THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS еx rel. N. DAVID GRAF et al., Appellees, v. THE VILLAGE OF LAKE BLUFF, Illinois, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant.
No. 91715.
Supreme Court of Illinois
Opinion filed June 19, 2003.
206 Ill. 2d 541
Unlike my colleagues in the majority, I am convinced that the purpose of the aggravated battery with a firearm statute remains exactly what Lombardi declared it to be five years ago: discouraging the infliction of injury by knowingly discharging a firearm. Inasmuch as this purpose is wholly distinct from that of the 15/20/25-to-life statutes, I prefer not to participate in the majority‘s cross-comparison analysis.
I therefore dissent.
JUSTICES KILBRIDE and GARMAN join in this dissent.
Steven M. Elrod, Peter M. Friedman and Julie A. Tappendorf, of Holland & Knight, L.L.P., of Chicago, for appellant.
JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
In this сase, we decide whether a trial court‘s finding that a parcel of land is contiguous to the annexing municipality in a proceeding initiated under section 7-1-2 of the
The circuit court of Lake County denied plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a complaint in quo warranto seeking to challenge the annexation of a parcel of land on the basis that it was not contiguous to the annexing village. The appellate court reversed, holding that the existence of contiguity was a jurisdictional condition precedent to the filing of a court-controlled annexation proceeding under
I. BACKGROUND
On October 10, 1980, two owners of parcels of land in an 8.3-acre tract, commonly referred to as “the Triangle,” filed a petition pursuant to section 7-1-2 of thе
In 1998, the Village annexed a different tract of land known as “the Sanctuary,” again using the court procedures created by sections 7-1-2, 7-1-3, 7-1-4 and 7-1-7 of the
On June 2, 1999, plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to file a cоmplaint in quo warranto to challenge the annexations. Plaintiffs alleged that contiguity in the Triangle annexation existed neither in fact nor in law. Further, they claimed that the subsequent Sanctuary an-
The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion, finding that it was an impermissible collateral attack on the final orders entered in two annexation proceedings. The court further found that none of the plaintiffs had standing to assert a challenge to the annexations because their pleadings did not describe a special interest or private right infringed by the annexations. Plaintiffs appealed.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court‘s order on the standing of plaintiffs Graf, Price and Surkamer, who resided in the Village. The court found that plaintiffs’ allegation, concerning Village tax revenues bеing diverted to pay for government services to the Sanctuary property, was speculative and insufficient. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 901. Therefore, plaintiffs did not show the requisite interest in the case to establish standing. Id. The court, however, partially reversed the trial court as to plaintiff Gottschalk, a Sanctuary resident, finding that Gottschalk‘s averments were sufficient to confer standing. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 902.
The appellate court further held that the existence of contiguity is a jurisdictional condition precedent to annexation, and its absence can be raised in a quo warranto action. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 906. The appellate court believed the provisions of section 7-1-46 of the
II. ANALYSIS
Quo warranto is an extraordinary remedy. It was originally a writ of right for the crown against one who
A. Standing
We first address the Village‘s argument that the appellate court erred in holding that plaintiff Gottschalk had standing to bring a quo warranto action. Gottschalk alleged that, as a result of the annexation, he must: (1) purchase vehicle stickers from the Village; (2) pay Village property taxes; and (3) pay for garbage-collection service regardless of whether he choоses to use it. The appellate court held that these allegations are sufficient to assert the kind of special interest necessary to maintain an action in quo warranto. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 902.
The Village argues here that Gottschalk‘s allegations do not describe a substantial adverse impact and that any new costs are outweighed by the benefits and services provided to residents of the Village. We disagree.
The Village cites no authority applying a balancing test of adverse impact versus new benefits and services. Nonetheless, it argues that a balancing test is consistent with the reasoning in People ex rel. Durst v. Village of Germantown Hills, 51 Ill. App. 3d 969 (1977). There, a township asserted standing to challenge an annexation
In the case before us, the only new benefit described in the record is garbage collection, a service unwanted by Gottschalk. Gottschalk‘s payments for garbage service, mandatory vehicle stickers, and Village property taxes significantly impact his private interests and are not outweighed by any benefits or services described in the Village‘s pleading. Thus, Durst is inapplicable here. Moreover, we agree with the appellate court that the increased financial burdens to Gottschalk resulting from the assessment of Village property taxes and the requirement that he purchase vehicle stickers from the Village are substantial. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 902.
In holding that taxpayers could challenge in quo warranto the right of a drainage district to continue to levy taxes, this court observed:
Moreover, the interest of a citizen in the taxes to be collected from him is obviously distinct, for many purposes, from a general public interest in the enforcement of the law. It is a personal and substantial interest, and it does not become the less so because other citizens have a similar interest. People ex rel. McCarthy v. Firek, 5 Ill. 2d 317, 324 (1955).
Therefore, we believe that Gottschalk has sufficiently alleged a special interest to confer standing to bring an action in quo warranto. The appellate court‘s reasoning on that issue was correct and needs no further explication here.
B. The Contiguity Challenge
In denying plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a quo warranto action in this case, the trial court construed section 7-1-2 of the Code and determined that the
The appellate court reached a contrary conclusion, finding that according to the plain language of section 7-1-4, the legislature intended contiguity to be a jurisdictional prerequisite to an annexation. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 904-06. In its analysis, the court did not refer to
Gottschalk argues, and the appellate court held, that the existence of contiguity is a jurisdictional condition precedent to annexation because section 7-1-4 of the Code requires the trial court to determine whether the petition or ordinance filed under
The Village argues that the conditions precedent to the exercise of the court‘s jurisdiction are established not in section 7-1-4 of the Code, but in section 7-1-2. That section provides as follows:
(a) A written petition signed by a majority of the owners of record of land in the territory and also by a majority of the electors, if any, residing in the territory shall be filed with the circuit court clerk of the county in which the territory is located, or the corporate authorities of a municipality may initiate the proceeding by enacting an ordinance expressing their desire to annex the described territory. *** The petition or ordinance, as the case may be, shall request the annexation of the territory to a specified municipality and also shall request that the circuit court of the specified county submit the question of the annexation to the corporate authorities of the annexing municipality or to the electors of the unincorporated territory, as the case may be.
65 ILCS 5/7-1-2(a) (West 2000) .
In the case before us, the petition to annex the Triangle property alleged that it was signed by a majority of the owners of record and alleged that it was contiguous to the Village. It was supported by the petitioners’ verification under oath. Thus, it conformed to the requirements of section 7-1-2 of the
In August 1998, the Village enacted an ordinance to initiate the annexation of the Sanctuary property. The ordinance contained a legal description of the property to be annexed and averments that it was not within any other municipality and was contiguous to the Village. It also requested that the court find the ordinance to be valid and in conformity with the Code. The trial court entered an agreed order resolving the issues raised by
In challenging the prior trial court orders, plaintiffs’ quo warranto petition is an independent action, not filed in either of the annexation proceedings. Therefore, it is a collateral attack on the two judgments that had previously found contiguity. City of Des Plaines v. Boeckenhauer, 383 Ill. 475, 480 (1943). Plaintiffs argue that a collateral attack is authorized under the holding in Jordan, 21 Ill. 2d 384. In that case, this court reviewed the finding that the requisite number of eligible eleсtors had signed an annexation petition and reasoned:
Plaintiffs do not purport to review the determination of the county court. Rather, their claim is that the county court lacked jurisdiction to make any determination, because the failure of the petition to comply with the statutory requirements rendered it insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the county court. The statutory requirements of the petition are jurisdictional, and the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the county court can be asserted in a quo warranto proceeding. Jordan, 21 Ill. 2d at 389-90.
In light of our holding in Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325 (2002), Jordan has no continued viability. Jordan was decided in 1961, prior to the amendment of the judicial article to our state constitution (
Jordan suggests that the statutory requirements of an annexation petition are nonwaivable сonditions precedent to the exercise of the court‘s jurisdiction. Jordan, 21 Ill. 2d at 390. However, as we explained in construing the limitations period contained in the
The legislature may create new justiciable matters by enacting legislation that creates rights and duties that have no counterpart at common law or in equity. [Citation.] Through the legislature‘s adoption of the Act in 1979, the legislature created a new justiciable matter. The legislature‘s creation of a new justiciable matter, however, does not mean that the legislature thereby confers jurisdiction on the circuit court. Article VI is clear that, except in the area of administrative review, the jurisdiction of the circuit court flows from the constitution.
Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9 . The General Assembly, of course, has no power to enact legislation that would contravene article VI. [Citation.]Some case law, however, suggests that the legislature, in defining a justiciable matter, may impose ‘conditions precedent’ to the court‘s exercise of jurisdiction that cannot be waived. [Citations.] We necessarily reject this view because it is contrary to article VI. Characterizing the requirements of a statutory cause of action as nonwaivable conditions precedent to a court‘s exercise of jurisdiction is merely another way of saying that the circuit court may only exercise that jurisdiction which the legislature allows. We reiterate, however, that the jurisdiction of the circuit court is conferred by the constitution, not the legislature. Only in the area of administrative review is the court‘s power to adjudicate controlled by the legislature. (Emphasis in original.) Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 335-36.
The reasoning in Belleville Toyota applies with equal force to the case before us. There is no common law authority for a municipality to initiate annexation procedures. It is well established that the legislature
Even if plaintiff‘s complaint defectively stated its claim under the Act, the circuit court would not have been deprived of subject matter jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction does not depend upon the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 340.
Applying these principles to the matter before us, it is apparent that the legislature has empowered the court to make findings and orders in annexation cases if presented with a petition or ordinance requesting judicial approval. Once a justiciable matter is properly submitted, a court has the power to decide rightly or wrongly the issues properly before it. As we observed in Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher:
Yet, jurisdiction is not affected by an incorrect judgment: ‘jurisdiction or power to render a particular judgment does not mean that the judgment rendered must be the one that should have been rendered, for the power to decide carries with it the power to decide wrong as well as to decide right.’ [Citation.] Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 532 (2001).
The form and content of an annexation petition or ordinance are prescribed by
For instance, in Richwoods, petitioners challenged the annexation of territory to the City of Peoria on various grounds alleged to be jurisdictional, including the absence of contiguity. In answering the quo warranto petition, the City raised the defense of justification, asserting that its right to annex the territory in dispute was derived from court orders in an annexation proceeding initiated under
To require the city in this prоceeding to go behind the adjudications in cause No. 64 Z 2103, and to prove again here the issues it has already proved there, would require us to ignore the express language of the statute [citation] that adjudications made in proceedings such as those in 64 Z 2103 are to be final and appealable, and in effect would allow, by a collateral proceeding, a de novo review of another adjudication. We are satisfied that quo warranto is not appropriate for that purpose ***. Richwoods, 80 Ill. App. 2d at 366.
The First District of the appellate court reached a similar conclusion in People ex rel. O‘Malley v. Village of Ford Heights, 261 Ill. App. 3d 571, 574 (1994). That court sustained the dismissal of two counts of an intervenor‘s petition in quo warranto challenging a court-ordered annexation, holding that quo warranto was not the proper means of challenging findings made in an earlier action. To allow the quo warranto petition to proceed would allow the improper de novo review of findings in a collateral рroceeding. O‘Malley, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 574. The court also rejected the intervenor‘s argument that the condemnation order was void because the legal description of the annexed property was materially defective. The court held that the legislature had empowered circuit courts to determine whether legal descriptions are materially defective and therefore an order making that determination was not void. Thus, the appropriate method to challenge the ruling was a direct appeal or a motion to vacate under
Conversely, the Second District of the appellate court rejected the reasoning in Richwoods and O‘Malley in Brzica, 268 Ill. App. 3d 420. That court reversed the trial court‘s dismissal of a quo warranto petition challenging an annexation because the petition initiating the proceeding did not contain signatures of a majority of property owners, as required by
For the reasons we have discussed, the holding in
In reversing the trial court, the appellate court also considered whether plaintiffs’ right to challenge the annexations is impacted by the statute of limitations in
The limitation set forth in this section shall apply to any annexation, even where the judge, body or officer annexing the territory did not at the time of such annexation have jurisdiction of the subject matter, and irrespective of whether such annexation may otherwise be defective or void, except that the limitation of this section shall not apply to annexations of territоry which was not contiguous at the time of annexation and is not contiguous at the time an action is brought to contest such annexation.
