139 N.Y.S. 896 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1913
Lead Opinion
The facts upon which it is claimed in this proceeding that one Joseph J. McKenna is improperly restrained in • a State prison are that said McKenna was charged with the commission of a crime in the territory of the borough of the Bronx on June 6, 1912; that he was subsequently indicted by a grand jury of the county of New York; tried in the Court of General Sessions of the Peace, and by a judgment of the said court was convicted of the crime for which he was indicted. The relator claims that the Court of General Sessions had no jurisdiction to indict or try the said McKenna by reason of the fact that the Legislature by chapter 548 of the Laws of 1912 created the said territory of the borough of the Bronx into a separate county of the State, which act became a law on April 19, .1912. The crime for which the said McKenna was indicted and convicted was murder in the first degree, and he is held by the warden of the State prison at Ossining under a warrant reciting the conviction. If this statute, chapter 548 of the Laws of 1912, is void as in violation of the Constitution it is conceded that the Court of General Sessions had jurisdiction to try the relator, and the writ must be dismissed.
The question of the constitutionality of that act having been ■ fully argued before us, it is important that there should be an early determination of that question. The prisoner was indicted by a grand jury in the county of New York. Section 6 of article 1 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, except in cases of impeachment, and in cases of militia when in actual service, and the land and naval forces in time' of war, or which this State may keep with the consent of Congress in time of peace, and in cases of petit larceny, under the regulation of the Legislature, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury. Section 252 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the grand jury has power, and it is their duty, to inquire
Section 9 of the act provides that “the several courts within the county of New York and within the first judicial district of the Supreme Court of the State of New York shall have and retain jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings and matters that shall have been rightfully commenced in said courts prior to the said first day of January, nineteen hundred and fourteen, and the several courts of the county of Bronx having criminal jurisdiction on and. after the first day of January, nineteen hundred and fourteen, shall have the same jurisdiction of crimes, Offenses and misdemeanors that shall have been committed in the said territory that the courts of the county of New York having criminal jurisdiction now have in the county of New York, provided proceedings shall not have been already rightfully commenced in any of the courts of the county of New York for the prosecution of said crimes, offenses and misdemeanors, in which case, the said courts within the county of New York shall have and retain jurisdiction of the same for the full, complete and final disposition thereof, and until the said first day of January, nineteen hundred and fourteen, the said courts of the county of New York, and in the said first judicial district, shall retain and exercise in all civil and criminal proceedings the same jurisdiction they now have.” The jurisdiction of a court of criminal jurisdiction to try a prisoner for a felony must depend upon an indictment being presented by a grand jury authorized to inquire into and present an indictment for the crime charged and undoubtedly
If the commissioner of jurors had been appointed, as was contemplated by the act, within thirty days after its passage and had returned and summoned a grand jury for the county of Bronx, I do not think the grand jury of the county of New York would have had jurisdiction to inquire into and present an indictment for a crime committed in the borough of Bronx after the act took effect. As. a fact the Governor had not appointed a commissioner of jurors within thirty days after the passage of the act, but no action or non-action of the Governor or of a commissioner of jurors appointed by him could confer jurisdiction on a grand jury of New York county to indict a person for a crime committed in the borough of Bronx after that county was duly created and existing as a separate and independent county of the State. As I view it, therefore, the question directly presented on this application involves a determination of the question as to whether this act, creating á . county of Bronx, violates any provision of the Constitution.
The division of this State into counties has existed since the State was organized and is recognized by several provisions of the Constitution. Thus section 10 of article 8 recognizes a county as one of the political subdivisions of the State and provides for the amount of indebtedness which a county is authorized to incur. Section 1 of article 10 provides for the election of sheriffs, clerks of counties, district attorneys and registers, and provides that these officers shall be chosen by the electors of the respective- counties. Section 2 of the article provides that all county officers whose election or appointment is not provided for by the Constitution shall be elected by the electors of the respective counties, or appointed by the boards of supervisors, or other county authorities, as the Legislature shall direct.
This analysis of the statute seems to me to conclusively establish that by it the comity of the Bronx was created as of the date of the passage of the act, April 19, 1912. The 1st section of the act declares that all the territory now comprised within the borough of the Bronx “ is hereby set off from the county of New York and is erected into the county of Bronx as a separate and distinct county of the State of New York from and after the date of taking effect of this act.” No language could be clearer or more emphatic. To construe this provision as postponing the creation of the county until a future time would, it seems to me, be a direct violation of its express language. All the subsequent provisions of the act contemplate the existence of a new county from the date of the passage of the act and provide for what the Legislature understood would otherwise be called an “interregnum,” viz., the period between the time of the coming into existence of the county and the time when the proper county officers should be elected. If the county was not created until the 1st. day of' January, 1914, when the county officers would be ready to assume their duties, the provisions to which attention has been called would have been unnecessary, for, until that time, the territory included within the boundaries of the new county would have remained a part of the county of New York. What was intended to be accomplished by the act was to create a county and then provide that the duties which by law were devolved upon the county officers should, until the county officers were elected, be performed by the officers of an adjoining county, viz., the county of New York. The operative part of the act was to take effect imme
We now come to the effect of section 16 of the act. That section provides that “At the general election in November, nineteen hundred and twelve,- there shall be submitted to the voters of' the borough of the Bronx the question: ‘ Shall the territory within the borough 'of the Bronx be erected into the county of Bronx?’ If it shall appear that a majority of the votes. cast on said question at said general election were against the erection of the county of Bronx, then this act shall be inoperative and void.” By this section the Legislature has for the first time in -the history of this State and, so far as I know, in any State, submitted a question to the people of a portion of the State, whether or not an act duly passed and which has become a law should become “inoperative and void,” or, in other words, whether such act should or should not be repealed was to be determined, not by the Legislature, but by the people of a limited territory specified. The question that was to be submitted was not whether an act which was to be in force over all the State should or should not apply to a particular locality, or whether the provisions of the law which,
Now, the Constitution (Art. 3, § 1), in the broadest terms vests the legislative power of the State in the Senate and Assembly. The people, by adopting this Constitution, renounced for themselves the exercise of legislative power and vested it in their representatives; when the State of New York became a free and independent State, the legislative, as well as the executive and judicial powers, were assumed by and were vested in the people. To insure a proper exercise of the powers
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the opinion of Presiding Justice Ingraham in so far as he holds that the effect of section 16 of the act under consideration is to render the whole act unconstitutional.
Clarke, J., concurred.
Joseph J. McKenna is held by the defendant under a warrant issued out of the Court of General Sessions. He was convicted in that court on October 25, 1912, of the crime of murder committed on June 6, 1912, within the territory constituting the borough of the Bronx, and which has, as it is asserted, been constituted the county of Bronx by virtue of an act of the Legislature passed on April 19, 1912, and known as chapter 548 of the Laws of 1912.
The relator’s contention is that the effect of that act was to deprive the Court of General Sessions in the county of New York of jurisdiction to try McKenna for the crime of which he was accused. This question of jurisdiction can properly be' raised by a writ of habeas corpus, and is the only question that can be so raised after conviction. (People ex rel. Hubert v. Kaiser, 206 N. Y. 52.) The question of the validity of the act is, therefore, called directly into question and will be first considered. This question is an important one which should be promptly decided, not only by reason of its relation to the rights of McKenna, but also because it is one of great public consequence, since the act calls upon public officers to do certain things in the near future which it will be their duty to do if the act is valid, but not if it is invalid.
The title of the act is: “An act to erect the county of Bronx' from the territory now comprised within the limits of the borough of Bronx, in the city of New York, as constituted by chapter three hundred and seventy-eight of the laws of eighteen hundred, and ninety-seven and all acts amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto.”
The Constitution of the State (Art. 3, § 1) provides that “The legislative power of this State shall be vested in the Senate and Assembly,” and the argument against the validity of the Bronx County Act is that by its 16th section, quoted above, the Legislature relinquished its constitutional power and duty, and has delegated to the people of the territory proposed to be embraced in the new county the determination of a question which by the Constitution has been committed to the Legislature alone. The question how far, and in what cases, the Legislature may make a statute contingent on approval by a vote of the péople, is one which has been much discussed by the courts and by writers of text books, and cannot as yet be said to have been generally agreed upon. Some point has been made as to the form of the question to be submitted to the people in the present case, but I consider that, so far as it concerns the power of the Legislature, it is immaterial. The point is that it is left to- the people to determine by their votes whether or not the act shall be effective.
One of the earliest cases dealing with this question was Barto v. Himrod (8 N. Y. 483). That case dealt with an act of the Legislature of this State (Laws of 1849, chap. 140) entitled “An act establishing free schools throughout the State,” and provided that the electors of the whole State should say whether “this act shall or not become a law.” It was held that the statute had not been constitutionally enacted. After quoting the provisions of the Constitution imparting all legislative power to the Senate and Assembly, and noting the single case in which
That case stands to-day as a binding authority upon the precise question which it decided, and'its reasoning is, in fact, generally followed throughout the country in so far as concerns general statutes made to be dependent upon the popular vote of all the electors of the State, although very eminent jurists, such as judge Rédfield and Judge Cooley, have expressed dissent" from its reasoning. .(State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 367; Cooley Const. Lim. [7th ed.] 167 et seq.) It has, however, been followed by a majority of the justices comprising the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. ' (Opinion of the Justices, 160 Mass. 586.)
Acts were passed authorizing certain towns and villages to incur obligations in behalf of projected railroads, the question whether they should or should not incur such obligations being left to the determination of the electors, or local authorities of the several municipalities. These acts were easily distinguished from Barto v. Himrod on the ground that the acts themselves took effect and became law solely by act of the Legislature, which did no more than to leave it to the • determination of the parties interested whether or not they would bring themselves within the law. (Bank of Rome v. Village of Rome, 18 N. Y. 38; Starin v. Town of Genoa, 23 id. 439; Clarke v. City of Rochester, 28 id. 605.) In People v. Fire Association of Philadelphia (92 N. Y. 316) the court explained what it understood to have been the specific point decided in Barto v. Himrod. Speaking of that case it said: “What was there denominated the School Law came from the hands of the Legislature not as a law, but as a proposition. Whether it should be. a law or not was precisely the question submitted to the popular vote. The Legislature proposed the law, but left it to the people to enact. The process carried out and applied to all bills would have resulted in a complete abdication by the Senate and Assembly of their authority and functions. Instead of making laws they would simply have suggested them, reported them for consideration, but left the judgment upon them, the determination of their expediency and wisdom, to an authority outside of their own. As to the School Law, the people were made the Legislature, and left to decide whether the bill proposed should or should not become a law. This court held that the Legislature under the Constitution could not so delegate its power, but was bound to determine for
The question whether or not and under what circumstances the Legislature may lawfully commit to the determination of the electors the question whether an act shall become operative has been considered in innumerable cases in other jurisdictions. The general rule to be deduced from the decisions of our own State, and from the best considered decisions in other States, appears to be that the Legislature may not lawfully so submit a mere proposition for a law, or a statute affecting the whole State and establishing the general policy of the State, but that it may lawfully so submit statutes, whether local or general in form, which affect only the people of a separate district, locality or municipal corporation, and as to the desirability of which the people of the locality are best able to judge. This is subject to the condition that the statute when it leaves the Legislature must be a complete act ready to go into full operation when accepted by the electors of the district to be affected, to whom is submitted only the question whether or not the act as framed by the Legislature shall become operative. In my opinion the act under consideration falls within the class of laws which may constitutionally be submitted for acceptance or rejection by the people of the territory proposed to be erected
