124 N.Y.S. 205 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1910
It' appears by the ■ order from which the appeal was taken that the court found that the respondent was duly subpoenaed at Delmonico’s down-town restaurant in the borough of Manhattan on the 20th' day of March, 1909, to attend Trial Term, Part 14, of the Supreme Court,' at the county court house in the' county of. New York, on the 23d day of March, 1909, as’a witness for the defendants in an action then pending trial' in said court wherein one Simpson was plaintiff and the relators were defendants; that he • failed to appear pursuant to the command of the subpoena; that he was a material witness on the issues to be tried in said action, and that his failure to obey said subpoena was caloulaté3 to, defeat, impair, impede or prejudice the rights or remedies of the relators ■ as -defendants in said action, but that it did not in fact defeat, impair, impede or prejudice their rights for the reason that they succeeded •in the action.
.On this adjudication, the learned court was not at liberty to fine the respondent with á view to. compensating the relators for actual damages sustained by the failure of t-lie witness to obey the subpoena, for no actual damages were shown; but -the court should have adjudged the respondent guilty of contempt and should
The memorandum opinion of the learned justice, who presided at Special' Term indicates that he would have adjudged the . respondent guilty of contempt were it not for a dictum, in Socialistic. Go-Op. Pub. Assn. v. Kuhn, No. 2 (51 App. Div. 583), based on authorities cited, to the effect that proof of actual loss by the aggrieved party is essential to warrant an adjudication of contempt which correctly states the. rule with respect to an adjudication by which a fine Of more than $250 and the' costs and expenses of the proceeding is imposed, but is not a correct statement of the law applicable to other cases. It must, of course, in all cases be shown- and adjudged that the misconduct or violation of duty was such that it might have defeated, impaired, impeded or prejudiced a right or remedy of a party and that it either was calculated to or in fact did do so. ■ When this is shown and duly determined by '.the
The material facts having been adjudicated adversely to the respondent, we deem it unnecessary to remit the case to the Special Term, and will modify tli.e order by inserting an adjudication that the respondent is guilty of contempt of court, and by imposing a proper fine. The only excuse offered by the respondent for his failure to obey the subpcena is that he claims that the original subpoena was not exhibited to him, and that he took the subpcena to his personal counsel for advice as to whether or not the subpcena was good, and that he was advised that it was a nullity, and that as he had-an important engagement in Chicago for the day on .which he was commanded by the subpcena to be in court, believing that the service was not good and that the subpcena was a nullity, he departed from the .jurisdiction of the court without intending any disrespect for the court. He does not, however, produce the affidavit of his counsel to corroborate his claim that such advice was given. . It appears that the respondent was-a member of the board of managers of the Hew York Cotton Exchange, and he was subpoenaed to prove the rules of the exchange. He was a man of affairs, and his failure to obey the subpoena was neither owing to ignorance of his diity.nor was it inadvertent or unavoidable. It is of course possible, but it is not probable, that a member-of the bar would take the responsibility of thus advising a witness to ignore a subpoena. The respondent should have known and doubtless knew that it was for the court, and not for his counsel, to decide whether or not the subpcena was properly served or was valid, and that such decision could not be- made on the facts as they appeared to him unless they were presented to the court. In taking the advice of counsel; if he was advised as he states, and departing from the jurisdiction of the court, he took the responsibility of an adverse decision by the court, and although he may have intended no willful disregard of the process of the court, yet, the' due- and prompt administration of-justice requires that he should be punished.
Ingraham, P. J., Clarke, Scott and Miller, JJ., concurred.'
Order modified as directed in opinion, and as modified affirmed. Settle order on notice.