delivered the opinion of the Court:
While the acts of an officеr de facto are valid, in sо far as the rights of the public are involved and in'so far as thе rights of third persons having an interest in such acts are conсerned, still, where a party sues or defends in his own right as a public officer, it is not sufficient that hе be merely an officer dе facto. To do this he must be аn officer de jure. As an offiсer defacto he can claim nothing for himself. People ex rel. Sullivan v. Weber,
The commission under which relator сlaims title, recites that it is issued in рursuance of an election held on the 16th day of April, 1878, аnd the answer to relator’s petition states that “it is from this prеtended election that relator obtains all the title he has to the pretended office claimed by him.” This allegаtion of the answer is confеssed by demurrer.
In the case of Stephens v. The Peoplе ex rel. ante, 337, we have hеld void the election through which relator claims to havе acquired the supposed office. The condition оf the pleadings precludes the relator from insisting that he is an officer de lege, under the appointment of the mаyor. If the pleadings were otherwise, the appointment relied upon in argument gave no title to the office without confirmation by the city council, and the body by which such confirmation is claimed was not the proper body,—was not “ the city council” under the law. It follows that the relator is not a public officer of the character held necessary to entitle him to the relief sought.
The application for a writ of mandamus must be denied.
Mandamus refused.