THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS еx rel. BRENT MANNING, Director of Conservation, Appellant, v. PATRICK NICKERSON, Appellee.
No. 84457
Supreme Court of Illinois
October 22, 1998
November 30, 1998
Appellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE HARRISON, specially concurring:
Although I agree with the result reached by the majority, I disagree with that portion of its analysis pertaining to requests for admissions which involve legal conclusions. There is no question that legal conclusions are not an appropriate subject for a request to admit under
James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and John P. Schmidt, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.
FREEMAN, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:
When the State of Illinois sues a defendant in the circuit court, may the defendant assert a counterclaim in the circuit court against the state seeking damages for common law claims otherwise barred by sovereign immunity, or must the defendant file a separate action against the state in the Court of Claims? That is the critical issue for decision, an issue on which the appellate court hаs issued conflicting opinions. Compare the opinion below in this case (292 Ill. App. 3d 346 (defendant may raise issues in the circuit court by way of counterclaim otherwise barred by sovereign immunity)) with People ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Cook Development Co., 274 Ill. App. 3d 175 (1995) (circuit court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate a counterclaim raising claims barred by sovereign immunity), and People v. Patrick J. Gorman Consultants, Inc., 111 Ill. App. 3d 729 (1982) (same).
The Director of the Illinois Department of Conservation (the Director) filed a complaint against the defendant, Patrick Nickerson, in the circuit court of McDonough County. The Director alleged that the defendant, who owns property adjacеnt to Argyle State Park, constructed a building and cut down trees on park property. The state sought a permanent injunction to compel the defendant to remove the building and money damages for the dеfendant‘s use of the land. The defendant filed a counterclaim against the Director and sought a judicial determination of the boundary line between his property and the state park, ejectment of the state from his land, and money damages for the common law torts of trespass, emotional distress, and slander of title.
On the state‘s motion, the circuit court dismissed the defendant‘s counterclaim and held that it laсked jurisdic-
The Illinois Constitution of 1970 abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity “[e]xcept as the General Assembly may provide by law.”
The purpose of soverеign immunity is to protect the state from interference with the performance of governmental functions and to preserve and to protect state funds. S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. State of Illinois, 93 Ill. 2d 397, 401 (1982). Thus, an action brought nominally against a state emрloyee in his or her individual capacity will be considered a claim against the state and barred by sovereign immunity if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff could operate to control the actions of the state or subject it to liability. Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 158 (1992). In this case, the Director initiated a lawsuit against the defendant because he believed that the defendant encroached on state park property. The Department of Conservation is charged with managing state park property, and thus the Director was acting consistent with his public duty as a state official.
Does it matter then that the defendant has raised these tort claims by way of counterclaim in litigation initiated by the state in the circuit court? On one level, as the appellate court concludеd, fairness seems to dictate that the defendant should be allowed to raise any counterclaim in the circuit court: the state started this fight in the circuit court and must live with the consequences. The doctrine оf sovereign immunity, however, is not about fairness. The legislature has conferred immunity upon the state, and the legislature—only the legislature—can determine when and where claims against the state will be allowed. With regard to tort claims, the legislature‘s directive could not be more clear: tort claims against the state must be brought in the Court of Claims. See
The defendant has raised two additional claims in his counterclaim: hе has sought a judicial determination of the boundary line between his property and the state park and ejectment. Does sovereign immunity require that these property claims also be brought in the Court of Clаims? The central issue in the case is who owns the land in question, and that issue is before the circuit court by virtue of the state‘s complaint. The defendant‘s response is that he owns the land—not the state. Thus, the property claims raised by the defendant are defensive in nature and are asserted for the purpose of defeating the
Therefore, we reverse the appellаte court‘s judgment with regard to the tort claims raised in the defendant‘s counterclaim: sovereign immunity bars the circuit court from exercising jurisdiction over those claims and requires that those claims be brought in the Court of Claims. We affirm the appellate court‘s judgment that the circuit court may exercise jurisdiction over the property claims raised in the defendant‘s counterclaim: those claims are defensive in nаture and must necessarily be decided to adjudicate the state‘s request for injunctive relief and money damages. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in part and the cause is remаnded to that court for further proceedings.
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part; circuit court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.
JUSTICE MILLER took no pаrt in the consideration or decision of this case.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with that portion of the court‘s judgment holding that the defendant must refile his tort counterclaims in the Court of Claims. I disagree, however, with the determination that the counterclaim seeking ejectment of the state from the land at issue may properly be
As the majority observes, actions against the State of Illinois may not be brought in any court except as permitted under the Court of Claims Act (Act). Sass v. Kramer, 72 Ill. 2d 485 (1978). Consistent with this principle, a countеrclaim against the state that would otherwise fall under the bar of sovereign immunity may not be asserted in the circuit court, but must be filed as provided under the Act. See, e.g., Gorman, 111 Ill. App. 3d 729. This court has determined that disputes involving propеrty of which the state is the record titleholder constitute “actions against the State” under the Act, and thus are within the exclusive province of the Court of Claims. Gordon v. Department of Transportation, 99 Ill. 2d 44 (1983); see also Sass, 72 Ill. 2d at 490-91. The Court of Claims also possesses sole jurisdiction over all claims against the state “founded upon any law of the State.”
The majority contends that, because the counterclaim at issue, like the state‘s complaint, sought an adjudication of the correct boundary line between the defendant‘s property and the state park, it was merely “defensive in nature” and was “asserted for the purpose of defeating the state‘s action” rather than for “obtaining an affirmative judgment against the state.” 184 Ill. 2d at 249-50. However, this ignores the fact that the counterclaim also explicitly demanded that “the [state] be ejected from [defendant‘s] property.” As a basis for this demand, the defendant alleged that the state had illicitly “entered upon, placed new boundary signs upon, trespassed upon and *** exercised dominion and possession over” that portion of the land bеlonging to the defendant.
An action in ejectment is an affirmative, statutory claim which must be pleaded and proved. See