The relators are patrolmen in the police force of the city of' Buffalo. The city charter creates a department of police and’ provides that there shall not be less than eleven nor more than fourteen police precincts; that the common council shall fix and determine the number of patrolmen in the police force; that there shall-be-a board of police;,which shall consist of the mayor, ex- offieio, who shall be -the president of the board, and two commissioners; that the board shall designate the number of patrolmen to be assigned to each precinct. The provision of the charter over which this controversy arises is as follows: “ The board (i. e., the defendants) shall designate the number of patrolmen to be assigned to each of said precincts and shall" divide said number of patrolmen into three platoon's, no two of said platoons to be on duty at one and the same time, nor shall they wear uniforms when not on actual patrol duty, except when in the discretion of the board public demands are such as to require the aid and assistance of a second platoon, or the board may in its discretion on such occasions order on duty all of said three platoons * * . .
• On July. 5, 1895, the defendants, by preambles and resolutions, made a determination, order or provision -that thereafter a certain number of the members of one or both of the platoons not .on active duty should constitute a reserve; "that"' the men in reserve should remain at the station house, subject
The claim of the relators is that the holding of a member of any platoon in reserve at the station house while a platoon other than the one to which he belongs is ón .active duty is a violation of the statute, in that it requires members of two platoons to be on duty at one and the same.time.- They claim further that the “ occasions ” mentioned in the statute when the defendants are authorized to order on' duty at one and the same time members óf different platoons are times only when there is riot, tumult, disorder, a large fire or an extreme breach of the peace within the city. ' They also claim -that when the new arrangement was made by the defendants there was not sufficient evidence of its necessity, or that one platoon on active duty was not adequate for the proper police protection of the city.
The facts of the case’touching the necessity of the- action taken by the defendants- which it is sought to annul, -according to the record as it is made up, are about as follows:.
The language of the provision of the charter with which we are dealing is not such as we should expect from one skilled in the drafting "of statutes, but its real meaning may be determined, -I think, with less difficulty than is frequently met with by courts in similar cases. We may broadly assume, for the. . purposes of this proceeding, that when the statute in question sáys".“nó two platoons to be on" duty at one and the same-time,” it means simply that no member of one platoon shall be required to- do .duty with -.another, platoon, on the theory that the greater number, of .the whole platoon, includes the . lesser number, or some part of the platoon; that when the statute says that “ platoons shall not wear uniforms when not on active duty, except when, in the . discretion of the board,, public demands are such as require the aid and assistance of a. second "platoon,” it means simply that no patrolman shall wear his-uniform when not on actual -active duty, and when the statute- says the board may, in its discretion on such occasions, order oh duty all three platoons, it means simply that they may order on duty any part of said three platoons. Such is evidently the meaning of the law. - \
¡Now a careful comparison off the statute with the record before us and the determination sought to be annulled makes it plain, '
1. That the defendants designated the number of patrolmen to be assigned to each police precinct.
2. That the defendants divided the patrolmen in each precinct into three platoons. ' •
3. That no patrolman is required to wear his uniform except when he is on actual active-duty.
4. That no member of either of the' three platoons is required to perform active patrol duty at the same time that a platoon Other than that of which he is a member is performing active patrol duty. •"
' My conclusion upon this point, therefore, is that the word “ duty,” es used in the charter, means actual and active duty as distinguished from being kept in reserve or within call for such actual and active duty. The fact that the defendants use the expression “ reserve duty ” does not imply that they give to the word a definition different from what I consider the correct one, and even if it did it would not prove the fact to be as it may be claimed by the. relators their language indicates.
The relators when held in reserve are hot on duty, therefore, within the meaning of the charter, but they are thus kept in reserve to be placed on duty if an emergency shall make it necessary, and in. the absence of any emergency during the time they are held in reserve they are set at liberty from the restraint which has been put upon their movements, without having performed a moment of such active duty as by the charter they are required to perform as patrolmen.. In my opinion there is no conflict between the charter and the determination of the defendants sought to be annulled.
For the purpose, however, of further considering the matter in hand, we will assume for the sake of the argument
E.or this reason alone, as it seéms to me, it must - be held -that the defendants’ aréwested with, the . discretionary power to determine and decide for Themselves whén, iri the. language .-of-.the charter, “ public demands, are such as require that mem;bers of different pilatoons shall:be. on, duty at one. and the sanie time.” .
The case of People ex rel. Purdy v. Fitch, 147 N. Y. 355, relied upon by the relators as authority for the contention that the writ of certiorari will lie in such a case as the one at bar does not, in my opinion, support the conténtion. That and many other cases hold, and in fact the rule is elementary, that where, as _ in that case, a board or officer exercises judicial functions, and no other adequate remedy is available to cor-rect errors made by it or him, the aggrieved party may prosecute the writ of certiorari, but that and all other cases to which my attention has been called where the writ was upheld are clearly distinguishable from the one at bar, in that the determinations reviewed were based on evidence which was certain and definite, and could be intelligently weighed and considered by a court on a review of the matter ; whereas, in the case at bar, the evidence upon which the defendants made the determination complained of may or may not have been Of that character, and even if it were of that character in the particular instance under, consideration, action by them on the same line, while exercising their functions as a board of police, must frequently and probably usually will be based on facts satisfactory to them, but which, if submitted to a court in a subsequent controversy as to the fact whether public demands were of a specific nature on a certain date in the past, would seem puerile and foolish.
My conclusion is that the writ- should be dismissed, with costs.
Titus, Oh. J,, and Hatch, J., concur.
Writ dismissed, with costs.
