65 N.Y.S. 935 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1900
The relator presented a petition to the Supreme Court upon which a writ of certiorari was granted, which recited that the relator is a domestic corporation having its principal place of business in the borough of Queens, in the city and State of Now York, and is aggrieved .by a final determination of the defendants in relation to the assessment of certain real estate in the boroughs of Queens and Brooklyn, in said city, and which writ required the defendants to make a return at a Special Term of the Supreme Court to be held at the court house in the city and county of New York on a day named, of “ all your proceedings concerning the assessments of the property of the relator hereinabove described had and taken by you.” The defendants failed to make such a return, whereupon a motion was made to punish them for contempt, which was granted, and from such determination the defendants appeal.
The defendants based their refusal to comply with the writ upon the ground that under the law the writ must be applied for in the second judicial district and made returnable there, and that, therefore, the writ was of no effect. This contention is based upon section 251 of the Tax Law (Laws of 1896, chap. 908), which provides that a petition for a writ of certiorari must be presented to a justice of the Supreme Court, or at a Special Term of the Supreme Court, in the judicial district in which the assessment complained of was rna.de ; that upon the presentation of such a petition the justice or
Assuming that this writ was issued under the provisions contained in this chapter, the first question presented is whether this point can he raised upon a motion to enforce the writ. The writ was granted by a justice of the Supreme Court while holding a Special Term in the city and county of New York. Whether or not the writ should be returnable at a Special Term to be held in the city and county of New York, or returnable at a Special Term to be held in the. second judicial district, was a judicial question presented to the. justice to whom the application was made. So long as the writ remained in full force and effect, it was the duty of the defendants to comply with its command, and the validity of the writ could not be attacked collaterally. The writ certainly was not void. A justice of the Supreme Court has by the Constitution the power to hold court in any county of the State, and as the justice could grant the writ, his determination of the question as to the place of the return could only be attacked in a direct proceeding for that purpose, and not upon an application to enforce the writ. The court below was, therefore, correct in compelling a compliance with the command of the writ.
We are, however, of the opinion that the writ was correctly returnable at the Special Term held in the first judicial district. Under the provision of the Tax Law before cited, the only writ allowed is the writ to the officer making the assessment, and if the defendants were not such officers, then the petitioners were not entitled to the writ. The defendants are the tax commissioners of the city of New York. It is their official action that is to be reviewed, and their duties are prescribed by the charter of the city of New York. If their official acts, which it is sought to review, were performed within the county of New York, then it would seem to follow that the writ must be returnable at a Special Term held in that county.
Section 885 of the charter (Laws of 1897, chap. 378) provides that the head of the department of taxes and assessments shall be called the board of taxes and assessments. Section 886 provides that “ All of the rights, powers and duties heretofore devolved by law upon the board of taxes and assessments in the city of New
This proceeding is brought under the provisions of section 906 of the charter, and is to review the final determination of the board of commissioners of taxes and assessments in determining the amount
It follows that the order appealed from must be affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.
Van Brunt, P. J., O’Brien, McLaughlin and Hatch, JJ., " concurred.
Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.