*1 KUNCE, Petitioner-Appellee, Judge, PEYTON H. Circuit THE PEOPLE ex rel. al., Respondents-Appellants. v. DENNIS HOGAN et Fifth No. 74-313 District Opinion April 1976.
JONES, J., dissenting. Office, Bradley Stonecipher, Paul Appellate both State Jan Defender’s Chicago, appellant for Coleson. James Lewis, Hogan. Chicago, appellant Melvin B. Dennis Mendelsohn, Ralph Attorneys William F. Meehan and both of Illinois State’s J. Association, Cairo, appellee. Mr. opinion GEORGE MORAN of the court: delivered JUSTICE J. appeal This an from order of the circuit court Alexander *3 (cid:127) County finding appellants, lawyer, a his criminal defendant and a prosecuted of court. each three counts of Appellants were on cause, cooperatе fully rule to the charging show that their refusal to with preparation presentence against of action report and their a civil judge the presiding contemptuous. were verdict,
By jury of two appellant guilty Coleson was found James counts of for welfare benefits. perjury application falsification of for Coleson, testify at trial. represented by appellant Hogan, Dennis did not Coleson, and presentence investigation The trial judge ordered fully probation with the officer Hogan cooperate ordered Coleson and to by filed conducting post-trial the motions were investigation. After suit behalf, a civil appellants on prior sentencing, Coleson’s but to attorney of against court and the State’s judges of the circuit 1;hree the criminal County practices Alexander out bail damages arising for proceedings against Coleson. officer, certain provided
At an probation interview the Coleson with answer information, Hogan, refused to background but on the advice of offense, rights his under asserting questions material instead perjury first, Constitution. fifth United States and sixth amendments motions, trial was informed hearing judge After a on post-trial interview, a second appellants’ actions at the He then ordered interview. officer, ordered to aU respond questions by Coleson asked ordered interfere, Hogan not to and warned bоth appeUants possible contempt citations. The trial judge granting further stated he was full and complete immunity given probation to Coleson for aUinformation to the advice, officer. A again, Hogan’s second was held and interview questions Coleson refused to certain literacy answer refused to take a test. imposed Sentence for the perjury convictions was thereafter judge. trial
A prior few days sentencing, judge the trial filed a to show rule cause I charging appeUants contempt. Count of the rule related to appeUants’ respect presentence actions with to the Counts investigation, II and HI related to the civil action the trial judgе which named a him, defendant. against Because of the action the trial pending excused judge, himself and another who wiUhereafter be referred to as the “presiding judge,” presided over the proceedings. AppeUants adjudged were court three on aU counts. counts, Hogan was fined *750for each of the three to three sentenced 30-day jail terms, concurrent possible disciplinary referred for action Attorney to the Registration and Disciplinary Commission. Coleson was fined *100 each count. sentencing
Under the the State IUinois a court is statutes of required presentence report any to order a defendant convicted of felony, (Ill. par. unless waived the defendant. Rev. Stat. ch. 3—1.) The purpose presentence report provide is to 1005— court with information may about defendant so that sentence be imposed, with the being able to take into account nature and circumstances of the offensebut alsothe and character history defendant, condition, his physical mental and social (Ill. case, 3—2.) situation. Rev. Stat. ch. instant par. 1005— defendant Coleson chose take of his have advantage right the court sentence, impose an informed but matters with discussing without certain the investigating Putting validity officer. aside for moment self-incrimination, Coleson’s asserted faced privilege we are power issue of the sentencing court to order a defendant who does not with an presentence report waive the to communicate probation investigating officer. Does a defendant’s failure waive report personal, to a objections, legal amount waiver of and all *4 may he to disclosing have certain information? in country testimony, part
There exists this a on the right to based sixth subpoena amendment’s to right right to confrontation and the witnesses, functioning necessary which has been characterized as to the the orderly (Blair courts v. United preservation society. and to the of an States, 468, 273, 281, 979, 982-83,39 (1919); L. 250 U.S. Ed. S. Ct. Testimony, Compel Agencies to Governmental The Power of