It.is not unreasonable that the Legislature should be unwilling to impose added burdens upon the residents of a particular district, or on the other hand, to withhold supposed benefits except with the consent of those to be affected. The precise question has not heretofore arisen in this State, but the solution at which I have arrived is not only in harmony with the trend of decisions in this State, but is the rule that has been universally applied in other States where the precise question has arisen. (People v. McFadden, 81 Cal. 489; People v. Nally, 49 id. 478; Erlinger v. Boneau, 51 Ill. 94; People ex rel. Wilson v. Salomon, 51 id. 37; People v. Reynolds, 10 id. 1; State ex rel. Spaulding v. Elwood, 11 Wis. 17.) It has been suggested that the reference should have been to the electors of the whole county of New York, out of which the new county is to be carved. I am unable to see that the electors of that part of New York county, not set apart, have any interest in the question whether or not the borough of the Bronx shall be erected into a separate county, or at least any interest that is comparable to that which the electors of the Bronx may be presumed to have. At all events the determination whether the matter should or should not be referred to popular vote, and, if so referred, to whom the reference should be made, was óne which rested alone in the discretion of the Legislature, which we have no power to review. Assuming, then, that the act was not rendered invalid by the reference to a vote of the electors contained in its 16th section, there are still other questions to be considered depending upon when the act became or will become fully operative.
The 1st section of the act provides that the territory now comprising the borough of the Bronx ‘c is hereby set off from
The act is not a “special city law,” and consequently was not one which should have been submitted to the mayor of the city of New York. ■ (McGrath v. Grout, 171 N. Y. 7.) I am, therefore, of the opinion that the act under consideration is valid and free from constitutional objection.
It remains to consider the relator’s contention that, assuming the act to be valid, the Court of General Sessions was without jurisdiction after its passage to try persons accused of crimes committed within the territory set apart to form Bronx county. The Legislature has attempted, and as I think successfully, to preserve to the Court of General Sessions, and other courts now established within the county of New York, jurisdiction until January 1, 1914, over all matters civil and criminal arising within the confines of Bronx county that they had before the passage of the act. The 9th section of the act reads as follows: “Prom and after the time of the taking effect of this act, the Supreme Court and on and after the first day of January, nineteen hundred and fourteen, the County Courts shall have jurisdiction over all crimes and misdemeanors committed within the territory of the county of Bronx, except as herein otherwise provided; within the county of Bronx the Courts of Special Sessions and Magistrates’ Courts as now constituted by law shall have jurisdiction of such offenses as may be tried and determined by such Court, of Special Sessions and by such Magistrates’ Courts as now constituted under and by virtue of chapter three hundred and seventy-eight of the laws of eighteen hundred and ninety-seven, and all acts amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto, the same as if this act had not been passed. Provided, however, that the several courts within the county of New York and within the first judicial district of the Supreme Court of the State of New York shall have and retain jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings and matters that shall have been right-' fully commenced in said courts prior to the said first day of
Much that has already been said as to the preservation of the jurisdiction and authority of county officers applies with equal force to the preservation of the jurisdiction of the local courts of the county.
Beading the act as a whole, it is not difficult to find in it an intention on the part of the Legislature that parts of the act shall not become operative until January 1, 1914, notwithstanding the act itself is declared to take effect immediately upon its passage. That means no more than it becomes a part of the statute law of the State on the day of its passage. When its various provisions are to become .operative must be ascertained from the body of the act itself. There is no constitutional reason why the Legislature may not enact that different parts of the same statute shall take effect at different times, and this is precisely what the Legislature has done in the present case. The clear intent of the statute is that the jurisdiction of the Court of General Sessions to try indictments for offenses committed .within the city, and the old county of New York, shall continue unimpaired until January 1, 1914, when a County Court is to be -established in Bronx county, which will thereafter have jurisdiction over crimes committed in that territory, and as to which proceedings had not -then been
It follows that the order appealed from should be affirmed.
Dowling, J., concurred.
Order affirmed.