Relator is the owner of the land and building at 4 Park avenue in the city of New York. The building is a twenty-
At the court hearing, for the purpose of establishing that the actual value of the property was $1,350,000, relator offered to prove that on March 1, 1941, the property had been sold to it by the New York Life Insurance Company, the former owner, for that sum. The court, over objection, excluded the evidence, holding that it would not receive evidence in any form of what occurred subsequent to January 25,1941, that being the taxable status date of the property for the year 1941; that the certiorari proceeding was one for review only and that it was not authorized to consider anything that came up which was not, or could not have been, before the assessor on the taxable status date.
In so ruling, we think the Special Term fell into error. The statute provides ‘ ‘ The taxable status of all real property assessable for taxation in the City of New York shall be fixed for the succeeding fiscal year on the twenty-fifth day of January in each year.” (New York City Charter [effective Jan. 1, 1938], § 157.) This means simply that the assessed valuation of relator’s property for the year 1941-1942 is to be determined as of January 25, 1941. (Matter of Appell, 199 App. Div. 580; affd., 234 N. Y. 600.) The statute does not bar proof of occurrences after the taxable status date which may shed light upon the actual value as of the taxable status date. Indeed, under the provisions of section 293 of the Tax Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 60), which are applicable to the city of New York because not in conflict with pertinent provisions of the New York City Charter (People ex rel. Am. S. Refining Co. v. Sexton, 274 N. Y. 304, 306, 307), at a trial before the court or referee, “ evidence as to actual sales of real property within the tax district that occurred during the year in which the assessment under review was .made may be given by either party.” The statute thus makes recent actual sales in the vicinity some evidence of value. (People ex rel. Hilton v. Lewis, 256 App. Div. 479.) This would apply particularly to a sale of the very property in question made within a few weeks of the tax date.
Evidence of a sale though made after the taxable status date is admissible at the hearing before the court even though it could not have been before the tax assessors on January twenty-fifth. A certiorari proceeding to review a tax assessment is not merely a writ of review. The law is settled that it is also in the nature of a new trial or a venire de novo; that upon a hearing of the application before the court all proof which was before the assessors or the tax commissioners, and such further evidence as the relator chooses to produce bearing upon the material issues raised by the petition and return may be produced and given. (People ex rel. Manhattan R. Co. v. Barker, 152 N. Y. 417, 430, 431; People ex rel. Jamaica W. S. Co. v. Tax Comrs., 196 N. Y. 39, 50; People ex rel. Bibb Mfg. Co. v. Wells, 84 App. Div. 330, 332; Tax Law, § 293.) In People ex rel. Jamaica W. S. Co. v. Tax Comrs. (supra), the Court of Appeals, at page 50, succinctly stated the rule, as follows: “When the action of assessing officers, however, is questioned by a writ of certiorari under the Tax Law, the court is authorised by the statute to take further and additional proof as to the true value of the assessed property, and upon such proof, in addition to the evidence before the assessing officers, it must endeavor to reach a correct conclusion as to what is a proper valuation. A certiorari proceeding under the Tax Law, therefore, is very much like a revaluation of the property which is the subject of assessment.” (emphasis ours.)
Section 8 of the Tax Law of the State provides that all real property subject to taxation shall be assessed at its full value. Tinder the Administrative Code of the City of New York (§ 155b-1.0; L. 1937, ch. 929) the assessed valuation must be stated at the sum for which the property would sell under ordinary circumstances. The rule for the guidance of tax assessors in making assessments “is the actual value of property to be assessed, and they may avail themselves of all tests of such value within their reach, and of every fact, and all information which in their judgment has any bearing upon such value.” (People ex rel. Jamaica W. S. Co. v. Tax Comrs., supra, at p. 52.)
The Court of Appeals has set forth the method to be employed and the factors to be considered in fixing value of real property as of a definite date. Many elements must be weighed. (People ex rel. Amal. Properties, Inc., v. Sutton, 274 N. Y. 309; People ex rel. Parklin Operating Corp. v. Miller, 287 N. Y. 126,129 — in tax assessment proceedings; Heiman v. Bishop, 272 N. Y. 83, 88 —in determining the amount of a' deficiency judgment; Matter of Board of Water Supply of New York, 277 N. Y. 452, 456-459 — in condemnation proceedings.) In a tax assessment proceeding, evidence of the price paid upon the sale of the same property within a reasonable time after the taxable status date furnishes some, although by no means conclusive, evidence of value. In determining what weight is to be accorded such testimony, the time, the place, the circumstances and the conditions of the sale must be explored. Was the sale bona fidef Was it a distress sale? Was there a fair market? What were the terms of the sale? Has there been any change in conditions between the date of the sale and the taxable status date? All these questions would have an effect upon the worth of such evidence in fixing the value of property as of a given date. Upon a new hearing, all circumstances surrounding this sale may be probed. Respondents will be privileged to adduce such perti
If it were clear from the entire record that the valuation fixed by the Special Term was not excessive, we would not be disposed to interfere with the determination appealed from. However, proof of a bona fide sale of the very property under consideration, for $910,000 less than the value fixed by the court, uninfluenced by other circumstances, would undoubtedly have an important bearing on the valuation finally determined. Such evidence must be received and weighed with all other relevant factors.
For the foregoing reasons the order so far as appealed from should be reversed and the matter remitted to the Special Term for a new hearing, with twenty dollars costs and disbursements to the appellant to abide the event.
Mabtin, P. J., Untermyer, Dore and Callahan, JJ., concur.
Order, so far as appealed from, unanimously reversed and the matter remitted to the Special Term for a new hearing, with twenty dollars costs and disbursements to the appellant to abide the event. Settle order on notice.