38 N.Y.S. 909 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1896
On the 23d of March, 1896, the relator made application to the respondents, commissioners of excise of the city of Hew York, for a license to sell wines and liquors at retail in certain designated premises in that city for a period of. one year. The commissioners rejected, the application and refused to grant the license on. the sole ground of the want of power, arising from the passage of an act of the Legislature, approved March..23, 18:96,. known as “The Liquor Tax Law,” under the provisions .of which they alleged they could-
The subject presented for our consideration on the appeal is that of the constitutionality of the law in question. It has been severely arraigned in argument as offending against justice and reason. It .may be as unjust, unwise, oppressive and odious as the relator' claims, but' all that does not help in the solution of the question before us, and we have no opinion to express on that subject. The final word concerning it has been spoken by the Court of Appeals. In Bertholf v. O’Reilly (74 N. Y. 516) it is said : “No law can be pronounced invalid for the reason simply that it violates our notions of justice, is oppressive and unfair in its operation, or because in the opinion of some or all of the citizens of the State it is not. justified by public necessity or designed to promote the public welfare. We repeat, if it violates no constitutional provision it is valid and must be obeyed. The remedy for unjust or unwise legislation, not obnoxious to constitutional objections, is to be found in a change by the people of their representatives according to the methods provided by the Constitution.”
Much of the argument against the validity of this law proceeds upon the assumption that it is fundamentally and radically a tax law. That being conceded, many of the contentions of the learned counsel for the relator might prevail. If the sole or the main purpose of the enactment is merely to raise revenue by taxation for
The fourteenth amendment t.o the Constitution of the United States does not impair the police power, of the State. (Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 id. 678; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 id. 27.)
• It is within the competency of .the State to interdict all traffic in liquors within its boundaries. That is admitted. The Legislature
That the purpose of the act is not primarily, to raise revenue from taxation is apparent from other considerations. Leaving out of the discussion altogether the pertinent question whether such taxes as those imposed by the act under consideration are in reality anything more than license fees, and confining ourselves to what is deducible from the structure and provisions of the act itself, we find that a third and conspicuous and all-important matter is provided for, and that is the local option feature, which plays so prominent a part in the legislation that it is made one of the cardinal elements proclaimed in the title of the act. The system created and established by this act is by the express terms thereof made to supersede and take the place of all prior existing excise laws or- systems throughout the whole State. It establishes an entirely new systérn, bringing under State control that which was theretofore under local, municipal or community jurisdictions and administrations. The right to traffic in liquor is not limited to individuals, except so far as certain disqualifications are designated in the act; but no one is permitted to sell at retail or deal in liquor in less than certain
Regarding, as we do,, this act as one constituting inherently and ■essentially an exercise of the police power of the State, we are brought to the consideration of the particular objections taken to it as violating the provisions of the Constitution of the State of New York.
First. The position is taken by the relator that the law is uncon.stitutionai, because it violates section 20 of' article 3 of the Constitution of the State, which provides that the assent of two-thirds of the members elected to both branches of the Legislature shall be requisite to every hill appropriating the public moneys or property for local or private purposes. The act of 1896 was. passed by a three-fifths vote only. ;. ... •.
In section 13 .of the act it is provided that all. taxes, fines and penalties (except those imposed upon or gathered from the traffic in-liquors on railroad cars, steamboats, etc.) under the act “ in counties ■containing a city of the first class shall be collected by and paid to the special deputy commissioner for such county, and in all- other •counties to the county treasurer of the county in which the traffic is-
Second. It is further objected by the relator that the act under consideration classifies cities in a different way than the Constitution does, and that for that reason it violates section 2 of article 12: of', the Constitution. This objection proceeds, we think, upon a' nmapprehension of the object of that section. The circumstances-which led up to the adoption of it are well known. It had not been unusual for laws to be passed -seriously affecting the local interests and property of cities without notice to the authorities of such cities, and without any opportunity for them or the inhabitants to be heard upon the subject. That had grown to be a great crying-evil,. and the provision of the Constitution was intended to remedy it. But it must be noticed that the classification has reference only to laws relating to the property, affairs or government of cities, and it is only with reference to that kind of laws that the classification is effectual or material. The act of 1896, in question, is not one -that can be said to relate to either of those things. As we have-before stated, it is a general law in the fullest sense of that word, having regard to the regulation of the liquor traffic throughout the-whole State, and contains such particular jnovisions with reference to special localities as the conditions of those localities seem to-require. In no sense does it relate to the property, affairs or government of the city. It is purely a matter of State government, and is a general law upon that subject, and is not, as we think, at all
Third. The further contention is made that the law should have been submitted to the mayors of cities of the first class as provided by the section of the Constitution above referred to. Much of what we have said with reference to the objection last considered applies equally to this, and it is unnecessary to repeat it. The law is not a special city law as to cities of the first class; it does not relate to the government, property or affairs of a particular city, and was not such a measure as, under the Constitution, should have been submitted in the manner claimed by the relator’s counsel.
The order and final adjudication appealed from must be affirmed, with costs.
Van Brunt, P. J., Barrett, Rumsey and Williams, JJ., concurred.
Order and final adjudication affirmed, with costs.