People ex rel. Stead v. Board of SupervisorsPeople ex rel. Stead v. Board of Supervisors
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Hand
delivered the opinion of the court:
The first question presented for decision upon this record’ is, is the provision of section 33 of the statute as amended, which provides the county board shall appoint as judges of election in the several election districts or precincts of the county the persons selected by the members of the county board belonging to the political party having the greatest number of votes upon said board and by the members of the
The. statute’ provides that in counties under township organization the county board, at its regular or at a special meeting, in the month of June in each year, except where judges are appointed by election commissioners, shall appoint in each election precinct or district in the county three judges of election, who shall be capable and discreet electors and possess the qualifications required by law of judges of election; that no more than two persons of the same political party shall be appointed judges in the same election district or undivided precinct, but that the supervisor shall be appointed as one of the judges of election in the district or precinct in which he resides, and 1 that the remaining judges of election in the various election precincts and districts of the county shall be made in the following manner: * First, that the members of the county board belonging to the political party having the greatest number of votes upon the board shall select the majority of the election’ judges . in each election district of precinct in each township in j which said political party cast the highest number of votes 1 at the preceding general election for Governor, and shall ‘ also select the minority judge of election in each election ’ district or precinct in each township in which said political j party cast the second highest number of votes for Governor at the preceding general election for Governor; second, that; the members of the county board belonging to the political \ party having the second greatest number of votes upon the <■ county board shall select the majority of the election judges in each election district or precinct in each township in which said political party cast the highest number of votes at the preceding general election for Governor, and shall also select the minority judge of election in the election district or precinct in each township in which said political party cast the second highest number of votes at the preceding general election for Governor. Said
It would seem clear from a reading of section 33 that’ it was the design of the General Assembly that the political ’ party casting the highest vote and the political party casting the second highest vote should be represented upon the board of judges of election at each voting precinct in the county, as it is provided, “no more than two persons of the \ same political party shall be appointed judges in the same election district or undivided precinct.” Prior to the amendment of 1905 the foregoing clause of the statute was found in section 33 as it then stood upon the statute books, but it was doubtless thought by the framers’ of the amendment that if the selection of the judges of election was left-to the county board, as it was by section 33 before it was amended, a partisan county board, while complying with the letter of the statute, might violate its spirit by selecting a minority judge, who, although a member of a political party differing from that of the political party of the majority of the judges composing the board of judges of election, by reason of his inexperience, timidity, want of party zeal, or otherwise, might not represent upon the board of judges of election the party to which he nominally belonged, and with a view to remedy this defect in the law the amendment was passed whereby it was provided the judges of election should be selected by the representatives of the two leading political parties upon the county board. If, after the selection of the judges of election was made under the amendment of 1905, it was left optional with county boards whether they would comply with such section as amended, and appoint the persons thus selected or not, as they might see fit, the amendment would be annulled and the statute remain in the same form as it was prior to the amendment, as prior to the amendment the majority upon the county board could make the appointment of judges
It is next contended that in the townships of Embarrass and Young America, as Lawrence B. Stringer carried both townships, that of Embarrass by a majority of forty-one votes and that of Young America by a majority of one vote over Charles S. Deneen for Governor, the majority members of the county board have the right to select two judges of election in each of the four election precincts or districts in said townships. We do not think this contention sound. In Embarrass township Charles S. Deneen carried district No. 2 by a majority of twenty-one votes over Lawrence B. Stringer, while Lawrence B. Stringer carried district No. i over Charles S. Deneen by a majority of sixty-two votes, and in Young America township Charles S. Deneen carried district No. i over Lawrence B. Stringer by a majority of four votes, while Lawrence B. Stringer carried district No. 2 by a majority of five votes over Charles S. Deneen. We think it clear the precinct or district is made the unit by this statute, and not the township. It is the evident intention of the statute that at each voting place there shall be an election board consisting of three judges, and that the political party which cast the ‘greatest number of votes for Governor at the last general election in that precinct is entitied to a
It is also urged that the petition was prematurely filed. The board of supervisors of Edgar county met in regular session on June 11, 1906, and organized. On the next day the members of said board belonging to the political party having the second greatest number of votes upon said board selected two judges of election in each election district in said county wherein the political party to which they belonged had cast the highest number of votes for Governor at the November election, 1904, and one judge of election in each election district in said county wherein the political party to which they belonged had cast the second highest vote at said election for Governor, and presented a list of the names of the persons so selected to said county board while in session, and made a demand upon said county board, in writing, that the board appoint such persons as judges of election in and for the respective election districts for which they had been selected, and a motion was made that the persons so selected be appointed by the county board as judges of election in the respective election districts for which they had been selected. That motion failed to carry and the board refused to make said appointment, whereupon one of the majority members of said board made a motion, which was carried, that “the board adjourn till ten o’clock A. M. June 26, 1906, at which time the election judges are to be selected.” It is therefore clear that •said county board had refused to appoint the persons as judges of election
In State Board of Equalization v. People, 191 Ill. 528, which was a mandamus proceeding against the State Board of Equalization to require it to value and assess the corporate stock and franchises of certain corporations organized under the laws of this State, the same position was taken by the State Board of Equalization‘as is here taken by the respondents. On page 539 it was said: “It is next contended that the respondents were not in default at the time the petition was filed; that the State Board of Equalization was then in session and had the entire session in which to value and assess the capital stock and franchises of said corporations, and that the petition for mandamus was therefore prematurely filed. The general rule is, that before applying for a mandamus an express demand should be made, and there should be a refusal to perform, either express or implied. In cases, however, where the duty sought to be enforced is of a public nature, affecting the people at large, and there is no one especially empowered to demand its performance, there is no necessity for a demand and a refusal. The law requiring the duty stands as a continual demand. (13 Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 618; People v. Board of Education, 127 Ill. 613; People v. Town of Mt. Morris, 137 id. 576; People v. Crabb, 156 id. 155; Commissioners of Highways v. Jackson, 165 id. 17.) The State Board of Equalization met on the 10th day of September. On the nth day of October the board, and each member thereof, were requested, in writing, to value and assess the capital stock and franchises of said corporations. Thereafter, and prior to the filing of the petition, the
We are of the opinion no further demand and refusal was required than appears from this record before a petition for mandamus might properly be filed to require the respondents to perform their duty, and that the petition was not prematurely filed.
It is further urged that the amendment to section 33 is unconstitutional and void, and furnishes no authority for the selection of judg‘es of election by the majority or minority members of the county board. It is first said the amendment is special legislation and in conflict with section 22 of article 4 of the constitution, because it provides a basis for the selection and appointment of election judges in counties under township organization different from that provided by section 32 of the same act for the selection and appointment of judges of election in counties not under township organization, in this: that in counties under township organization the selection is to be based upon the vote cast “at the preceding general election for Governor,” while in counties not under township organization the selection is to be based upon the vote cast “at the preceding general election,” which would include an election for county, or even township, officers. We have never understood that a law which only applies to the class of counties in this State which have adopted township organization was void, as amounting to special
The case of Reynolds v. Town of Foster, 89 Ill. 257, is a case directly in point. In that case it was held that
It is also urged said section 33 is unconstitutional in this: that it is said it delegates legislative power to the members of a majority of a political party and to the members of a minority of a political party upon the county boards of the State by authorizing such members of the county boards, and under certain circumstances the chairman of a county central committee of a political party, to select the judges of election to be appointed in the several counties of the State under township organization. The selection or
In the Hoffman case, in speaking of the power of the legislature to authorize the county court to appoint election commissioners, on page 604, it was said: “The original power to fill all offices rests with the people. The constitution, in section 10 of article 5, provides for the appointment of certain officers by the Governor. But the reasoning in People v. Morgan shows that it was never intended to vest in the Governor the selection of such local and municipal officers as these commissioners. The power to appoint officers of this class is not specifically designated in the constitution as either a legislative, judicial or executive power. It is not therein specifically conferred on either department. Nor is there anything therein expressed which, either directly or impliedly, prohibits the legislature from authorizing the county court to appoint the commissioners. Therefore the authority conferred on that court to do so does not make the act invalid.”
In the Morgan case, in considering the right of the legislature to confer power upon the circuit court to appoint South
We are of the opinion section 33 as amended is a constitutional enactment.
The demurrer to the petition will be overruled and the writ of mandamus awarded as prayed for in the petition.
Writ awarded.