65 ILCS 5/7-1-46 (West 2000) .
The appellate court reasoned that since contiguity is treated in the same portion of a statute that deals with jurisdictional matters and since contiguity provides the
The Village has never contended that Gottschalk‘s contiguity challenge is time-barred. Instead, it argues that the challenge is foreсlosed by the preclusive effect of the affirmative contiguity findings in two final judgments. We agree. Under these circumstances, the remedy of quo warranto will not lie because the validity of the annexation process has already been given final judicial approval. Thus, the lack of a time-bar to that remedy is irrelevant.
III. CONCLUSION
Although plaintiff Gottschalk has sufficiently alleged the special interest necessary to confer standing to bring an action in quo warranto, nevertheless we hold that the plain language of the statutory scheme allowing court-approved annexations does not permit a collateral, quo warranto challenge to the final legal or factual determinations in such cases.
Appellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent from the court‘s opinion because I believe the circuit court incorrectly denied
In reaching its conclusion that the lack of contiguity does not impact on the subject matter jurisdiction of the court (206 Ill. 2d at 558), the court relies heavily on the analyses contained in Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325 (2002), and Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514 (2001). I dissented in Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d at 365 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow, J.), and in Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 533 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.), and am compelled to again register my disagreement with the court‘s position in this area.
As it did in Belleville, the court today insists that the 1970 constitution changed the concept of jurisdiction in Illinois. While I agree that the changes made to the judicial article in both 1964 and 1970 affected jurisdiction, I do not believe the changes lessened the legislature‘s power to define the statutory causes of action that it creates. Contrary to the suggestion in both Belleville and Steinbrecher that this court has overlooked the changes made to the judicial article (see Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d at 335-36; Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 529-30), this court has consistently recognized that the “jurisdiction” of our circuit courts is conferred by our constitution. In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 65 (1993). In my view, the court today, as it did in Belleville and Steinbrecher, has placed too much emphasis on the changes to the judicial article. Prior to the amendment, article VI read as follows:
The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction of all causes in law and equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as is or may be provided by law ***.
Ill. Const. 1870, art. VI, § 12 .
To be sure, the Judicial Article of 1962, effective January 1, 1964, changed the language of article VI:
The circuit court shall have unlimited original jurisdic-
tion of all justiciable matters, and such powers of review of administrative action as may be provided by law. Ill. Const. 1870, art. VI (1964), § 9 .
However, the word “unlimited” was eliminated from the article in the Constitution of 1970, and it currently reads as follows:
Circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters except when the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction relating to redistricting of the General Assembly and to the ability of the Governor to serve or resume office. Circuit courts shall have the power to review administrative action as provided by law.
Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9 .
In my view, the biggest change resulting from the 1964 amendment was the elimination of the distinction between courts of law and equity, which means that our circuit courts have the power to hear all justiciable matters, whether the causes of action arose from common law, in equity or by statute in derogation of the common law. This change, however, did not alter the fact that a court cannot act in excess of its authority. Nor did it change the way we are to view statutory conditions precedent.
In Belleville, this court identified three cases as being illustrative of the case law which recognized the view that “the legislature, in defining a justiciable matter, may impose ‘conditions precedent’ to the court‘s exercise of jurisdiction that cannot be waived.” Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d at 335 (citing In re Marriage of Fields, 288 Ill. App. 3d 1053 (1997), People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 268 Ill. App. 3d 420 (1994), and In re Estate of Mears, 110 Ill. App. 3d 1133 (1982)). The court rejected the viewpoint espoused in those cases because “it is contrary to article VI” of the 1970 constitution. Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d at 336. The court stated that “[c]haracterizing the requirements of a statutory cause of action as nonwaivable conditions precedent to a court‘s exercisе of
Notwithstanding the rejection of cases like Mears, the court in Belleville nevertheless went on to cite Mears, among other authorities, as support for its proposition that the 1964 amendments to the judicial article “radically changed the legislature‘s role in determining the jurisdiction of the circuit court.” Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d at 337, citing In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 74 (1993) (Miller, C.J., concurring, joined by Bilandic, J.); Mears, 110 Ill. App. 3d at 1137. Indeed, the court pointed to that portion of the Mears analysis that traced the development of jurisdiction from the 1818 constitution to the 1970 constitution. The court concluded that “[i]n light of these changes, the precedential value of case law which examines a court‘s jurisdiction under the pre-1964 judicial system is necessarily limited to the constitutional context in which those cases arose.” Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d at 337. The point made in Belleville, and reiterated today, is that the 1970 concept of jurisdiction changed the way in which we are tо regard statutory conditions precedent and the consequences of a failure to comply with them.
