9 Colo. 422 | Colo. | 1886
We deem it unnecessary, for the purposes of the present case, to discuss the powers of the state board of equalization, for the reason that it appears from an examination of the laws in force levying state taxes that all the levies sought to be enforced by the peremptory writ prayed for were made by the legislature, and not by the state board of equalization. It is averred in the petition that the four-mill rate for state purposes was levied by the state board of equalization, but these taxes were in fact levied by the fifth general assembly, and no change in the rate so prescribed was made by the state board. Laws 1885, p. 318, § 3. The same is also true of the rates levied for the support of the state institutions. A separate act was passed in each instance, fixing a rate.to be levied annually, on all taxable property within the state for the support of each of these institutions. Some of these laws were enacted at the first session of the general assembly of the state, and some at later sessions thereof, but all prior to the session of 1885. These laws remain in force, and must be re
At every regular session of the legislature since the adoption of the state constitution, a rate of taxation has been prescribed “for state purposes.” In the same section of these several acts, up to and including the year 1883, the county clerk of each county has been required to extend these taxes in a separate column of his tax list. The language of these several acts is as follows: “The
county clerk of each county, in making up the tax list required by this act, shall compute and carry out, in the proper column, a state tax at the rate aforesaid. ” Laws 1877, p. 756, § 44; Laws 1879, p. 152, § 1; Laws 1881, p. 208, § 1; Laws 1883, p. 247, § 1. The amendment of April 7, 1885, adopts the same provision, by reference to section 70, Gen. St. (Laws 1885, p. 318, § 3).
The form of the first tax list prescribed by the legislature exhibits the same intent. It provides a column for state taxes, one for deaf-mute tax, and indicates, by a blank column and foot-note, an intent that other columns are to be added for other special state levies. Gen. Laws, p. 758. By the first section of an act approved February 4, 1876, which is still in force, it was provided that “all taxes for state institutions in each year shall be combined under one head, and entered by the clerk of each county of this state upon the tax list, under the head of ‘ State Institutions,’ in one column.” Gen. St. p. 837, § 2868.
From this review of the legislation on the subject under consideration it sufficiently appears that the rate of taxation levied “for state purposes” was not intended by the legislature to include, as part and parcel thereof, the rates levied for the state institutions. Respecting both purposes, then, the rates were separately levied, and the laws in force required them to be separately extended, the rate for state purposes in one column, and that for state institutions in another column. This review also shows the legislative construction of the limitations on the rate of taxation imposed by section 11 of article 10 of the constitution. The rates therein prescribed relate only to taxes for state purposes; and, if this clause does not cover and include all state purposes (the position assumed by the relator), it follows that, as to the state purposes not included, there was no limitation.
We how approach the main question involved in this case. If the four mills so levied by the legislature of 1885 were designed to be in addition to the specific levies, the total rate levied for all state purposes or expenditures for the year 1886 amounts to five and seventeen-thirtieths mills on the dollar. The question; then, to be decided is, has the state legislature power and authority, under the constitution, when the valuation of the property within the state amounts to or exceeds $100,000,000, to levy an, annual state tax at a rate exceeding four mills on the dollar of valuation for all state purposes?
Article 10 of the constitution is devoted to the subject of revenue, and upon a .correct construction of its provisions depends the solution of this question. This article requires the general assembly to provide by general laws for the levy and collection of state, county and municipal taxes; that the laws to be enacted shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure uniformity of tax
Constitutions are adopted as a whole, and it is a rule of
The relator interposes, in behalf of the theory on which the case is prosecuted, the rule of contemporaneous construction. He reminds us that successive legislative assemblies, commencing with the adoption of the constitution, have construed this section as a limitation of the mill rate which may be levied to defray the expense of the state government proper, which is constituted, by article 3 of the constitution, of the legislative, executive and judicial departments. He urges, in support of this interpretation, that a state purpose is that which is necessary for the support of the state, and that, since the three departments named constitute the state government, it is only the taxes necessary for the support of these departments that can be said to be included in this clause. He maintains that the state institutions form no part of the powers of the state, are not material to its existence, and, while they are entitled to be supported by the state, yet, being of secondary importance to the existence of the state government, it could not have been intended by the framers of the constitution that the taxes necessary for their support should be classed as taxes “ for state purposes.” This position is supplemented and fortified by the argument ab inconvenienti. It is alleged that if the rate to be levied for all state'purposes, including the one and seventeen-thirtieth mills directed by prior laws to be levied for the support of the state institutions, be now -limited to four mills on the dollar, it will result in a deficiency of revenue to meet, the current expenses of the state government, as fully appears from the-expenditures of the past year.
The construction placed by several legislative assemblies upon the constitutional provision, and the inconveniences which may be occasioned by adopting a different construction, are deserving of,'and have received, respectful
After a careful examination of the subject under consideration, and giving due weight to all established rules and principles of construction applicable to a question of the nature and importance of that here presented, we are unable to intei’pret the limitation of the rate of taxation for state purposes otherwise than as already stated.
It may be true, as alleged by the attorney-general, that a levy of four mills on the dollar will not, at the present time, support the state institutions, and also provide a sufficient revenue to defray the necessary expenses of the departments of state. But this consideration, however serious, cannot control the decision of the question. “A constitution,” says Judge Cooley, “is not to be made to mean one thing at one time, and another at some subsequent time, when the circumstances may have so changed as perhaps to make a different rule in the case seem desirable.” Const. Lim. 67.
It was foreseen by the framers .of the constitution that such an emergency as the present might arise. Their determination to protect the people from the imposition o£ onerous taxes to support a state government is unmistakable. But to fix the proper limitations, such as would effectually restrain extravagance on the one hand, and at the same time make ample provision for the necessary expenses of a state government at different periods of its existence on the other hand, was, to a certain extent, experimental. To meet this difficulty it was provided, in the same section which limits the rate of taxation, that the rate might be increased, by submitting the proposed increase to a vote of the tax payers of the state.
The last proposition of the- relator is that, if section 11 is to be construed as restricting the legislature to a tax of four mills on the dollar for all state purposes and expenditures under the present valuation of the property within the state, then the act of April 7, 1885, repeals by implication the acts levying separate taxes for the state
The peremptory writ is denied.
Writ denied.