People ex rel. Stead v. Superior CourtPeople ex rel. Stead v. Superior Court
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Scott
delivered the opinion of the court:
Ralph Lipsey was convicted at the February term, 1906, of the criminal court of Cook county, of receiving stolen property in violation of section 239 of chapter 38, Hurd’s Revised Statutes of 1905, and the” value of the goods was’ fixed at $210. He was sentenced to the penitentiary. Thereafter he sued out of this court a writ of error to review the record. On April 18, 1907, the judgment was affirmed, and he filed a petition for rehearing, which was .denied on June 5, 1907. The mandate of this court issued, and he was taken to the penitentiary at Joliet to undergo imprisonment in accordance with the judgment of the criminal court. Thereafter, and on January 30, 1908, a petition was filed for and on behalf of Lipsey in the superior court of Cook county for a writ of habeas corpus, asking that such writ issue and be directed to the warden of the penitentiary. This petition was addressed to the Hon. Willard M. Mc-Ewen, one of
The first question for determination is whether or not the superior court, or any judge thereof, had jurisdiction to order the issuance of this particular writ of habeas corpus. It appears from the petition for that writ that Lipsey had sued out of this court a writ of error to review the proceedings of the criminal court and that the judgment of that court had been by this court affirmed. It also appears that the question of the sufficiency of the verdict returned by the jury in the case in the criminal court was not raised by assignment of error in this court when the case was brought here, and it is stated by that petition that neither Lipsey nor his attorney discovered the alleged insufficiency of the verdict until after the petition for rehearing which was filed in this court had been denied. It is urged in the brief filed in the present proceeding on behalf of Lipsey, that “if the judgment of the criminal court is void and the Supreme Court of Illinois did not decide that such judgment was valid, habeas corpus lies.” • It is true that the question as to the. sufficiency of the verdict, and the validity of the judgment based thereon, was not specifically presented when the case was brought here by writ of error. It is also true that this question.might then have been presented to and passed upon -by this court had Lipsey seen fit to invoke the judgment of the court in reference thereto. The general rule is, when a judgment is affirmed by this court all questions raised by the assignments of error, and all questions that might have been so raised, are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant or plaintiff in error. A judgment or decree having been affirmed by this court must be regarded as free from all error. Gould v. Sternberg, 128 Ill. 510-
In the absence of authority directly in point sustaining counsel for the prisoner in the position taken by him, we are not disposed to establish an exception heretofore unknown to the law of this State to the general rule above stated. The judgment of this court affirming the conviction of Lipsey must be regarded as an adjudication by this court determining the judgment of conviction against him to be valid.
It is true, as contended by counsel both for respondent and for Lipsey, that circuit and superior courts, and the judges of those courts, have concurrent jurisdiction with this court in habeas corpus proceedings. That fact, however, does not authorize either of those courts, or either of such judges, to decide a question contrary to the way it has been decided by this court. When this court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, .has determined a question, either of law or of fact, the matter is ended so far as the circuit and superior courts, and the judges thereof, are concerned, and they may not, by reason of the fact that their jurisdiction in habeas corpus is concurrent with that of this court, overrule or review such decision of this court dealing with questions either of law or of fact. When the petition for the writ of habeas corpus was presented to Judge Mc-Ewen it appeared therefrom that the judgment in the criminal case had been affirmed by this court, which, as we have seen, was án adjudication that the “judgment of conviction was a valid one, and while he had all the power and authority in a habeas corpus proceeding
or from the documents thereto annexed, that the party can neither be discharged, admitted to bail nor otherwise relieved, the court or judge shall forthwith award a writ of habeas corpus.” In this case it appeared from the face of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus that the question thereby raised had, as a matter of law, been adjudicated against Uipsey by this -court when his case was here on writ of error, and it therefore appeared from the petition that Uipsey, so far as imprisonment by virtue of that judgment was concerned, could not by the superior court, or any judge thereof, be discharged, admitted to bail or” otherwise relieved, and for that reason the writ should not have issued.
It is contended, however, that even if this be true the superior court was not without jurisdiction; that, having general jurisdiction in habeas corpus, the court had the
It is - contended, however, that the order - allowing the filing of the petition for the writ of certiorari should be vacated and the writ of certiorari issued from this court should be quashed, for the reason that this court is without jurisdiction in the case now at bar. We have no original jurisdiction in certiorari.
