*1 testimony, on this find that away. Judge run Based we Ebel’s de- respondent proved subject termination that ad- involuntary mission clear and evidence was not errone- convincing manifestly ous.
Nеvertheless, the trial court order should reversed based defects. procedural aforementioned Reversed. STOUDER, JJ., concur.
SCOTT and State, EDGAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, Secretary of THE PEOPLE ex rel. JIM PENCE, Defendant-Appellee. v. TIMOTHY No. District 3 — 88—0398 Third 15, 1989. Opinion filed November HEIPLE, J., dissenting. Hartigan, General,
Neil F. Attorney Springfield (Richard Merrill, W.
Jr., General, Assistant Attorney Chicago, counsel), appellant.
No brief filed for appellee.
JUSTICE BARRY
opinion
delivered thе
of the court:
The appellant, the
State,
Secretary
from
appeals
an order of
the trial court
the
directing
to issue to
Secretary
defendant,
the
Timo
thy
Penсe,
a judicial driving
(Ill.
1987,
permit
95½,
Rev. Stat.
ch.
par.
206.1).We reverse.
6 —
Initially, we note that the defendant has not submitted an ap
pellee’s
Nevertheless,
brief.
where the record is
and the
simрle
court
of review can
decide the
easily
disputed errors
an
without
appellee’s
brief, the reviewing court
may decide
merits of the
First
appeal.
Capitol Mortgage
Corp. Talandis
(1976),
Construction
63 Ill.
Corp.
128,
2d
The record shows that the defendant was arrested 11, on October 1982, for while driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (Ill. Rev. 1987, Stat. ch. par. 501). 21, 1982, On Deсember defendant was on placed for the offense. The defendant again was arrested on for DUI. At the time of his arrest, second he given notice of the statutory summary suspеn sion of his driving privileges pursuant to section 11 — 501.1 of the Illi nois Vehicle (Code) (Ill. Code ch. 11— 501.1). The Secretary subsequently confirmed the defendant’s statutory summary suspension, stating that because the defendant offender, was not a first the suspension would inbe effect for a mini mum of 12 months. On March 1988, the defendant pled to guilty driving influence, while under the and the cause was set for sentеnc ing April 13, 1988. April On the defendant petitioned the court for a judicial driving permit (JDP). date, On that the court placed the defendant on court supervision, $450, fined him and or dered the issuance of a JDP. Pursuant to section 206.1(B)(d) 6— (Ill. Code 206.1(B)(d)),the Secretary, 6— after JDP, the order for reviewing returned the order to the trial court. a Following hearing, second the court found that “it still ap pears offender,” may defendant and resubmitted [that the] [a] order to The Secretary. Secretary brought then the instant ap peal.
98 whether,
The issue on is the facts appeаl presented, under defendant was a first in section 11 — 500 of the defined eligi and therefore judicial permit. pertinent ble for a Section 11 — 500 states has not “any person previous first оffender is who had part violating assigned supervision conviction Section 11 — *** ordinance, last or a similar of a local within the 5 provision 500.) years.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. In instant par. 11 — of his casе, the defendant was arrested for DUI within five re charge. for the All ceiving court-assigned supervision previous DUI other on the proceedings, including entry guilty plea for a charge, рetition JDP, granting and the of that filing after the run. petition, five-year statutory period occurred an the five-year period is whether arrest within itself question from statutory sufficient to remоve definition first offender. in the it is nec ambiguity wording
When found statute related in essary statutory provisions examine evidence Liquor, Heritage Food Inc. v. Insurance meaning. (Amman tended & A 3d rule of (1978), App. Co. N.E.2d cardinal ordains that sections in should be statutory pari construction materia *3 the may reference to one another so that sections considerеd with 244, v. 76 Ill. (1979), effect. Scheib 2d 390 given (People harmonious that to one 872.) fact, presumed In it is statutes which relate N.E.2d and that the governed single policy, are one and a subject by spirit Mаya to People intended the enactments be consistent. legislature 281, Ill. 473 1287. (1985), 105 2d N.E.2d are to those driving permits only persons