One of the problems, in my view, with the Steinbrecher/Belleville analysis is that this court runs the risk of improperly legislating in the area of statutory causes of action. For example, in Belleville, the court addressed whether the time limitations contained in the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act constituted an “ordinary” limitations period, i.e., an affirmative defense, as opposed to a condition precedent to suit. A majority of the court concluded that the limitations period was not “a jurisdic-
My research has found no legal authority that supports the court‘s view that the changes to the judicial article made in both 1964 and again in 1970 eliminated the legislature‘s ability to establish conditions precedent to statutory causes of action it creates. Indeed, the authorities that do speak to the jurisdictional “revolution” the court so strongly embraces do so while acknowledging the continued ability of the legislature to establish nonwaivable conditions precedent to statutory cases of action. An example, of course, is Mears. As I have noted, the court in Belleville cited to Mears with approval for the proposition that the 1970 constitution changed the way in which we are to view the term “jurisdiction.” However, the court rejected key portions of the analysis in Mears that spoke to the precise issue of the legislature‘s ability to define statutory causes of action. A review of the case illustrates this.
At issue in Mears was the last will and testament of Frances Mears. Mears, 110 Ill. App. 3d at 1133. The principal beneficiary of Mears’ will was Illinois Wesleyan University, which was to receive all of the residue of the estate after several monetary legacies had been paid out. Mears, 110 Ill. App. 3d at 1133. Mears, a widow, died childless, and her heirs were 53 known nieces and
Like this court today and in Belleville, the appellate court in Mears cited the changes wrought by the 1970 constitution in concluding that the concept of “jurisdiction” had changed over time. However, the court in Mears, unlike this court, nevertheless continued to recognize the power of the General Assembly to impose conditions to relief in the statutory causes of action it creates. Indeed, the court in Mears acknowledged that even in light of the 1970 constitution:
[T]he legislature may still impose substantive conditions precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. While this may sometimes erroneously be called a lack of jurisdiction, it is in reality an inability to exercise jurisdiction because the
court cannot waive the condition.” (Emphases added.) Mears, 110 Ill. App. 3d at 1138.
Contrary to the view expressed in Belleville, it is clear to me that this statement in Mears was not “merely another way of saying that the circuit court may only еxercise that jurisdiction which the legislature allows.” Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d at 336. The court was expressing the view that notwithstanding the “revolutionized” concept of jurisdiction, a court cannot act beyond its statutory authority. A similar view was also espoused in published legal commentary following the judicial article amendment in 1964. See H. Fins, Re-Examination of “Jurisdiction” in Light of New Illinois Judicial Article, 53 Ill. B.J. 8 (1964). I also note that in the concurring opinion in M.M., to which the court in Belleville also cited for support of the effect of the changes to the judicial article, the concurring justices cited, with approval, to the portion of Mears that recognized the continued viability of statutory conditions precedent. In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 75 (Miller, C.J., concurring, joined by Bilandic, J.).
In light of the above, I do not agree that the conclusion reached in Belleville was “firmly rooted in our constitution.” Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d at 341. As I review our case law in this regard in order to address the issues raised in the present case, I can find no authority for linking the changes to the judicial article with the notion that statutory conditions precedent are somehow incompatible with article VI. In faсt, the authority that the court points to as hailing the revolutionary constitutional changes to jurisdiction is the same authority the court is willing to “reject” in the context of statutory conditions precedent. The court‘s use of only selective portions of the very case law it relies on diminishes the persuasiveness of its legal analysis.
In addition, I am compelled to point out another matter that deserves comment. The court today echoes Belleville‘s rejection of applying pre-1964 case law to the ques-
As I pointed out in my dissent in Steinbrecher, this
Our conclusion, while firmly rooted in our constitution, is also consistent with the trend of modern authority favoring finality of judgments over alleged defects in validity. See In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 175-77 (1998), citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 (1982); see also Fields, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 1060, citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 (1982). Labeling the requirements contained in statutory causes of action ‘jurisdictional’ would permit an unwarranted and dangerous expansion of the situations where a final judgment may be set aside on a collateral attack. [Citation.] Even if the statutory requirement is considered a nonwaivable condition, the same concern over the finality of judgments arises. Once a statutory requirement is deemed ‘nonwaivable,’ it is on equal footing with the only other nonwaivable conditions that would cause a judgment to be void, and thus subject to collateral attack—a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or a lack of personal jurisdiction. [Citation.] As our appellate court has observed, ‘[b]ecause of the disastrous consequences which follow when orders and judgments are allowed to be collaterally attacked, orders should be characterized as void only when no other alternative is possible.’ In re Marriage of Vernon, 253 Ill. App. 3d 783, 788 (1993) ***. (Emphasis added.) Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d at 341.
The emphasized language demonstrates that the court‘s concern in this area is primarily with preserving the
The fact that members of this court are concerned about the finality of judgments is not objectionable, in and of itself—the excess-of-authority approach has received criticism. See 1B Moore, Federal Practice 648 n.41 (2d ed. 1948); H. Cox, The Void Order and the Duty to Obey, 16 U. Chi. L. Rev. 86, 90-92 (1948). As one court has put it, the application of the rule “necessarily require[s] the drawing of distinctions between subject matter jurisdiction, excess of jurisdiction, and mere error. These distinctions have often proved difficult to draw.” Hartt v. Hartt, 121 R.I. 220, 226, 397 A.2d 518, 522 (1979). This court has chosen to resolve this problem by holding that the changes in the judicial article of our constitution narrowed the definition of “jurisdiction.” However, as I have demonstrated, the changes to the judicial article cited by the court do not support the view that orders made by a court in excess of its authority are shielded from collateral review. The amendments did not speak to whether jurisdiction includes the рower of a court to act in excess of its authority. The court errs in its reliance on those amendments in support of its policy decision to uphold the finality of judgments. In so doing, the court has created confusion—rejecting the legislature‘s ability to create conditions precedent in some cases (see Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d at 341), but reaffirming the legislature‘s prerogative of imposing limitations and conditions on the availability of relief in statutory causes of action in other cases (see In re Marriage of Kates, 198 Ill. 2d 156 (2001)). See also Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d at 371 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow, J.) (noting inconsistencies in this area).
I am not unsympathetic to the concerns of finality
Section 7-1-46 of the Code specifically addresses actions contesting completed annexations. The statute provides that
Neither the People of the State of Illinois nor any person, firm or corporation, public or private, nor any association of persons shall commence an action contesting either directly or indirectly thе annexation of any territory to a municipality unless initiated within one year after the date such annexation becomes final ***. The limitation set forth in this section shall apply to any annexation, even where the judge, body or officer annexing the territory did not at the time of such annexation have jurisdiction of the subject matter, and irrespective of whether such annexation may otherwise be defective or void, except that the limitation of this Section shall not apply to annexations of territory which was not contiguous at the time of annexation and is not contiguous at the time an action is brought to
contest such annexation. (Emphasis added.) 65 ILCS 5/7-1-46 (West 2000) .
In my view, this section obviates the court‘s concerns for finality in this area. The plain language of the statute indicates that contiguity, whether it be considered “jurisdictional” or not, is not subject to a time bar. That is to say, the legislature has allowed an unqualified right to attack a completed annexation on contiguity grounds. I note that the court dismisses the statute as “irrelevant” to the issue because defendant did not raise the time bar (206 Ill. 2d at 558). I agree that defendant did not raise the issue of timeliness, but the statute nevertheless contradicts the court‘s view that contiguity challenges cannot be made in quo warranto actions. The court states that
the legislature expressly authorized the trial court to make that determination [contiguity] in a hearing under section 7-1-4 of the Code. The trial court clearly made a contiguity finding. There is no basis, therefore, to allow another court to revisit that same issue in a quo warranto proceeding when the correctness of the original ruling could have been challenged by direct appeal or by a timely petition for post-judgment relief. 206 Ill. 2d at 557.
This ruling overlooks the fact that the legislature has expressly provided for such challenges in
In my view, the court‘s holding today does an end run around section 7-1-46 and renders it meaningless. One of the fundamental principles of statutory construction is to view all provisions of an enactment as a whole.
In light of the foregoing, I believe the circuit court erred in denying plaintiffs’ leave to file their amended complaint.
CHIEF JUSTICE MCMORROW joins in this dissent.