18 N.Y.S. 282 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1892
This is a certiorari to review the action of the defendant, as state superintendent of public instruction, in removing the relator from his office of trustee of school-district No. 1 of the town of New Paltz, Ulster county. The power of the superintendent of public instruction to remove school officers is under section 18, tit. 1, c. 555, Laws 1864, reading as follows: “Whenever it shall be proven to his satisfaction that any school commissioner or other school officer has been guilty of any willful violation or neglect of duty under this act, or any other act pertaining to the public schools, or of willfully disobeying any decision, order, or regulation of the superintendent, the superintendent may, by an order under his hand and seal, which order shall be recorded in his office, remove such school commissioner or other school officer from his office. ” It appears that in 1887 or 1888, at an annual school-meeting held in district No. 1 of the town of New Paltz, the qualified voters resolved that an arrangement should be made with the normal and training school in said town for the instruction of the pupils in said school-district; and that such an arrangement was entered into, whereby the
The return of the defendant is conclusive as to the facts therein set forth. People v. Fire Com'rs, 73 N. Y. 437. That return set forth that the relator appeared in person and by counsel before the defendant on the return-day of the order hereinbefore referred to, and by the return and by the statement of his counsel admitted that he had violated that and a previous order of the superintendent, and had neglected and refused to comply with the orders of the superintendent; and that he had advised teachers to commence suits against the district for their wages, instead of levying a tax to raise the money to pay them,' as the superintendent had ordered him to do. As above stated, the facts stated in the return are conclusive upon the court here, and these, facts, being true, abundantly justified the defendant in removing the relator from office. The proceeding was perhaps summary, but the facts were admitted; there was no occasion for proof.
But it is claimed that there are facts stated in the affidavit upon which the writ was issued which are not denied in the return, and therefore the court may consider them, under the case of People v. Commissioners Dept. Fire and Buildings, 106 n. Y. 64, 12 N. E. Rep. 641. The claim of the relator is that the real reason the defendant removed the relator was that he refused to discontinue a proceeding he liad brought to compel the local board of managers of the normal school at Hew Paltz to pay over the public school moneys they had received to be paid to the teachers employed by the relator. Even if that were so, I see no reason to reverse the order of the superintendent. He had made a decision of that question himself. It was in a matter over which he had jurisdiction. He also there and then made a decision in regard to the matter, and it was in a matter where the statute made his decision conclusive. The conduct of the trustee as to school matters was also subject to his supervision and control. He then and there made an order, which he had a right to make, directing the relator to abandon his proceedings against the local board of managers of the normal school. The relator then and then refused to abandon the proceedings, and expressly announced, by his counsel present with him, his intention of continuing such proceedings. This, I think, constituted a willful disobedience of an order or decision of the superintendent, within the meaning of the statute. “Willful,” I think, in this statute, means intentional, (Anderson v. How, 116 N. Y. 336, 22 N. E. Rep. 695;) and the relator certainly intended to disobey the defendant’s order. It was not a case of neglect, omission, or misapprehension, but of absolute refusal, and an announcement of an intention of doing directly the reverse of what he was ordered to do. The writ should be quashed, and the determination of the defendant affirmed, with $50 costs and printing disbursements.