Lilienthal, the tеstimony is party’s right to Based on one (1926).) L. Rev. 694 39 Harv. to right the to effectuate testify. And to party in another duty concomitant to the power there exists thus, testify, to duty the to enforce testimony, governmental or testimony, some right to Without a compel testimony. the burden Recognizing compel. power be no there can necessity, stated, power Homes testify, duty the enforcing “[T]he Justice countries, English-speaking is in limited, usually itas testimony is require necessary is privacy sacrifice the least, the cases where at ”o o * (Harriman 407,419-20,53 Com., 211 U.S. Commerce Interstate proper that the 263, in order (1908).) Ct. And 29 S. L. Ed. policy the testimony and necessity the for bemay struck between balance by the noninterference, compel possessed primarily power (1961).) Evidence (Lilienthal, Wigmore, at judiciary. §2195 judicial testimony inferior Therefore, before an compel power case, upon officer, depends in this probation officer such Wigmore. superior court. power existence of that trial order defendant validity judge’s instant case upon the depends officer probation Coleson communicate with of no basis We conceive sought. can right court’s to the information the entire right to waive T a defendant has right.1 contrary, such a o the 3—1.) We do 1973, ch. (Ill. par. Stat. presentence report. Rev. 1005 — in the right a magically a creates that the lack оf such waiver believe necessity governmental mind of or a probe court to the defendant interrogation testimony. jurisdictions have stated Courts other guilty a improper after verdict sentencing of a defendant a State, 685,158 A. by jury. E.g., Heyward 161 med. has been rendered (1932). 900-901 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has sentencing held at the stage a still possesses defendant process rights. (Mempa basic due Rhay, 19 L. Ed. 2d (1967).) S. Ct. It is our conclusion that a defendant facing sentencing by an Illinois court has the right to be free from the burden of duty testify, unless exists there an overriding governmental necessity, right to his testimony, neither present which are in this case. too,
Then it is clear that the questions defendant’s refusal to answer justifiеd under fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. At the time of Coleson’s testify refusal to he adjudged guilty had been jury of the offense of perjury. apparently The lower court believed that as a verdict, result of guilty Coleson’s fifth privilege amendment 1 We dealing are not question right of a defendant’s to information possession person of a by probation third preparation who interviewed in the officer presentence report. *5 678 incrimination, is possibility It true that the removal of the of
ceased. including adjudication guilty, privilege. a final of does eliminate the States, 507, 249, L. S. Ct. (Reina v. United 364 U.S. 5 Ed. 2d 81 260 in (1960).) aspects. But conviction here was not final several “[t]he 108, 22 Ill. imposed.” (People Hartley, App. Sentence had not been v. 3d held, (1974).) 109 In a Hartley ample authority, the court where sentenced, pending, post-trial defendant had not been motions were a final appeal expired, jury the time for had not the verdict was not fifth extinguist conviction such as to the defendant’s amendment his protection A is full from the effects of privilege. defendant entitled to Scotti, 104,108,112 (1953).) Ill. N.E 91 Reina testimony. (Halpin v. 415 .2d and the case at bar in that the clearly distinguishable Hartley is from already serving in was a sentence and there no contemnor Reina being any post-conviction indication in that case that remedies were pursued. incriminating testimony
A the use of proper grant immunity of from self-incrimination, operate extinguish privilege against can to a witness’s testimony. (Kastigar his compelling and can be basis for a valid order the 441,32 212, 92 States, (1972).) S. Ct. 1653 v. United 406U.S. L. Ed. 2d specified under certain provide procedure statutes of this State a where to a witness and the witness immunity granted circumstances can be 38, (Ill. par. 3.) Assuming, ch. compelled testify. Rev. Stat. 106 — trial, a presentence investigation part of arguendo, First, respects. in important two immunity complied statute was not than its motion rather immunity to Coleson on own judge granted the trial defendant, State, secondly, Coleson was on motion of the authority must be immunity statutory A under grant material witness. of Rockola, v. 339 (People compliаnce in strict with the terms of the statute. Court reversed (1930).) Supreme Ill. 171 N.E. In Rockola the testify after an a refusal to adjudication which was based on the court empowered in that case immunity. of The statute grant invalid offenses, specified trials certain investigations grant immunity held invalid immunity was including bribery. grant of of crime conspiracy trial was charged Rockola because the offense bribery, commit not the offense itself. trial was by immunity granted
Having decided that the a court’s of question remains the authority, his there statutory not within such this State have no of immunity. The courts power grant inherent (1964).) The power. (People English, v. III. immunity of by grant self-incrimination privilege against removal of Viramontes, 53 v. (Apodaca legislature. may only accomplished by be In words 425, 13 (1949);English. N.M. 212 P.2d A.L.R.2d Judge Cardozo: grant immunity very assumption of an truth the
“The *° *. assumption power It is the to annul legislative power crimes, statutory law to stem the individuals or classes the from the grand jurors county justice, course of to absolve duties, from his.” prosecuting officer performance 489, 495 261-62, 177 (1931). N.E. Doyle Hofstader, 257 N.Y. immunity, grant legal judge’s from trial invalidity Aside protection protect the defendant granted wholly inadequate valid, immunity, A to be grant the effects of statements. purports privilege must the fifth amendment be co-extensive with Hitchcock, (1892); L. Ed. 1110 (Counselman remove. immunity did not Kastigar States.) grant this case the United *6 the result of protect imposition Colesоn from the of harsher sentence as be testimony, is that the information would not nor clear obtained against used him the event of a retrial. its to ground
Another on which the lower court seems have based judgment imposed upon are the disclosure limitations information presentence investigation. may Such information be obtained provided to sentencing judge, prosecutor, penal officials institution, 1973, (Ill. Stat. anyone and “as the court.” Rev. else ordered 38, 3—4.) gives ch. do the State us par. comprehend, We not and 1005 — no legal logical suggestion, or how limited disclosure could serve privilege remove the self-incrimination.
The fact the with the court ordered Coleson communicate probation after fifth does not overruling plea officer amendment contends, and affect the of this As the State all orders outcome case. if judgments promptly, even believed complied courts must be America, (United 330 U.S. incorrect. States v. Mine Workers United 258, 884, (1947).) general 91 L. Ed. 67 S. Ct. But rule does 677 is self- apply which asserted be where the order to reveal information 574, 449, 464, 42L. 2d incriminating. (Maness Meyers, 419 U.S. Ed. 586-87, 584, 95 in that instance (1975).) S. Ct. The situation different Thus, in compliance. from possibility irreparable injury because of be amendment, properly may review precompliance area of fifth sought, prevail, if the violation of privilege and later held to v. Meyers. longer supports order citation. Maness no been could have ground privilege final Coleson’s on which probation officer extinguished is that information obtained subject subsequent voluntarily and thus provided, would not have been suppression. Burger: the words of Chief Justice a later upon yet bag’ and reliance
“Here the ‘cat’ was not ‘out of the with no the cat out’ objection suppress would ‘let motion (Maness Meyers, putting it back.” assurance whatever of 584, 574, 586, 593.) 449, 463, 95 S. Ct. 42 L. Ed. 2d U.S. 791, 1969).) We States, (D.C. Cir. 416 F.2d (See also Ellis v. United compel testimony because may lawfully that a court cannot hold Such circular subsequent exclusion. compulsion would be the basis for by the guaranteed which is destroy very protection reasoning would fifth amendment. lawyer can iswhether a final issue with which we are faced his client to offering faith advice to good
be
of court for
held
correct,
given was
hold that the advice
disobey a court order. Since we
along
judgment
with the
must be reversed
judgment against Hogan
further than to base our
obligation
go
an
against Coleson. But we feel
extremely important
It is
that alone.
attorney
decision as to
on
contempt adjudication
that the
express clearly
unequivocally
we
if his
were incorrect.
even
advice
against Hogan would be reversed
until
rule,
complied
must
reversed
As a
orders of courts
be
general
258, 91 L.
