153 Mich. 724 | Mich. | 1908
(after stating the facts).
“And although it has sometimes been urged at the bar that the courts ought to inquire into the motives of the legislature where fraud and corruption were alleged, and annul their action if the allegation were established, the argument has in no case been acceded to by the judiciary, and they have never allowed the inquiry to be entered upon. The reasons are the same here as those which preclude an inquiry into the motives of the governor in the exercise of a discretion vested in him exclusively. He is responsible for his acts in such a case, not to the courts, but to the people.”
In this connection we notice the contention of respondents that in repealing that law the legislature must act in good faith. It is sufficient to say that the courts must conclusively presume that the legislature did act in good faith. Under the rule above stated the courts have no authority to investigate that question. The only cases to which our attention is called, which oppose this principle, relate to certain proceedings of municipal bodies. The principle of those cases is limited. It does not extend even to legislative action of municipal bodies. It certainly does not apply to this case. This was decided in People v. Gardner, supra.
“ Previous notice of any application for an alteration of the charter of any corporation shall be given in such manner as may be prescribed by law.”
The repealing law was enacted twice by the legislature in 1905. One of these laws is Act No. 455, Local Acts 1905; the other is Act No. 492, Local Acts 1905. Act No. 455 received the approval of the governor April 5, 1905. Act No. 492 received the approval of the governor April 25, 1905. It appears from respondents’ plea that they had no formal notice of this pending legislation. They did, however, learn of it, and were afforded a hearing by the governor, but were denied a hearing by each house of the legislature. It also appears by their plea that the bills were introduced by legislators from Kent county, who had been requested to take this action by the municipal authorities of the city of Grand Rapids. It also appears that the legislator who introduced the bill had given more than one day’s notice of his intention so to do. Each of the acts was passed in due form. Act No. 492 received a vote of more than two-thirds of the members-elect to each house. Under these circumstances were respondents denied any rights given them by section 16 of article 15 ? At the first session of the legislature, after the Constitution of 1850 took effect, it passed a law providing for the giving of notice in cases coming under said section 16. That law is found in sections 8569, 8570, and 8571, 3 Comp. Laws. Of this law it was said by Justice Christiancy, in People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich., at page 54:
“The effect of this act, and of the constitutional provision under which it was framed, would be to justify the legislature in disregarding, and probably — while the act remains in force — to impose upon them the duty to dis*729 regard the application as such,' until the proper notice should have been given as provided by the act. It does not, however, operate to restrict the right of the legislature itself to make such amendment as they may think the public interest may require; nor does it restrict the right of any member of either house of introducing a bill for that purpose on giving one day’s previous notice of his intention so to do. Nor do we think, as insisted by the counsel for the respondents, that the notice, when given in either house by a member, is by this act required as in case of an ‘ application ’ in behalf of the corporation or individuals, ‘ to set forth briefly the nature of the alteration applied for.’ This provision applies only to cases where alterations are ‘ applied for ’ from without the legislature itself, and is coextensive' only with the provision requiring the publication of the notice of such application. The provision allowing a member of either house to give one day’s notice of the intention to introduce a bill for such purpose was, we think, intended to recognize the almost universal custom or practice in legislative bodies in this country to require one or more days’ notice from a member of his intention to introduce, or ask leave to introduce, a bill; in which case nothing more than the title or general object of the bill is usually required.
“It is urged that if this be the true construction of the Constitution and the act, both may be readily evaded; as it would always be practicable for the corporation to procure some member of the house or senate to give the one day’s notice, and to introduce the bill on his own responsibility as a member. This may or may not be true; but if true, it is a difficulty inherent in the nature of the subject itself, and for which the courts cannot provide a remedy. A proper respect for a co-ordinate branch of the government requires us to presume that each member of the legislature acts upon his individual conviction of public duty, and that he will not become the willing instrument of designing parties, to enable them to evade the statute or the Constitution.”
This reasoning, which we thoroughly approve, answers every argument advanced by respondents in support of their claim that they were entitled to notice under section 16 of article 15 above quoted. Perhaps it might also be stated that section 16 of article 15 has no application to a repeal of a charter. There is a distinction between an
In this connection, we consider the claim of respondents that the constitutional rights of certain holders of bonds of the corporation are impaired by the repealing acts.
It results from this reasoning that the judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed.