142 N.Y.S. 611 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1913
In September, 1912, relators were assigned to defend a prisoner who had been indicted for murder in the first degree. So successful were then’ efforts that, after a trial lasting two days, the defendant was acquitted. The justice presiding over the court in which the action was tried allowed to the relators $500 as counsel fee, and certain amounts, hereinafter specified, as “personal and incidental expenses.” (Code Crim. Proc. § 308.) . The comptroller of the city of New York refused to pay the latter amounts, and from an order granting a motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus, directing payment thereof, he now appeals to this court.
The items in dispute are stated as follows:
“ 1. For the employ of professional men before trial to furnish counsel with proper and scientific information concerning the condition of the defendant’s mind, so that they might .be able to decide upon and establish such defense as might be fairly offered and
upheld in her behalf............................. $100 00
“ 2. For a copy of the testimony taken at the coroner’s inquest at the examination of Sarah Sypher and witnesses....................................... 2 50
“ 3. For car fare for John E. Walker, a necessary witness, residing at Medford Station, Long Island, to defray his railroad expenses in coming to relators’ office in Brooklyn before the trial to assist relators
in preparation for trial.......................... 3 00
‘4. For car fare for Susan Hoelper, a necessary witness, residing at Franklinville, New Jersey, four hundred miles from New York City, to defray her 'railroad expenses in coming to relators’ office in Brooklyn ' twice before the trial to assist relators in preparation for trial......................................... 20 00”
We think that the order must be reversed. It appears from the moving affidavit that the defense to the action was that “the defendant at the time the alleged crime was committed was suffering from such a defect of reason as not to know that her act was wrong.” In preparing for the
The order should be reversed, and the motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus denied, but, under the circumstances, without costs.
Jenics, P. J., Thomas, Carr, and Putnam,'JJ., concurred.
Order reversed, and motion for peremptory writ of mandamus denied, without costs.