36 N.E.2d 351 | Ill. | 1941
Upon application of the county collector of Franklin county for judgment for 1939 delinquent taxes appellant, Guy A. Thompson, trustee of the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, objected to a levy of 84 cents on the $100 in Non-High School District No. 107 for the purpose of paying interest and retirements for the year 1939 on $132,000 of bonds. The amount of tax was $687.86. In addition to the tax levy for bonds a levy of 75 cents on the *246 $100 was made for educational purposes, making a total levy for Non-High School District No. 107 of $1.59 on the $100. Appellant paid the educational tax, but objected to the bond purpose tax. Its objections were overruled and judgment entered against it. The appeal comes directly to this court because the revenue is involved.
The tax was levied by the non-high school board of education for district 107 of Franklin county. The educational levy was for $40,000, which took the entire 75-cent rate authorized by law. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, chap. 122, par. 102.) The only authority for the issuance of the $132,000 in bonds was a resolution of the non-high school board of education for district 107 on April 7, 1939. The act of April 12, 1937 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, chap. 122, par. 102d) authorized any non-high school district until January 1, 1938, to issue bonds for the purpose of paying unpaid tuition claims or judgments obtained against a non-high school district, or other claims against said district. No election was ever held in the school district authorizing the issuance of the bonds involved, as required by paragraph 102d, supra.
The contention of appellant is that a non-high school district, at the time of the levy here involved, was limited to a levy of 75 cents on the $100, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, chap. 122, par. 102,) and that no authority existed in April, 1939, to issue non-high school bonds. Appellee, on the other hand, contends that such non-high school district was authorized to issue bonds under the act of 1937 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, chap. 122, par. 327.56) which authorized any school district, operating under general law or special charter, having a population of 200,000 or less, until July 1, 1939, to issue bonds for the purpose of paying orders issued for the wages of teachers or the payment of claims against such district.
Appellee also claims that the judgment of the county court was proper because of a validating act enacted in *247
1939. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, chap. 122, par. 406.10.) Under the statute in effect on April 7, 1939, the power of a non-high school district to levy taxes was limited to 75 cents on the $100 valuation. A local governmental body has no inherent power to issue bonds, and, in the absence of statutory authority, such power does not exist. (People v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicagoand St. Louis Railway Co.
The resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds in question contains a recital that it is pursuant to authority of "an act to authorize school districts having a population of 200,000 or less to issue bonds for the payment of orders issued for wages of teachers," etc. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, chap. 122, par. 327.56.) This leads us to a consideration of whether this statute applies to non-high school districts, the appellant claiming that it is limited to school districts other than non-high school districts, while appellee claims that because a non-high school district has been considered as properly a part of the system of free schools authorized by the constitution,(People v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis RailwayCo.
These differences in the statute indicate clearly that paragraphs 327.56-327.61 have no application to non-high school districts because (1) an election is necessary for *249 non-high school districts, and is only necessary in other districts if required by a petition of the voters; (2) the authority to issue such bonds expired January 1, 1938, for non-high school districts, and July 1, 1939, for other districts; (3) the resolution authorizing bonds for non-high school districts is filed in one county, as a non-high school district does not extend beyond county lines; for other schools the resolution is filed in each county in which a district exists, as a school district under the general law may be in parts of one or more counties; (4) non-high school districts are only authorized to levy 75 cents on the $100 whereas district schools may levy $1 for educational and 38 cents for buildings under section 189 of the School law, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, chap. 122, par. 212,) unless, under special circumstances, more is authorized by a vote of the people; (the reference in paragraph 327.59 to the bond tax being in excess of the limitations of section 189 clearly has reference to the district school tax) and (5) the bonds authorized for non-high school districts are for the payment oftuition, and the bonds authorized by paragraph 327.56 are for the payment of wages of teachers. Non-high school districts do not have teachers, but only pay tuition to the high school districts to which they send their pupils.
Acts enacted at the same session of the legislature must be considered in pari materia, so that both acts, if possible, may be given effect. (People v. Village of Oak Park,
Appellee relies upon the validating act enacted May 5, 1939. (Laws of 1939, page 1082.) There are several requirements contained in this validating act to which the acts and proceedings of Non-High School District No. 107 did not conform. We do not notice the particulars in this respect, because as pointed out above, such district did not conform in any way to the provisions of paragraph 102d, supra, and was not authorized, by the provisions of paragraphs 327-56-327.61, supra, to issue bonds. Such being the case the validating act relied upon attempts to make bonds legal and lawful, which, at the time of their authorization and issue, were unauthorized by law. There was no authority in law for the issuance of such bonds. In People
v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.
It follows that the judgment of the county court of Franklin county, overruling the objections of appellant to the levy of 84 cents on the $100 for the payment of principal and interest on bonds issued by said Non-High School District No. 107, was wrong. The objections should have been sustained.
The judgment of the county court of Franklin county is reversed.
Judgment reversed.