Judicial issued (Ill. suspended. have been Rev. driving privileges summarily whose 1987, 95½, pro We those par. 206.1.) therefore focus on Stat. ch. 6 — summary suspension to determine the statutory with dealing visions as defined in section 11 — 500. Those meaning of “first offender” 2—118.1, 6—206.1, 6—208.1, 0, and 11— are sections provisions — 5 11 0 11—500, 95½, 2—118.1, 6—206.1, 6—208.1, (Ill. pars. the Rev. Stat. ch. 501.1 of .1). 1—5 01 1 suspension that the of summary it must be remembered Initially, is civil in nature proceeding is a which driving statutory privileges N.E.2d (1987), App. Ill. 3d 508 v. Morrison 155 (Peoplе the companion the resolution of regard without to operates 68). Ill. 525 Notice of 2d N.E.2d (People (1988), case v. Gerke is served im driving of statutory summary suspension privileges the if of аrrest, subsequent analysis or mail based on a mediately upon arrest, time of and takes effect on blood or urine collected at the (Ill. date of Rev. Stat. ch. following 46th notiсe. day offender, as defined in 95½, 501.l(f— (g).) After a first pars. 1), 11 — section notice of the summary suspension receives 11 — judicial he the circuit court for a driv driving privileges, petition may 206.1(B)(a).)The ing рermit. ch. (Ill. 6 — utilized for definition of a first in section 11 — 500 is to be offender (I purposes of section 6 — 206.1 and section 6—208.1. interpreting both following provision ll. is 11 — 206.1(B): contained in section “Effective January 2 — following shall whenever first offender arrested procedures apply for Section or any provision offense defined in 11 — 501 a similar a local ordinance: ***.” (Emphasis added.) 95½, par. 206.1(B).) Similarly, section in 208.1(f) perti states 6 — 6 —
nent offender, to part “subsequent that an arrest of a first for any offense as defined in Section 11 — 501 or a similar of a local provisiоn ordinance, following statutory summary suspension privi leges pursuant 501.1, offender, to Section for circuit a court may directing issue order to Secretary of State issue a judiciаl driving permit as in Section provided (Emphasis 6 — 206.1.” added.) Stat. Rev. 208.1(f). In at the looking statutory whole, as a language appears it that the date of arrest is the event in most operative actions taken under provisions the statutory suspension summary law. For the most part, notice to suspension is issued at offender the time of arrest. the Secretary When of Stаte confirms the it suspension, ap- pears that the looks to Secretary the date of the arrest determine whether the offender is a first offender a repeat offеnder. Section 6—206.1 forth sets procedure issuance a JDP and states that that procedure is to be followed a first whenever offender is “ar- Therefore, rested.” viewing definition оf a first light of the used in language governing the statutes the summary suspen- sion of driving privileges, we conclude the dispositive question whether the second DUI occurs arrest within five disposi- tion оf the offender’s previous DUI arrest. case,
In the instant was placed on on again and was arrested DUI December *4 12, 1987. His second arrest for DUI within years occurred five court-аssigned receiving supervision. He therefore not a first was of fender in as defined section 11 — 500 and the circuit court had no au Pine, Ill. thority driving permit. issue See 2d 88. People The of the сircuit court of Henderson judgment County, insofar as reversed; re- it is granted judicial driving permit, defendant is mainder of affirmed. judgment part; part. in in
Reversed affirmed
STOUDER, J., concurs. HEIPLE, dissenting:
JUSTICE determining The whether question presented by appeal sole this Pence, under defendant, a first time offender section Timothy was ( and 11—500 there I ll. for to the majority fore eligible judicial driving permit. Contrary elapsed had the defеnd holding, since more than five between and offenses for under the influence alco ant’s first second time offender (DUI), meaning hol defendant was first within I the statute. dissent. Accordingly, in provides Section 11—500 of Illinois Vehicle relevant part:
“For the Section 6 — 206.1 and 6— purposes interpreting Code, any person 208.1 of this ‘first offender’ shall mean who had or court assigned has not conviction previous *** last 5 years.” Section within the violating 11 — 500. to the dates of interpreted pertaining Section 11 — 500 should or the themselves, not the orders dates the violations dates only The violations are the dates of arrests. of the actual DUI dates constant, are certain only These are events significance. objective. and truly or somе time at the- time of the violation might
An arrest occur it applied, of the reasoning majority later. A trial later still. If this results. In uncertain, capricious very and disparate will result case, instance, majority, the rationale accepting even tried and for his guilty found pleaded guilty the defendant been first violation on October offense at time between his any December offense on his second December statutory per- five-year have him to be outside would found defendant first sentenced Since, however, the iod. offense on December
21, 1982, for a second and then arrested five-year per- to be within the majority finds iod. reads, “for Section 11— violating in the statute key language *** 5 years.” within the last *5 Here, the defendant’s first DUI violation occurred on Octo
ber 1982. The defendant’s second DUI violation then took place Thus, 1987. of more than five existed be gap was, tween the two within the definition violations the defendant statute, a first time when the second violation oc curred. TAYLOR, LANE, Director,
JAMES Petitioner-Appellant, v. P. MICHAEL Corrections,
Department of Respondents-Appellees. Third District No. 3 — 89—0304 Opinion filed November 1989.