130 N.Y.S. 363 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1911
Lead Opinion
By article 12 of the Tax ■ Law (Consol. Laws, chap. 60 [Laws of 1909, ch. -62], § 210,.as amd. by Laws of 1910, chap. 38; Id. §§ 211, 212) it is provided that upon every sale or transfer of shares of stock in any domestic or foreign corporation there shall be paid to. the State a tax of two cents upon each $100 of Lace value or fraction thereof. -This tax is paid by affixing to the instrument of transfer, or in case there be no instrument of transfer, upon the books of the party making the transfer, adhesive stamps which are purchased from the Comptroller. For the making of such sale or transfer without the affixing of said stamps the party is deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and is punished by a fine of not less than $500 or more than $1,000, or imprisonment for not more than six months,. Or both such fine and imprisonment. By section 216 (as amd. by Laws of 1910, chap. 453) it is provided that the State Comptroller may inquire into and ascertain whether the tax imposed by the provisions of this article has been paid, and for this purpose he is given authority to examine certain books and papers of any person, firm or corporation whose memoranda of transfers shall be made accessible to him for that purpose, and a failure to disclose the books and memoranda showing such transfers by any person or corporation is made a misdemeanor, subjecting the. party to-heavy fine or imprisonment or both. In 1911 this law was amended so as to prohibit the sale of stamps hy private dealers, or by any one except an authorized agent of the Comptroller.
For the purpose, of making the examinations necessary to ascertain whether the stamps have been duly affixed and the tax paid, the Comptroller has in his office fourteen employees, called examiners of stock transfers. In 1905, when these examiners were first appointed at the request of the State
The requirement of the Constitution in section 9 of article 5 thereof is to the effect that appointments in the civil service of the State shall be made according to merit and fitness, “to be ascertained so far as practicable by examinations, which so far as practicable shall be competitive.” By this provision of the Constitution it is provided that laws should he enacted to provide for the enforcement thereof. In the enforcement of this fundamental law, to somebody must be assigned the duty-of determining in what cases it is practicable to ascertain the qualifications for the office by competitive examination. That duty is primarily placed upon the executive branch .of the government, and by statute has devolved upon the Civil Service Commission. ' It is true that its determination cannot be arbitrarily made, but is subject to review by the courts. There is no doubt, however, as to the rule by which such review should be determined. It is clearly stated in the opinion' of Chief Judge CtjlleN in People ex rel. Schau v. McWilliams (185 N. Y. 100) in this language: “It seems to me that the cases cited indicate the true extent to which the court should assume to supervise the action of the civil service commission. If the' classification of the commission clearly ■ violates the Constitution or the statute, mandamus should issue to correct the classification. If the action of the commission is not palpably illegal the court should not intervene.” In the same case the chief judge states:.“Where the position is one, as to the proper mode of filling which there is a fair and reasonable ground for difference .of opinion among
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting):
I do not think Chief Judge Cullen in his opinion in People ex rel. Schau v. McWilliams (185 N. Y. 92) intended to lay down the inflexible-rule'that the courts could not interfere , in . any classification by the Civil Service Commission unless .its.. act was palpably illegal as that term , is ordinarily understood. - All that was decided in that case was that the court haid made ■ a mistake in People ex rel. Sims v. Collier (175 N. Y. 196) .in - holding that certiorari was the .proper remedy for review of. classification. . The language employed in -the opinion was by way of justification for permitting a review through a writ of mandamus.
The Constitution (Art. 5, § 9) provides that appointments in the civil service of thé State shall' be made according to merit, and fitness, to be ascertained, so far as practicable, by examinations which, if practicable, shall be competitive. -Whether. fitness can be ascertained by a competitive examination- or whether the. position is or is not a confidential one involves the exercise of judgment and discretion- on the part of the Commissioners.
■It certainly is a part of. the duty of courts to ascertain in judicial proceedings whether or'not the constitutional law is violated, and it would seem on review of classification by the Civil Service Commission that it is proper for the. court ■ to ascertain whether such discretion has been abused" or whether such judgment has been erroneously exercised, Of course, if the strict rules applicable to the writ of mandamus are to be
If its acts can be reviewed by mandamus only when palpably illegal, the practical outcome will be that no act of classification by the Commission, however arbitrary or however wrong, .can be corrected by the courts, and if the Civil Service Commission chooses to do so it can make the Civil Service Law a mere farce.
■ Assuming, as I do, that the rule is that courts may review the erroneous exercise of discretion and judgment of the Commission in classification under a writ of mandamus, 1 see no justification for the reclassification which the Commission has
I, therefore, vote for an affirmance of the order of the Special Term.
Kellogg, J., concurred.
Order reversed, without costs, and motion denied, without costs. .