Workers,
Ed.
330U.S.
(United
v. United Mine
appeal.
on
States
Moreover,
in certain
improper,
it is
(1947).)
Prior to substantial had existed Coleson’s County. controversy in This had concerning procedures bail Alexander in in States District Court filing litigation resulted of civil the United County. The judges some of the and other officialsof Alexander Court of ruled that a cause of action had Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (7th been in Cir. litigation. (Littleton Berbling, stated v. 468F.2d review, 1972).) reversed, On Supreme holding United States Court plaintiffs standing lacked in that most of them had never been chаrged plaintiffs prosecuted with an offense.Asto those who had been past, Supreme standing compláin Court that lacked held because of suit. O’Shea prosecutions had terminated with the Littleton, (1974); S. Ct. 38 L. Ed. 2d Littleton, Spomer (1974). U.S. L. S. Ct. 685 38 Ed. prior sentencing, claimed that time of Coleson’s bail to the practices still Spomer litigation similar to those in O’Sheaand attacked the Essentially, alleged existed. Coleson that he had been denied assistance of bond, had hearing, placed counsel at his bail had been under a *1000 and been on his opportunity denied the to show entitlement to release own recognizance. testimony It was Hogan’s stipulated hearing reading Supreme that after States Court cases of United Littleton, Spomer plaintiff O’Sheav. Littleton and he concluded that a in a practices standing litigate civil action bail lose challenging would once he deposit was sentenced and his bail returned. citation,
With II HI reference to Counts presiding judge contemptuous did not find that was used, totally lacking of itself that it language because of the but rather merit; sentencing that it could rather than before have been filed after solely purpose obstructing justice. therefore was filed for the charges transcript was a evidence introduced to sustain the *8 and the proceedings, complaint proceeding criminal the in the civil 682 hearing At thе before by judge. rule filed the trial to show cause
verified it agreed that the had to judge, the State evidence presiding faith, complaint good that was not filed in but rather was prove court,” rule to cause. “disrupt was the verified show or embarrass However, committing a appellants charged because were not the trial physical presence judge, in the of the contempt direct criminal against rule show cause was not evidence judge’s verified 499; Oliver, 92 L. S. Ct. (See re Ed. 68 appellants. Therefore, Skar, 101.) if are v. 30 Ill. we People 2d order, that so on the basis solely sustain trial court’s we must do intent complaint sentencing was filed with the prior by justice. point contempt оbstruct We out be committed may that scandalous, contemptous language incorporating impertinent, insulting or notice of reflecting on the of the court in motions and integrity pleadings, Richardson, Ill. Sherwin, People v. (People motions. v. Ill. 84.) However, did find that the trial court’s order not we further observe must language complaint. there was such in the The trial court’sorder all. at upon imposed be sustained or not ground which Miller, People v. 51 Ill. 292. 2d N.E.2d language We are situation contained therefore faced with a where contempt complaint evidentiary furnish an basis a sufficientto conviction, prove beyond a but rather a situation where the State must filed the reasonable that the defendant doubt extrinsic evidence justice. intent to reflects that State obstruct record than charges introduced other support no evidence these whatsoever the verified contempt citation. contempt. In
This case
it was
indirect
theory
was tried on the
that
indirect
opinion,
charges
our
made
the defendant were not
part
in a constituent
contempt,
contempt
but rather
direct
committed
judge.
presence
court outside
that
contempt.
consistsof acts
are two classes of
One
There
direct
sees
performed
presence
judge,
are
in the
of a
so
physical
later
which are
and hears for himself
the elemеnts of misconduct
all
other
charged against
having
contemptuous.
has
been
the defendant
occurs before
category
conduct which
direct
includes
(In
court,
judge.
physical presence
not in the
part
constituent
but
1, 3;
Oliver;
220, 224,
People
N.E.2d
51 Ill.
People
Jashunsky,
re
may be
category
first
Skar.) Contemptous
that falls within the
conduct
Oliver;
Skar.)
