72 N.Y.S. 782 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1901
The ground for the rejection of the claims by the board of supervisors, that the claimant was not licensed by the State Board of Charities, is untenable. The provision of the statute requiring a. license is as follows : “ It is hereby made unlawful for any person or corporation, other than a charitable or benevolent institution,, society or association, or society for the prevention of cruelty to-children, now or hereafter duly incorporated tinder the laws of this, state, or a local officer charged with the relief of the poor and placing-out in the manner now provided by law, to place out any destitute child, directly or indirectly, unless such person or corporation shall be duly licensed, as hereinafter provided, by the state-board of charities, to place out destitute -children.” (Laws of 1898,. chap. 264, § 2.) If by the phrase, “ the claimant not licensed ” the-board of supervisors had reference to the relator, who was the-superintendent of the poor, it is clear that he was, within the exception of the statute,, “a local officer charged with the relief of the poor.”' He is an officer upon whom the statute imposes the duty of providing homes in, families for indigent children. Section 2 of chapter 438 of the Laws of 1884, which prohibits the sending-of children between the ages of two and sixteen years, as paupers,, to' any county poorhouse or almshouse, or the detention therein of such children for support, requires that' “ county superintendents, overseers of the poor, boards of charities or other officers, shall pro
Nor were the assignments to the relator of the claims of Maybee in contravention of public policy. No assignments were necessary. The relator, as superintendent of the poor, was authorized to expend not exceeding fifty dollars for each indigent child chargeable to the county placed in a suitable home found by Maybee. Under his authority he could have expended this sum for each child and have a legal claim against the county for reimbursement. This was, in effect, what was done. The arrangement between him and Maybee was substantially the same as if the relator had paid Maybee and had presented a claim in his own name to the board of supervisors for reimbursement. That could not fall under the condemnation of being against public policy. The formal assignment to him of May-bee’s claim did not put him in any different relation to the county than he would have occupied if he had paid Maybee for his services and presented his claim under the resolution to the board of supervisors for expenses. It was a matter of form rather than of substance, and does not bring him within any principle of law prohibiting his recovery against the county.
I am of opinion that the order and judgment appealed from should be reversed and the relator’s motion for- a peremptory writ of main damns should be granted requiring the board of supervisors to reconvene and to audit and allow the claims at such sums as are proper.
All concurred.
Judgment and order reversed on the law and facts, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and motion for writ of peremptory mandamus granted, with fifty dollars costs.,