delivered the opinion of the court:
We are called upon in this case to decide whether one who practices osteopathy pursuant to the certificate of the State Board of Health authorizing him to treat human ailments without the use of medicine and without performing surgical operations is a physician entitled to registration under section 15 of the act “to provide for the registration of all births, still-births and deaths in the State of Illinois,” etc., known as the Vital Statistics act, approved June 22, 19x5. (Hurd’s Stat. 1916, p. 2473.) The necessity for this decision, arises from the refusal of the proper officers of the city of Chicago to register the name and occupation of Fred W. Gage, a graduate of the American School of Osteopathy at Kirksville, Missouri, who was examined, and received the certificate of the State Board of Health on August 30, 1900, authorizing him to treat human ailments in the State of Illinois without the use of medicine and without performing surgical operations, and who has since been engaged continuously in the practice of his profession as an osteopathic physician, having complied in all respects with the rules and regulations of the State Board of Health. Dr. Gage filed a petition for a writ of mandamus requiring the registration of his name in the manner provided by the act. A demurrer to the petition was sustained, the petition was dismissed and the relator appealed.
That the relator was engaged in practicing medicine is settled by section 7 of the act to regulate the practice of medicine in the State of Illinois (Hurd’s Stat. 1916, p. 1701,) and the case of People v. Gordon,
A proviso to section 3 of the Medical Practice act declares that only those who are authorized to practice medicine and surgery in all their branches shall call or advertise themselves as physicians or doctors. ’ This proviso is regarded by the counsel for the appellees as sustaining the position that only persons licensed to practice medicine and surgery in all their branches are authorized to issue certifi- _ cates of death. The proviso is somewhat inconsistent with the provision that treatment for any physical ailment shall constitute the practice of medicine and which authorizes such treatment by persons not authorized to practice medicine and surgery in all their branches. It does not, however, declare that persons treating physical ailments without the use of medicine and without performing surgical operations are not physicians, but only that they shall not call themselves physicians or advertise themselves as such. We said in People v. Gordon, supra, that “the State Board of Health is authorized to divide those who desire to practice medicine in this State into two classes,—-that is, those who desire to practice medicine and surgery in all their branches, and those who desire to practice any other system or science of treating human ailments without the use of medicine or instruments. Section 7 defines what shall be regarded as practicing physicians, within the meaning of the act, as including both classes.” Whether the legislature can constitutionally prohibit one of these classes from publicly assuming the title of physician or doctor is a question discussed in the brief of the appellant which we do not find it necessary to decide. The appeal was brought directly to this court on the ground that if the word “physician,” in sections 7 and -15 of the Vital Statistics act, means only those who are authorized to practice medicine and surgery in all their branches, then to that extent those sections aré unconstitutional, and that the proviso to section 3 of the Medical Practice act is unconstitutional; but we do not find it necessary to decide those questions, since we hold that the word “physician,” in the Vital Statistics act, is not limited. to any particular school of medicine but includes osteopathic physicians.
The judgment of the circuit court of Cook county is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to overrule the demurrer to the petition.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