People v.
re
summarily
judge. (In
punished
by the
category
falls within the second
Allegedly
which
contemptous behavior
at criminal
extrinsic evidence
must be
of direct
established
Oliver;
When a
Skar.)
(In
People
impartial hearing.
fair and
re
defendant,
prove
of this
the State must
charged against
kind
beyond
contempt.
a reasonable
defendant commited the
*9
doubt
Barasch,
Skar;
Ill.
People
People
v.
v.
Chicago
ex rel.
Bar Association
407, 412, 173
417, 420;
Building
Hart
City Chicago
Corp.,
2d
N.E.2d
v.
of
39,
Ill. App.
2d
The proceeding against the appeUants contempt charges on the criminal, civil, rather than proceeding object because the of the proceeding punish was to appellants. Cyanamid American Co. v. Rogers, 679; 21 Ill. Dole, 3d App. N.E.2d Eastman v. 213Ill. App. 364.
A criminal
contempt
every
respect.
a crime
fundamental
(Bloom Illinois,
475.)
Ill.
220 N.E.2d
rev'g 35
crime,
Because a criminal
contempt
parts
is a
consistsof
basic
the two
offense;
is,
of a criminal
a mens rea and an actus
rea
reus. The mens
required
embarrass,
contempt
criminal
is an intent “to
hinder or
obstruct a court in its
its
derogate
administration of
or to
from
authority
dignity,
bring
(In
or
or
disrepute.”
the administration of law into
re Estate Melody,
42 Ill. 2d
see also United
Seale,
States v.
(7th
In order to sustain pursuant the trial court’s order entered II cause, Counts and III the rulе prove beyond to show the State had to of. a reasonable doubt that the appeUants filed the civU embarrass, hinder, intent “to or obstruct” the circuit court justice. administration of Since support there no valid evidence to trial court’s finding, finding the order of the trial court defendants guüty on Counts II and III of the citation must also be reversed. foregoing judgment For the reasons the the circuit court of County finding court is guilty Alexander defendants reversed.
Judgment reversed.
CARTER, J., concurs. JONES, dissenting:
Mr. JUSTICE protection right the full of the constitutional zeal assure representation majority glossed disregarded of counsel the has over and true, glaring flagrant contempt case court. contempt finding
I no as to Mr. quarrel have with the reversal I. Count attorney Hogan regard Coleson on count or as to However, finding disagree with the reversal of the majority’s I II III I accordingly Counts by attorney Hogan under *10 respectfully dissent. as majority opinion attorney Hogan of reverses conviction finding II III that no that
Counts and because their there was evidence of attorney damages against Judge Kunce Hogan civil for their justice.” majority premise with an to obstruct discussion “intent III with attorney Counts II and of the citation Hogan’s contempt of under “* 6 ° beyond prove that: a reasonable statement the State must complaint with by doubt extrinsic that filed the evidence the defendant is in Illinois justice.” applicable intent to obstruct This not the standard apply the rule Although they of law. refused to and is a misstatement properly III the stated attorney Hogan majority under Counts II and generally defined as opinion contempt court earlier their that of a in its administration obstruct conduct calculated to embarrass or bring the dignity, or justice authority or to from its or derogate of Ill. 2d Jashunsky, v. 51 disrepute. (People of into administration law 451, 248 104.) The 42 Ill. 2d N.E.2d Melody, In Re Estate of the acts of majority opinion ignores a consideration they presumably instead a rule regard applies to this standard and Seale, 1972). In (7th Cir. 345 have taken United States F.2d from respondent acts of the court discussed whether the Seale case contempt. dealing came of a Federal statute there within the ambit it that a district §401(1) (1970) provides and The statute is 18 U.S.C. in its person any summarily “[mjisbehavior has power punish justice.” administration presence or so near thereto as obstruct contempt support lists requirements The Federal four statute misbehavior; (2) the must (1) conviction: the conduct constitute obstruction to the administration must to the level an misbehavior rise so presence in the or justice; must be court’s (3) question the conduct (4) justice, there administration of and proximate that obstructs the must an be intent to obstruct. requirement their for
