48 N.Y.S. 537 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1897
Lead Opinion
On the 28th of May, 1896, the. relator was tried upon certain charges, of which, on the 22d day of July, 1896, he was found guilty and was sentenced to be dismissed from the police force. It is unnecessary to consider particularly the nature of the charges or the evidence against the relator to support them. They were sufficiently proved and the action of, the hoard in dismissing' him was amply justified. The only question presented is as to the regularity of the proceedings which resulted in his dismissal.
The commissioners of the police force of the city of Yew York are by the statute intrusted with authority to make rules, orders and regulations for the government, discipline, administration and disposition of the police force. They are made responsible that the men of the force are properly trained and disciplined, and for the due and proper performance of all their duties. (Consol. Act [Laws of 1882, chap. 410], § 250.) Upon them is imposed the duty of making all appointments to the police force. (Id. § 265.) They make all details for special and other duties which policemen are called upon to perform, and all promotions in the force come directly from them and are made at their discretion. (Id. § 271.) For the proper performance of all these duties it is necessary that they should acquaint themselves with the qualifications of all members of the'force, that they should .observe their conduct, watch their behavior, and thus enable themselves to ascertain whether the men upon the force perform their ■duties properly and are fit persons from whom to make promotions to the various grades. To do this properly of course requires frequent inspection and close observation of the conduct of the men. In the performance of this dirty it is quite likely that the commissioners will detect violations of the rules and improper conduct on the part of the members of the force, if any such thing takes place. But the board of police commissioners are also the sole tribunal intrusted with the power to punish violations of the rules and infractions of discipline by any members of the police force. (Id. § 272.)
It is quite true that members of the police force, before they can be punished for any offense, afe entitled to a hearing upon charges to be preferred against them, and, to a certain extent, the hearing of those charges partakes of the nature of a trial; but the board of police commissioners, in the performance of those disciplinary-duties, is not a court. It is a subordinate and administrative tribunal, and its- action must, be examined, in view of the peculiar manner in which its authority has been conferred and of the way in which the court is organized (People ex rel. Flanagan v. Bd. of Police Comrs., 93 N. Y. 97); and the strict legal rules which apply to the qualification of a judge' sitting in a court cannot be applied to such commissioners. In the performance of these duties their position is unique and is not analogous to the situation of. a judge or of a court except, perhaps, in a few cases where a judge is called upon to punish summarily for contempt committed in the presence of the court, in which case he acts upon personal observation and inflicts summary punishment for an offense committed in his own presence. Although in that case the judge may be said, in a sense, to be interested, yet he is not disqualified from acting because of that interest. But,' in a case where the police commissioners are called upon to sit in judgment upon an offense committed in the presence of one of them who is not a witness to prove it, or who, being a witness, has not to pass upon a con
Patterson, O’Brien and Ingraham, JJ., concurred ; Van Brunt, P. J., dissented.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting):
I dissent. I cannot imagine a case in which, where a party is entitled to a trial, it would be proper for a judge, who is to' weigh the evidence, to be the witness to prove the fact sought tó be estab- . lished. Such a procedure would make a trial a farce ; and it has been too frequently held that these trials are not mere forms,, but matters of substance, in the condluct, of which the party accused is entitled to the protection of all the rules governing q%tasi judicial tribunals; to allow such a departure from ordinary judicial procedure.
Proceedings' affirmed and writ dismissed, with costs.