10 N.Y.2d 374 | NY | 1961
The question, undecided in this State (see Matter of Richetti v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 300 N. Y. 357, 360) but answered affirmatively in many decisions elsewhere, is this: Does an inordinately long and unexplained delay in imposing a criminal sentence cause the trial court to lose jurisdiction so that a sentence thereafter imposed is void and the defendant is entitled to habeas corpus relief 1 Although there are no controlling New York statutes (see Code Grim. Pro., §§ 471, 472, 482), it is settled law in this State that- the imposition of sentence may not be “ indefinitely deferred or postponed” (Matter of Ilogan v. Bohan, 305 N. Y. 110, 112; People ex rel. Prosser v. Martin, 306 N. Y. 710; People v. Cioffi,
An important holding to the contrary is the United States Supreme Court’s in Miller v. Aderhold (288 U. S. 206, 210) where it is said that, while indefinite or overlengthy postponement is unlawful, it gives the defendant no rights at least unless he has moved for timely sentencing, since his failure so to move is a consent or waiver. But the Miller holding is not binding on us and seems at war with concepts prevalent in this State especially since our State nowhere imposes on a defendant any duty to demand sentence and the question of retention or loss of jurisdiction should not depend on activity or nonactivity of defendant. Furthermore, a waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right and there is no proof here of any such intention of this relator. Actually, as will appear, the matter of the outstanding charge had been called to the attention of the prosecutor who took no action.
Relator, by the sentence which he is here attacking as void, was sentenced in November, 1959 to imprisonment for a term of
Relator was on parole from West Coxsackie for a year and a half, then was returned as a parole violator, then was released in April, 1958 at the expiration of the maximum term for which he had been sent to the institution. After being free for some months, he was rearrested on other charges to which he pleaded guilty and at this point was brought in for sentence on the old 1953 indictment. The sentence was probation for 5 years but
This State has a strong policy against unreasonable delays in criminal causes and it has been enforced to the full (see People v. Wilson, 8 N Y 2d 391). No reason appears why it should not be enforced here. Sentencing is the entry of judgment in a criminal cause. It is a part of the judicial process and, as explained in the above-cited cases from other jurisdictions, it is in the absence of compelling reasons inconsistent and disorderly to defer that part of the process. We need not stop to inquire what factors justify long delays in sentencing because we find here nothing that the law would accept as a reason. Not only orderly administration of the courts and the public interest therein demand prompt disposition of these matters but a convicted defendant also has an enforcible interest in having judgment pronounced. Until such pronouncement he cannot be eligible for pardon or commutation of sentence, and deferment of imprisonment puts off the time when he can serve his term and return to society or can be eligible for parole. In this case the sentence if promptly announced in 1953 could not have sent relator to prison since he was but 17 years old. Lack of a judgment prevents an appeal. For all these reasons we think the better rule is that a long and unnecessary failure to sentence is not only an error but results in lack of jurisdiction. If sentencing can be delayed 6 years without failure of jurisdiction, it can be delayed forever.
We cannot list in advance all the circumstances which will justify long delays. We know that they are unavoidable in many instances. The rule we make is to be applied to extremely long and unreasonable delays only.
The order appealed from should be reversed and the prayer of the petition granted.
Judges Dye, Froessel, Van Voorhis, Burke and Foster concur; Judge Fuld concurs in result only.
Order reversed and matter remitted to Special Term for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion herein.