It thus that the has lifted appears majority and elements of the second fourth finding of from in Illinois are precedent statute. without under the Federal Such criteria determining whether inject standard for entirely new court has committed. been establishing contempt, for
Developing improper standard “a contempt, mens majority parts are basic to criminal state there two Seale, and United Melody, rea and an cite Estate They actus reus.” Oliver, (7th for 1972), authority rel. Cir. States ex Robson v. F.2d required description the “mens rea” “actus reus” nor make reference contempt finding. The cases cited discuss neither aspect contempt. to a “mens or rea” “actus reus” here, majority if governed the criteria of Federal statute Even finding The Illinois rule is disregarded general rule for intent. mind, and, admitted, by if shown intent is a state of can be Koshiol, 573, 262N.E.2d surrounding 45 Ill. 2d (People circumstances. 446.) ordinarily proved circumstantially, by Intent must be inferences (People drawn from in its appraised conduct factual environment. Johnson, And statute the 864.) Ill. 2d N.E.2d under the Federal determining rule existsis similar to that requisite whether the intent following Illinois as the Seale case: shown from as a act requisite “The minimum intent is better defined volitional reasonably done one be aware that who knows should course, design Of an actual wrongful. conduct [Citations.] grievous is more subvert administration of mind, of such an evil perhaps culpable proof state of but more required intent. unnecessary motive to establish the [Citation.] intent be which this can Certainly, the most obvious source from *11 Indeed, some transcript. ascertained is the trial [Citations.] of intent depicted carry conduct will itself sufficientindicia therein this 461 F.2d on issue.” satisfy proof Government’sburden 345, 368-69.
The Rule Kunce filed asserted that Judge to Show Cause which complaint damages Hogan for civil filed on behalf Coleson attorney for, was so good not filed in faith but prayed to obtain relief hinder, justice and delay impede of criminal the administration judicial interfere with court so as lessen processes and embarrass the the court’s dignity authority. and
I believe the assertions of the Rule were well in founded law and in fact attorney established and that Hogan properly was guilty found contempt and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
The contemptuous act attorney Hogan his serving was as attorney in fifing Coleson suit damages against civil Judge Kunce before whom being prosecuted Coleson was for the perjury, crime of while that criminal case was still pending. Such action is question without a direct attack upon integrity speaks the court. The act for itself and embarrass, obviously was calculated to hinder and obstruct the court in its administration and derogate did from its authority dignity and bring disrepute. administration of law into majority opinion assert that the State introduced “no evidence in support charges whаtsoever” of the other than the verified contempt citation. But that is not true. The record shows that the civil complaint for damages against Judge Kunce was attached to and incorporated in the Rule to Show Cause that charges contained the against made attorney Hogan, and that this complaint was Moreover, admitted by stipulation parties. into evidence of the throughout the contempt hearing attorney Hogan, through attorney, admitted the complaint against Judge of the Kunce while the criminal case Coleson pending. was No further evidence of attorney Hogan’s contempt required.
In this case written acts specifications constituting nоtified, (the Cause), were filed respondent Hogan Rule to Show was hearing Hogan present represented by was held at which was counsel. fifing Judge properly After the Rule to Show Cause Kunce recused assigned himself from the case and it was to another who Thus, conducted the hearing. attorney Hogan process was accorded due Skar, 101; proceeding. People of law this 30 Ill. 2d N.E.2d S. Mayberry Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 27 L. Ed. 2d 91 Ct. United States v. Seale.
