29 How. Pr. 360 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1865
The return to this writ of habeas corpus, shows that the relator is imprisoned by the sheriff of Cayuga county upon a process for a contempt, specially and plainly charged in the commitment, issued by the county judge of Cayuga county, an officer clearly having authority to commit for the contempt so charged. By the 41st section of the habeas corpus act, it is provided that when it appears by the return that -the prisoner is in custody in such case, he can only be discharged from such imprisonment in one of five cases therein specified, none of which is applicable to this case except the first, which is, “ when the jurisdiction of such court or officer has been exceeded, either as to matter, place, sum or person.
The county judge clearly had jurisdiction in proceedings supplemental to execution. The proper order for the appearance before him of the relator, was duly made under section 292 of the Code, upon due proof of the recovery of a judgment in this court, and that an execution therein had been duly returned unsatisfied, and such order had been duly served upon the relator, and he in pursuance of the requirements thereof had duly appeared before said judge to submit to the examination thereby directed. The county judge had • thus also duly acquired jurisdiction of the person of the relator, according to the statute.
The examination of the relator had been commenced, but as the proof clearly shows, had not been completed,
The argument of the learned counsel for the relator is, that the ‘appointment of a receiver of the property of the judgment debtor, is the chief object and end of these proceedings supplemental to execution, and that upon such appointment the proceeding is terminated; that such appointment is the final step in the proceedings, like final judgment, and that the jurisdiction of the officers is thereupon at an end. This view of the proceedings, I think, is a mistaken one. They were designed to be a substitute in part for the creditor’s bill of the court of chanceiy, under the old system. For the proceedings by suit, subpoena and injunction, calling for a discovery upon oath, and involving the appointment of a receiver, an order from a
The appointment of the receiver was under said rule 191, or might have been, the first step in the master’s office under the order of reference, and I think in practice was
It was the duty of the judge to file the order appointing the receiver immediately upon such appointment, under said section 298, in the clerk’s office, and the filing of the testimony was of no consequence. It might be evidence, if nothing else appeared, that the judge had concluded the examination of the debtor, but that clearly appears to have been otherwise. I think the county judge did not exceed his jurisdiction in any particular; that the proceedings were not ended before him by the appointment of the receiver, or by any other act or step, and that he was in the proper discharge o his duty in requiring the relator to answer such further questions as should be put to him touching his property, and that his refusal to do so was a contempt, for which the county judge might lawfully commit him as he did.
It follows that the relator must be remanded to the custody of the sheriff of Cayuga county, and the writ of habeas corpus dismissed.