Section 8 of chapter 37, Hurd’s Revised Statutes of 1905, provides in reference to the power of this court as
We may only direct the issuance of a writ of certiorari as auxiliary to, or ancillary to, or in aid of, or to protect, our appellate jurisdiction. “The office of the common law writ of certiorari is to bring before the court the proceedings of inferior tribunals or officers acting judicially in cases where they exceed their jurisdiction or where they proceed illegally and there is no appeal or.other mode provided for directly reviewing their proceedings.” ( Glennon v. Britton, 155 Ill. 232.) It is‘apparent that the proceeding before Judge McEwen is one of the character that may here be reviewed by certiorari, as his determination in the matter may not be reviewed upon appeal or by writ of error, provided it can be said that the writ herein issued is auxiliary or ancillary to, or in aid of, or to protect, the appellate jurisdiction conferred upon this court by the “constitution. Upon this proposition the respondent insists that the jurisdiction which was exercised in this cause is original; that the criminal cause is no longer pending in this court; that upon the affirmance of the judgment of the criminal court and the issuance of the mandate from this court the matter was ended so far as this tribunal is concerned; that in the punishment of Lipsey it is the judgment of the criminal court, and not the judgment of this court, that is being carried into effect, and that the jurisdiction in certiorari that is conferred upon this court by statute can only be exercised in aid of a proceeding,” appellate in character, actually pending in this court. It is said that the case of People v. Circuit Court of Cook County, 169 Ill. 201, necessarily leads to this conclusion. That case dealt with the right and power of this court to issue a writ of prohibition, such jurisdiction as it has in reference to a writ of that character being conferred upon it
Section 465 of chapter 38, Hurd’s Revised Statutes of 1905, provides: “If the judgment is affirmed, the Supreme Court shall direct the court in which the original sentence was rendered to carry the same into effect, and shall give judgment against the plaintiff in error for costs, and execution may issue therefor, from the Supreme Court.” The question is, may we issue the writ to prevent the unauthorized and illegal acts of a court or judge interfering with the execution of a judgment which we have affirmed and which we have directed the criminal court to carry into effect ? Is such a use of the writ a use which is ancillary or auxiliary
It is also contended that in any event the writ was prematurely issued by this court because no final judgment or order had been entered by Judge McEwen, and for aught that appears the prisoner might be by him remanded, in which event, it is said, no necessity for the issuance of the writ would ever have existed. In Hyslop v. Finch, 99 Ill. 171, it was said: “A common law certiorari will lie, first, whenever it is shown that the inferior court or jurisdiction has exceeded its jurisdiction; second, whenever it is shown that the inferior court or jurisdiction has proceeded illegally and no appeal or writ of error will lie.”
“This writ was issuable at common law before the proceedings instituted had culminated in a trial, order or judgment, and was based on the absence or the excess or usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the tribunal from which the proceedings were removed.” (State v. Dobson, supra, and authorities there cited.) Where, as in the case at bar, the tribunal whose proceedings are attacked acted without jurisdiction and made an order or entered a judgment prejudical to the party complaining, the writ may issue without awaiting a final judgment or order in the proceeding. Where, however, the tribunal possesses jurisdiction to hear and determine the cause the writ will not issue until the proceeding has terminated, and then only if it appear that the tribunal has entered an illegal judgment or order. In the latter instance the court has jurisdiction to proceed, and no wrong is done unless
The affirmance of a judgment of conviction by this court must, according to the law, be regarded by the judges of the circuit, and superior courts as a final determination by this court; that there is in the record reviewed no error, and that the judgment is valid for aught that appears upon the record. Interference by nisi prius judges, exercising jurisdiction in habeas corpus, with the execution of such a judgment for any reason appearing upon the record of the case presented to the Supreme Court constitutes a wrongful infringement of the appellate jurisdiction of that court and tends to bring the courts of the State into disrepute.
The foregoing opinion disposes of this case as it is here presented. Nothing said or left unsaid is to be deemed an intimation that the superior court could rightfully have discharged Lipsey on habeas corpus if the criminal case had not come to this court and if the verdict was properly the subject of the criticisms leveled against it. The criminal court had jurisdiction of the offense with which Lipsey was charged and had jurisdiction of his person. It had jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the verdict and jurisdiction. to enter the judgment which it did enter. (Ex parte Watkins,
The record of the proceedings before Judge McEwen and the record of the superior court in the habeas corpus case will be quashed. If Lipsey is still in the custody of the sheriff of Cook county, the warden has the power, and it is his duty, forthwith to take him, Lipsey, and return him to the penitentiary, there to undergo imprisonment pursuant to law, and it is the duty of the sheriff to deliver Lipsey to the warden that he (Lipsey) may be so returned.
’ Record quashed.