23 Mich. 471 | Mich. | 1871
On the 27th day of March, 1867, the legislature of this state passed an act purporting to authorize and empower the governor to seize and take possession of any land, not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres, within the state, for the purpose of conveying the same to the United States, for the erection and maintenance of light-houses thereon. For this purpose he was to appoint three commissioners, who were to enter upon, and take possession of, the land in the name of the state, cause the same to be surveyed and
On the 14th day of November, 1870, the governor having previously been notified from the office of light-house engineers, of the desire of the United States to acquire a certain site for a light-house, at or near the mouth of the Saginaw river, appointed three commissioners to enter upon, and take possession of, the same, and appraise the value and fix and determine the compensation to be paid therefor conformably to the requirements of the act aforesaid as so amended. These commissioners proceeded as directed, appraised the value of the land and fixed the compensation to be paid at the sum of seventeen thousand four hundred and ninety-six dollars and eighty-four cents, and duly filed their report as required by the act. The officer in charge of the light-house department, however, when informed of this report and award, immediately notified the governor that the sum awarded was regarded as excessive, and was, moreover, greater than the appropriation made by congress for the purpose; and for these reasons the acceptance of the land for light-house purposes was declined. Thereupon the governor apprised the commissioners of the conclusion, but the owners of the land, claiming that the title had passed by. the proceedings to the state, insisted on being paid the
The state resists this application on various' grounds’ some of which go to the regularity of the proceedings merely. The view we take of the legislation, however, does not render it necessary to consider objections of mere form, because we think the acts in question have no constitutional warrant, and consequently all the proceedings taken to condemn land under them are void. *
If the state has authority to condemn the lands, it must be by virtue of its eminent domain; and it is to this that the right is referred by the relator’s counsel. The eminent domain may be said to be the rightful authority which exists in every sovereignty, to control and regulate those rights of a public nature which pertain to its citizens in common, and to appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public safety, necessity, convenience and welfare may demand. The authority springs from no contract or arrangement between the government and the citizen whose property may be appropriated, but it has its foundation in the imperative law of necessity, and is recognized, and may be defended and enforced, upon the ground that no government could perpetuate its existence and further the prosperity of its people, if the means for the exercise of any of its sovereign powers might be withheld at the option of individuals. The right being thus found to rest upon necessity, t the power to appropriate in any case must be justified and limited by the necessity; and whenever in any instance the government or its officials shall attempt to seize and appropriate that which cannot be needful to the due execution of its sovereign powers or the proper discharge of any of its
The states of this Union possess the eminent domain for all legitimate purposes under their own sovereignty. They may take and appropriate .lands for roads, canals, statehouses, court-houses, school-houses and many other purposes needful to enable them to accomplish the objects for which their governments have been created by their people. But there are other public objects which, though to be accomplished within their territorial limits, are just as much beyond the scope of the eminent domain as possessed and exercised by them, as they would be if to be accomplished within the exclusive jurisdiction of a foreign nation. Under the division of powers between the United States and the individual states, each has its sphere of sovereignty, within which it moves and .operates without let or hindrance from the other, and within that sphere it employs the eminent domain wherever needful to the complete and effectual exercise of its powers, and with as little occasion or necessity for the permission or assistance of the other as if the two governments were wholly foreign to each other, instead of being constructed as parts of one harmonious system. For the one to enter the sphere of the other and employ its officers and machinery in the exercise of its eminent domain for the benefit. of the other would not only be as much without warrant, but also as much a work
In the exercise of its sovereignty, and as a part of its-provision for the regulation, control and protection of commerce, the United States erects light-houses, and may without question seize the property of individuals for the purpose, observing the constitutional requirement of making due compensation therefor. To do this, would be but an ordinary exercise of the right of eminent domain. But when the state undertakes to do the same, not for any purposes of its own, but in order to turn the property over to the United States, the difficulties appear to us insure mountable. In the first place there can be no necessity for the exercise of this right by the states for this purpose, for the authority of the nation is ample for the supply of its own needs in this regard under all circumstances. In the second place, the eminent domain in any sovereignty exists only for its own purposes; and to furnish machinery to the general government under, and by means of, which it is to appropriate lands for national objects, is not among the ends contemplated in the creation of the state government. Thus we perceive that the foundation upon which must repose the right to appropriate individual property against the will of the owner under the eminent domain, is wholly wanting in the case before us. We do not doubt that the appropriation would have been effectual had the United States seen fit to accept the land and the owners to receive the compensation awarded; for a statute may transfer the title to land in any form the parties mutually assent to, — Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y., 511; but until the
When we look into the legislation of congress, we discover also that the United States has never undertaken to confer upon the states authority to judge of its needs of lands for national purposes, or to assess the compensation it should pay.” Any such judgment and assessment must consequently be wholly provisional, and subject to its acceptance and ratification. If in the mean time the title to land seized could vest in the state, and the state could be required to, make payment therefor as is attempted by this proceeding, we reach the extraordinary result, that the state may seize and appropriate the lands of an individual for the sole purpose of turning it over to the Union for its needs; while on the other hand the Union is at liberty to accept it or not at its option, and if it shall refuse, the state, whose position in the taking was that of agent merely, without any interest whatever of its own, must, nevertheless, retain and pay for the land, while the owner, who was subject to this obligation only, that he should surrender his property to the public needs, is found to have been deprived of it on a claim of necessity which the government repels, and has no security against its being appropriated to any private purpose for which the state authorities may find it advantageous to sell it. This simple statement appears to us to demonstrate that the state can have no such power as has been attempted to be exercised in the case before us. It is of no importance in this proceeding that the federal authorities, at first, expressed a desire for the appropriation of the land. Their request to that effect was withdrawn before the relator’s demand was made.
It was suggested on the argument that the aid of the state in obtaining a site for a light-house, is analogous to
It is suggested by the eminent counsel for the relator that the proceeding may be sustained on the ground of the interest of the state, by reason of its coast-wise commerce, in the establishment of light-houses upon these waters. But the act does hot proceed on any theory of state interest. It assumes that
What power the state may have to purchase lands with the voluntary consent of their owners, in order to turn them over to the nation for light-house or any other national purposes, is not in question before us. We confine our remarks to the precise case at bar, which brings under examination a proceeding for the compulsory taking of lands. The state abandons the proceeding before its completion; the individual seeks to compel its being carried into effect. The right to do so, if it exists at all, must be mutual, and the question of state power is consequently involved of necessity.
We attach no importance to the circumstance that no law of congress can be shown empowering the general government to condemn lands for light-house purposes. When congress discovers a necessity for such legislation there can be little doubt of its adoption. We think counsel is in error in supposing that the assent of the state is a condition precedent to the taking of lands by the general government. Its consent is required only for the purpose of a transfer of jurisdiction. The power of the general government is ample, and the only question we are to discuss is the authority of the state in cases in which the right of federal action is unquestionable, to step in and act for it.
It is said in Comyn that “ Parliament cannot do any thing out of its jurisdiction; as it cannot make a person inheritable in France.” — Com. Dig., “Parliament,” {K). The English courts have frequently recognized and acted upon the doctrine that offenses can be punished neither at the common law nor under statutes except by the sovereignty against which they are committed. Thus in Butler’s Case, referred to in 18 Rep., 58, and again in 8 Inst., 118, which was a
When we have reached the conclusion that the laws of any state can operate only within the limits of its sovereignty, this case is disposed of. It is not a matter of importance whether those limits are territorial or by defined subjects. This court, in People v. Tyler, 8 Mich., 320, felt constrained to confirm a conviction in a state court of one who had committed an offense against the sovereignty of the state, notwithstanding he had been erroneously con
It may be said that there is no constitutional provision which expressly declares that the state shall have no authority to appropriate property for the public uses of the United States, and that the powers not prohibited may, on general principles, be exercised. But any such express
For the reasons assigned, the legislation in question is void. The enactments before us could not be adopted by the legislature, because not within the sphere of state powers. They, therefore, constitute an attempt to appropriate the property of individuals without due process of law; and ihe state authorities were justified at any point in abandoning the proceedings taken under them.
The writ applied for is denied.