THE PEOPLE ex rel. Asa P. Dyer et al. Appellants, vs. M. F. WALSH, Director of the Department of Registration and Education, Appellee.
No. 20396
October 23, 1931
Rehearing denied Dec. 2, 1931
346 Ill. 52
The judgment of the circuit court in refusing to allow the employer‘s motion to amend the præcipe and writs of certiorari and scire facias is therefore affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
RAY E. LANE, for appellants.
Mr. COMMISSIONER EDMUNDS reported this opinion:
On March 21, 1930, a petition on the relation оf Asa P. Dyer and others was filed in the circuit court of Sangamon county praying that M. F. Walsh, as director of the Department of Registration and Education, be commanded by writ of mandamus to issue to petitioners licenses entitling them to practice the treatment of human ailments without the use of drugs or medicines and without operative surgery. To this petition a demurrer was filed. The cause is here on appeal frоm a judgment sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the petition.
The petition which is thus before us does not allege facts showing a compliance with the Medical Practice act, which provides that no person shall practice medicine or any of its branches, or midwifery, or any system or method of treating human ailments without the use of drugs or medicines and without operative surgery, without a valid existing license so to do, аnd which further provides that no person, except as otherwise provided in the act, shall receive such license unless he shall pass an examination of his qualifications therefor by and satisfaсtorily to the Department of Registration and Education. (
Before considering the contentions advanced by petitioners it is in order to call attention to the fact that this act
The first contention is that the act deprives petitioners of liberty and property without due process of law, because its effect is to take away from them the right to practice the profession of chiropractic, whiсh they were practicing at the time of its passage. This contention is not well taken. The right to pursue a lawful calling, business or profession cannot be arbitrarily taken away, but there is no arbitrary deprivаtion of such right where its exercise is not permitted because of a failure to comply with conditions imposed by the State for the protection of society. Few professions require more сareful preparation on the part of those who follow them than that of medicine. Everyone may have occasion to consult a physician, but comparatively few can judge of the qualifications of learning and skill which he possesses. Reliance must be placed upon the assurance given by his license, issued by an authority competent to judge in that respect, that he possesses the requisite qualifications. Due consideration, therefore, for the protection of society may well induce the State to exclude from practicing the treatment of human ailments thosе who have not such a license or who are found upon examination not to be fully qualified. The same reasons which control in imposing conditions, upon compliance with which such persons are al-
The contention is made that the act discriminates between chiropractors and those practicing medicine in all its branches, in that the latter, if practicing at the time the law was passed, are exempted from examination whereas chiropractors are not. We find no such exemption in the act. It does provide that “all licenses and certificates heretofore legally issued by authority of law in this State permitting the holder thereof to practice medicine, or to treat human ailments in any other mannеr, or to practice midwifery, and valid and in full force and effect on the taking effect of this act, shall have the same force and effect and be subject to the same authority of the depаrtment to revoke or suspend them as licenses issued under this act.” (
Petitioners insist that therе is a discrimination, in that the act imposes higher and more strict educational standards upon those treating human ailments without the use of drugs or medicines and without operative surgery than upon those prаcticing medicine in all its branches. The argument made in this connection appears to be based upon the fact that those treating human ailments without the use of drugs or medicines and without operаtive surgery who graduated after July 1, 1926, from a school teaching their system, are required to show that such school required, as a prerequisite to admission thereto, a four-year course of instruction in a high school, whereas those practicing medicine in all its branches who graduated from a medical school after the act became effective are required to show that such school rеquired, as a prerequisite to admission thereto, a two-year course of instruction in a college of liberal arts or its equivalent. To hold that the standard of preliminary education thus imposed upon those treating human ailments without the use of drugs or medicines and without operative surgery is higher and more strict than that imposed upon those practicing medicine in all its branches would be to arrive at a conclusion opposed to that dictated by common knowledge of our educational system. Our view of the educational requirements prescribed by the Medical Practice act has already been expressed in certain of the earlier cases cited. In the Witte case we said: “An applicant for a license to practice any system or method of treating human ailments withоut the use of drugs or medicines and without operative surgery who is a graduate of a school in which the particular system or method of treatment is taught, whether before or after the passage of thе act, is not required to
A further contention is that the act operates as an ex post facto law, changing the status of petitioners and making them criminally liable for acts which they were lawfully performing before the law was enacted. The authorities do not support this contention. In Gray v. Connecticut, 159 U. S. 74, the defendant held a State pharmacist‘s license. A statute subsequently enacted provided that spirituous liquors could not be used in the preparation of pharmacists’ compounds unless the pharmacist was the holder of a druggist‘s license from the county commissioners. A conviction under the statute was upheld. In Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189, there was involved a statute, enacted in 1893, providing that any pеrson who after conviction of a felony practiced medicine should be guilty of a misdemeanor. Defendant had been convicted of a felony in 1878. His conviction under the act was sustained. In Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505, the сourt said: “It is further insisted that having once engaged in the practice, and having been licensed so to do, he had a right to continue in such practice, and that this statute was in the nature of an ex post facto law. The case of Hawker v. New York, supra, is decisive of this question. This statute does not at-
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Per CURIAM: The foregoing opinion reported by Mr. Commissioner Edmunds is hereby adopted as the opinion of the court, and judgment is entered in accordance therewith.
Judgment affirmed.
