpose. The salary of the superintendent of schools is payable from the State school fund. The cоroner receives no salary from the county. The janitor, superintendent and matron of the county farm are none of them county officers, and a separate item of the levy covered the pay of the members of the board of review. The item for the payment of salaries of county officers was excessive to the amount of $5000, and a proportionate amount should have been deducted from the amount for which judgment was rendered against the appellant’s property.
Objection was made to the road and bridge tax of the towns of Carson and Hurricane on the ground that no semiannual meeting of the highway commissioners was held, as required by section 50 of the Road law, between the first Tuesday in August and the first Tuesday in September, for the purpose of determining the tax rate to be certified to the county board. By section 56 a regular meeting is also required to be held on the first Tuesday in September, at which the highway commissioners are required, annually, to determine and certify to the board of supervisors the amount necessary to be raised by taxation for the proper сonstruction, maintenance and repair of roads and bridges. This requirement was contained in the law prior to July 1, 1913, and it was held that it was mandatory, and that the commissioners had no power to levy a tax.at any other time than the day fixed by the law. The provision was intended for the protection of the tax-payer, аnd the exact time was fixed by law for the purpose of giving those interested a hearing if they desired it. A construction which would permit the board to meet at anоther time and levy the tax would, in effect, deny persons interested the right to be heard, and such an unauthorized meeting affects the substantial justice of the tax. (Chicаgo and Northwestern Railway Co. v. People,
An objection was made to the road and bridge tax of the town of Ramsey that the' highway commissioners did not hold a meeting оn the first Tuesday in September and did not at such meeting determine and certify to the county board the amount necessary to be raised by taxation for road аnd bridge purposes. This objection was not sustained by the evidence. On the contrary, the appellant proved by one of the commissioners, without objeсtion, that such a meeting was held and such a certificate was made, and the certificate was received in evidence. No objection was made to this method of proof. The further objection was made to a part of the road and bridge tax of this township that the highway commissioners certified that $1026 had been agreed upon, allowed or awarded as damages for laying out, widening, altering or vacating roads and for ditching to drain roads, whereas no amount hаd been agreed upon. The evidence consisted of the record of the highway commissioners and the testimony of one of them, from which it appeаred that from January 1, 1913, to the first Tuesday in September, when the meeting was held, $100 had been awarded for the purposes mentioned. The fiscal year extended from the first Tuesday in September, 1912, to the first Tuesday in September, 1913, and evidently this evidence failed to disprove the allowance during this period of time of the amount certified to. The objection was properly overruled.
Judgment was improperly entered against all the prop^ erty of the appellant in the сounty instead of the town of Bowling Green for the road and bridge tax of Bowling Green township.
The judgment of the county court is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to sustain the objections to the road and bridge taxes of the towns of Carson and Hurricane and to the proportionate amount of the cоunty tax indicated in this opinion, and to render judgment for the remainder of the county tax and for the road and bridge taxes of the towns of Ramsey and Bowling Green against the property of the appellant in the county and in those towns, respectively.
Reversed in part and remanded, with directions.