61 N.E.2d 382 | Ill. | 1945
The collector of Piatt county made application in the county court for judgment for delinquent taxes for 1941. Among those listed as delinquent in payment of taxes was appellant, the Baltimore Ohio Railroad Company and its subsidiary, for nonpayment of both general taxes and drainage taxes. It paid one hundred per cent of its general taxes, part, only, being under protest. It paid *391 none of the drainage taxes under protest, and filed objections to part of the general tax and all of the drainage special assessment. There has been no appeal from the judgment of the county court in its ruling upon general taxes, and consequently this appeal only involves the judgment rendered against appellant for nonpayment of special assessments levied for the improvement of the Hammond Mutual Drainage District of Piatt and Moultrie counties.
Appellant filed some fifteen objections, and appellee made a motion to dismiss all of the objections and for the entry of judgment against appellant because no part of the special assessment, for which judgment was sought, had been paid under protest. The court denied this motion. All of the objections of appellant, some fifteen in number, to the application for judgment were, upon motion of appellee, stricken by the court, and judgment entered against appellant for the full amount of the special assessment, together with interest and costs.
The appellee contends the payment of seventy-five per cent of the amount of the special assessment under the provision of section 194 of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, chap. 120, par. 675,) was jurisdictional, and therefore appellant has no right to question the rulings of the trial court in striking the objections made to the validity of the assessment. It has been frequently held that there is a substantial difference between a tax and a special assessment. (County ofMcLean v. City of Bloomington,
In People ex rel. Smith v. Brewer Estate,
We are unable to see any substantial distinction between "any part of any one or more of the taxes levied," on a piece or parcel of land, and "any part of a real property tax." The distinguishing feature between the two sections lies in the words "for any reason other than that the real estate is not subject to taxation." This language is not in the prior statute, and, very obviously, it means that the owner of land which is not subject to any taxation *393 at all is not required to pay any amount under protest in order to object to a tax. We think the distinction claimed is without merit.
It is also contended that our decision in People v. TaylorvilleSanitary Dist.
Appellant filed a number of objections to the validity of the drainage tax. There were fifteen in number. It is not necessary to do more than classify the nature of these objections. The first class indicates that the railroad company never was included in or a part of the drainage district in question, and never later became a part of it; second, that the proceedings failed to show that a district had been created under the particular provision of the drainage act; and third, that the assessment was never legally made by the district, and the assessment against appellant's land was excessive. We deduce such to be the effect of the objections, although the arguments of counsel take a much broader range. All objections made by appellant were stricken. Attached to the objections was the contract under which the Hammond Mutual Drainage District of the counties of Piatt and Moultrie was organized. *394
It appears that the drainage district in question was organized under section 77 of the Farm Drainage Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, chap. 42, par. 162.) Sections 1 to 70 of the Farm Drainage Act provide for a complete and comprehensive system of farm drainage, and the method of organization by petition, description of territory, character of drain, etc. By section 77, an alternative method of organizing a district is provided, where it is done by mutual agreement of the landowners and not by court action. It is provided, in effect, that the owners of land which require combined drainage may form a district by mutual agreement to include lands of their own only, by an instrument in writing and duly signed and acknowledged and recorded in the drainage record. The contract may include the location and character of the work, the adjustment of damages, the classification and amount of taxes to be levied, and how the work is to be done; and such agreement, when executed, creates a drainage district to the same extent as though the district had been organized by the regular means prescribed in the preceding sections of the statute.
The agreement of the landowners in the Hammond Mutual Drainage District is attached to the objections and made a part thereof, and the motion to strike said objections admitted the truth of the matters set forth therein. The contract in question shows upon its face that it constituted a valid mutual drainage district, and it was so held to be a valid district in Comrs. ofHammond Mutual Drainage Dist. v. Drainage Comrs. of District No.9,
Section 77 of the Farm Drainage Act was construed in People exrel. County Collector v. Curry,
Under these decisions, the Hammond Mutual Drainage District consisted of the territory owned by the signers of that agreement. Neither the railroad company nor any of its successors was a party to that agreement, and consequently its land was not within the district, and not taxable by the district for drainage purposes.
While the objections of appellant are somewhat ambiguously drawn, they clearly present to the court the question whether land not included in a drainage district can be assessed by a drainage district, and whether, upon application for judgment, the point can be considered by the court. It is elementary to entering a valid judgment that the court must have jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties. To have jurisdiction of the subject matter of this lawsuit is to have jurisdiction of the land in the district. Land without the district is not within the jurisdiction of the court. *396
Appellee raises the familiar point that the legality of the district cannot be raised upon objection to taxes. It requires no citation of authority to establish this proposition, as it has been many times sustained by this court. The authorities cited by appellee purporting to bar appellant from making the objection that its land is not within the district do not reach this point. The case of Evans v. Lewis,
When the district now before us was organized appellant was not a party to its organization. To become a party thereto it was necessary to sign an agreement, and it is admitted it did not sign the agreement. It was therefore no part of the drainage district. Even had it so desired it could not question the district at that time, because it was not included in it. The matter as it now appears before the court still discloses that its land is no part of the district. Appellee leaves the inference in its brief that it might be a part of the district by annexation proceedings, or by voluntarily connecting with it, but the objectors disclose they have presented the entire drainage record to *397
the court, and if such proceedings had existed they would be shown by the record and can only be shown by the record. No such proceedings have been shown. (People ex rel. Mark v. Hartquist,
The court was wholly without jurisdiction, because the record discloses to the court that the property sought to be assessed was not within the district. As late as the case of People exrel. Anderson v. Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railway Co.
The judgment of the county court of Piatt county is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to sustain the objections.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.