Admittedly
language
damages
used
for civil
per
se contemptuous
contemptuous
that is not the nexus of the
—but
act. We are not concerned here with the rule which holds that the mere
fifing
containing contemptuous
with the
any
clerk
document
Kelly,
matter
sufficientto
direct
as in In re Estate
constitute
365 Ill.
Kunce, knowledge of legal authority acting without sufficient CF—22, and, in in 73 — CF—11 and the state of the record 73 — purported of to exercise authority Judge excess his to effect authority Supreme of Illinois Court administrative and 73— 73 — CF—11 flowing together of cases administrative subject substantially be different as cases he knew to CF — matter parties.
and purported, 7. That Kunce Peyton at the the Honorable time aforesaid, 28, 1973, authority to exercise administrative June courts Roy Gulley, the Honorable O. Administrator of the Illinois, Peyton State either had authorized Honorable not act, or, given Kunce to if the Honorable so authorization was other basis Peyton delegation Kunce was and without invalid in law. authority by
8.
purported
That the
exercise of administrative
also,
C.
Peyton
Hon.
of the Hon. W.
instigation
Kunce was
at the
Spomer
aggravation
knowing
and was an
of and a
continuation
wrongful
the substantial
imprisonment
attachment and false
portion
alleged
of Plaintiff*s
2 above.”
person
paragraph
Hogan
It is
readily
attorney
apparent
allegations
from these
Judge
Mr.
Kunce as
litigated
Coleson could have
their bond issue without
fixing
party
part
since
the bond
defendant
Kunce never took
process.
allegation
Judge
“purported
was that he
against
sole
Kunce
authority
Suprеme
to exercise the
Illinois
Cotut
administrative
effect
73 — CF—11 and 73—
flowing together
an administrative
cases
° ° °
short,
.”
granted
CF — 22
the State’s motion
Judge Kunce
case,
this,
For
in a
while
damages
consolidate.
he was sued for
civil
yet pending before
consolidated cases 73 — CF—11 and 73 — CF—22 were
him,
*100,000.
civil
attorney Hogan
action
held accountable for
patent absurdity
and he should be
charge,
his
against
perjury
attack
court. If
innocent of the
Coleson was
so, if a
erred,
grievously
if the
appeared
whom
even
before
he
occurred,
remedy
his
had
Coleson had
miscarriage
plainly
then
Coleson,
in his
well
right
attorney Hogan, representing
appeal
knew this.
a civil
because
Bringing
damages
suit for
ruling
litigant.
for a
pending
case is
an available mode of relief
judiciary may
subject
just
rulings
While the
be
criticism
their
behavior, they enjoy immunity
upon
judicial
from civil suits based
Fisher,
646;
Bradley
(13 Wall.)
actions.
20 L. Ed.
In re
Mason,
33 Ill.
People
ex
Bar
Chicago
rel.
Ill.
Standidge,
Association
We need not be concerned with whether filed a *13 hinder, court, complaint with impede intent to embarrass or derrogate authority bring from its or dignity, or of law administration disrepute. into It is settled well that whether direct has been established depends upon alleged the action and intention of the Denson, offending party. (People Ill. 2d Macek, Ill. 135, 182 745; Co., Anderson N.E. Kneisel v. Ursus Motor Ill. 243.) 147 N.E. The Anderson and Kneisel cases are particularly apt they constituting since involved аcts direct occurring outside presence of the court. attorneys
Courts should require practicing higher have a regard (In administration required than that which is of laymen. re Kelly.) Hogan’s filing Estate in the Attorney conduct of this civil suit for damages is flagrant precise so outrageous precedent that no can be Clearly good Judge found. was not faith as to since he Kunce nothing to with the bond in had do Coleson’s case. The conclusion misbehavior flagrant which can be drawn from it deliberately impede orderly that was calculated to administration court, justice. authority His conduct dignity assailed possessed punish contempt. the inherent him I affirm power would III finding contempt against attorney Hogan under Counts II and Rule to Show Cause.