114 Ill. 34 | Ill. | 1885
delivered the opinion of the Court:
This case is not analogous to that of The People ex rel. v. North Chicago Ry. Co. 88 Ill. 538, as seems to be claimed by counsel for appellees. There the application was by a private party to file an information. Here it is by the Attorney General, at the instance and upon the affidavit of the Auditor of Public Accounts. It is provided by section 15, chapter 12, of the Revised Statutes of 1874, that “the Auditor shall be deemed the proper officer to institute all suits, motions, and other proceedings in law and equity, in which the State is plaintiff, except in cases otherwise provided by law. ” By other provisions of the statutes the Auditor is given supervision over life as well as other insurance companies, and where companies assume to insure without having sufficient legal authority, it is within the line of his duty to cause them to be prosecuted, and to be deprived of their franchises, etc. And by the second subdivision of section 4, chapter 14, of the Revised Statutes of 1874, it is made the duty of the Attorney General “to institute and prosecute all actions and proceedings in favor of or for the use of the State, which may be necessary in the execution of the duties of any State officer. ” There is not, therefore, in our opinion, the slightest O foundation for the position that this is a private prosecution. It is a suit instituted by appropriate public officers in respect to a matter which concerns, so far as we are able to perceive, the public alone.
The question now comes before us for the first time whether, under the first section of the amended and revised act in relation to quo xoarranto, of March 23, 1874, (Rev. Stat. 1874, chap. 112, p. 787,) it is necessary to lay a rule upon the respondents to show cause against it, upon presenting a petition to the court or judge for leave to file an information in the nature of a quo xvarranto. The language of the prior statute was: “It shall and may be lawful for the Attorney General, or the circuit attorney of the proper circuit, with the leave of any circuit court, to exhibit to such court one or more information or informations in the nature of a quo xvarranto, at the relation of any person or persons desiring to sue or prosecute the same, * * * and to proceed therein in such manner as shall be usual in cases of informations in the nature of quo waxranto,” (Gross’ Stat. 1869, p. 533,)— thus adopting, unmistakably, the common law practice in that respect; and so we said in The People ex x'el. v. Tf/a-ite, 70 Ill. 25: “The mode for instituting such proceedings is, usually, as pursued in the case at bar. The State’s attorney submitted a motion, based on affidavit, for leave to file an information in the nature of a quo xcaxranto. A rule xiisi was laid on defendant to show cause why the information should not be filed. Bespondent answered the rule by counter affidavits.”
But the language of the section now under consideration varies materially in this respect. It provides that “the Attorney General, or State’s attorney of the proper county, either of his own accord or at the instance of any individual relator, may present a petition to any court of record of competent jurisdiction, or any judge thereof in vacation, for leave to file an information in the nature of a quo warranto, in the name of the People of the State of Illinois; and if such court or judge shall be satisfied that there is probable ground for the proceeding, the court or judge may grant the petition, and order the information to be filed and process to issue. ” This change in phraseology is so marked that we think it clear it was intended not to adhere to the former practice. If it was intended to adhere to it, why change the language of the statute? Authority is given by the present statute to the judge in vacation, as well as to the court, to act upon the petition. But a judge in vacation can make orders only to the extent the statute authorizes him to do so. ■ He possesses no docket, can enter no general orders, and render no judgment in vacation, by virtue of his general powers as judge; and when he is, by statute, authorized to act in vacation, the statute itself is the measure of his authority. In The People ex rel. v. Moore et al. 73 Ill. 132, we held, while not passing upon this question, that the fact that the court, before acting upon the relator’s petition, entered an order for a rule on the respondents to show cause, etc., did not render his act in .subsequently refusing leave to file the information, erroneous; but we there intimated that the court might have acted upon the petition alone. We now hold that the court or judge may, under the present statute, act upon the petition of the relator without first laying a rule upon the respondents to show cause, and if satisfied that there are probable grounds for the filing of the petition, allow it to be filed. No hardship can result from this, when it is reflected that the summons, if ordered in vacation, must be returnable on the first day of the next succeeding term; and if ordered in term time, it must be returnable on any day of the same term, not less than five days after the date of the writ, as shall be directed by the order of the court, (see Quo Warranto act, sec. 2,) and that the respondents, upon the return to the writ, may demur to the information, and thus test its sufficiency; or, if it be sufficient, by plea set up any defence why judgment should not be pronounced upon it against the respondents. (See Quo Warranto act, sec. 4.) When the court had here allowed the information to be filed, and-ordered the summons to be issued, its discretionary powers were exhausted, and the issues of fact and of law presented by the pleadings must then have been tried and determined “in accordance with the strict rules of law, in the same manner, and with the same degree of strictness, as in ordinary cases.” (High on Extraordinary Legal Remedies, latter part of section 606.) It is not denied that if the order to issue the summons had been made under a misapprehension of some fact material to be known by the court before making such order, and but for which it would not have been made, it would have been competent for the court to vacate the order at any time during the term. But the court here acted upon no such mistake. It simply allowed that which should have been interposed as a defence on the final hearing, to be urged as a ground for vacating the order.
With regard to the merits of this case we desire to express no opinion, further than to say we think there is probable cause for allowing the information to be filed and the summons to issue. Although the payment of dues to a corporation on account of fees or assessments upon its members, may be purely voluntary, persons may acquire legal rights to share in them when they are paid. Through forfeiture of benefits, etc., payments of dues on account of fees or assessments may be almost, if not quite, as effectually enforced as by legal process. At present we do not perceive why the payment of a premium to one who holds a number next to that held by the one who dies, and solely because he does die, is not, in effect, in the nature of a wager upon the life of one in whom the party thus benefited has no interest, and why, therefore, the transaction is not within the condemnation of the principle announced in Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 Ill. 35. And see, also, to like effect, Carman v. Wetherbee, 105 Mass. 149; State v. Standard Life Ins. Co. 38 Ohio St. 281. At all events, it can not be said the questions are so clear and free from doubt that there are not probable grounds for allowing the petition to be filed.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed.