13 N.E.2d 181 | Ill. | 1938
Appellants, by the People, filed a petition for mandamus to compel the city of Chicago and various officers therein named, to pay the interest accruing on a judgment entered against it, as compensation for property condemned and taken in a local improvement proceeding, in the sum of $16,200. The principal of the judgment was paid on February 17, 1937, but payment of interest was refused. The present appellants hold the judgment by assignment from the original property owners. The answer admitted the recovery of the judgment but denied it was mandatory upon the city to pay it, alleging that the city had no money with which to pay the judgment. The answer also alleged that from the beginning of the condemnation proceeding to the payment of the amount of the judgment, appellants had been in the undisturbed possession of the property, had the beneficial use thereof in the same manner and to the same extent they had prior to the institution of the proceedings in condemnation, and that if appellants, under the law, are entitled to interest on the judgment, the defendant city is entitled to have the interest canceled, or reduced, by having set off against it the value of the beneficial use of the property.
The principal question arising on this record is whether the beneficial use of property taken in condemnation proceedings may be set off against interest accruing after final judgment is entered and before payment thereof. Payment of the judgment was accepted by appellants under protest and they claimed interest accruing thereon at five per cent. *166 This interest amounted, up to the date of the payment of the judgment, to $5244.77. The defendant city introduced as evidence the opinion of a witness that the beneficial use of the property between the date of the final judgment and the payment thereof amounted to $5425. The trial court found there was $5244.25 interest due on the judgment and that the beneficial use of the premises amounted to $5400; that the city was entitled to have that amount set off against the interest accrued, and so found that there was no money due appellants. The petition for mandamus was dismissed.
Appellants brought the case directly to this court apparently on the theory that a constitutional question is involved. Counsel for appellees do not dispute that claim but, as has often been stated by this court, it is the court's duty to determine, on its own account, the question of jurisdiction. Does the claim of a set-off for beneficial use against a claim for interest on a judgment entered in a condemnation proceeding for just compensation for property taken, present a constitutional question? This court, through a line of very definite decisions, has declared that interest on condemnation judgments accrues against a municipality under, and only under and by reason of, the Interest statute. Interest is purely statutory and arises neither from an agreement, express or implied, nor by way of damages or penalty. In some of the opinions expressions have been used indicating that provision should be made for interest in order to avoid failure of the constitutional guaranty for just compensation. This is by no means saying that interest is a part of just compensation. The justice of the application of the Interest statute may well be supported by the constitutional guaranty, but there is nothing in the constitution which guarantees interest or declares it shall be paid. It has been well settled by this court that, in this State, interest on final judgments for compensation is allowed by reason of the application of the Interest statute to all final judgments. *167
In Turk v. City of Chicago,
People v. Kelly,
In Feldman v. City of Chicago,
In the opinion in the Feldman case the following language was used: "But the basis for the rule is sound, in that it originates from the constitutional right to just compensation for private property taken for public use. Where there is delay in the payment of a condemnation judgment it cannot reasonably be said that its payment at some later date will amount to just compensation, because the owner in such cases is deprived of the full and beneficial use and enjoyment of his property without legal process or compensation." This language does not, as counsel suppose, mean that the rule in this State is, or ever has been, that interest is a part of just compensation, although until compensation is paid the constitutional guaranty is, of course, not met. The determination both of the accruing of interest and the rate thereof is, as said in the Turk and Feldmancases, and other cases, purely statutory. The quoted language from the Feldman case is not to be construed as holding otherwise. The ruling of this court in that case is plain.
Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. v. United States,
No constitutional question is involved in this case. As we have stated, the sole question is whether the city has a set-off against the plaintiff's claim for interest on their judgment. Such does not involve a constitutional issue.
As there is no constitutional or other question giving this court jurisdiction, the cause is transferred to the Appellate Court for the First District.
Cause transferred.