192 A.D. 406 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1920
This is an appeal by the relator from part of a final order made at the Westchester Special Term September 27, 1918, in certiorari proceedings, which order directs that the assessment of a certain designated parcel be reduced from $50,000 to $40,000, and also from that part of the order which dismisses the writ of certiorari as to the remaining parcels.
The proceeding is by certiorari upon the petition of the city of New York to set aside as invalid the 1917 assessment in the town of New Castle of certain real property belonging to the city of New York therein. The assessors, the respondents, made their return to the writ. At the hearing at Special Term the parties submitted the matter upon an agreed statement of facts.
While various other objections as well were taken by the appellant at Special Term, it now insists only upon one, which is in effect that the lands are not assessable, that, is, not taxable.
The material facts are the following: The village of Mount Kisco, Westchester county, is situated partly in the town of New Castle and partly in the town of Bedford; through it flows a small stream called Branch brook, which empties into Kisco river some four miles distant from the village, and that river is a direct tributary of the Croton river, now reservoir, which is the main water supply of New York city and has been such for some eighty years past. Drainage of the village naturally flows into that brook. The population of the village
Except for the special statute the property clearly would be taxable under the General Tax Law (Consol. Laws, chap. 60[Laws of 1909, chap. 62], §§ 3, 4, subd. 3), because it would fall plainly within the exception from the exemption clause: “ except the portion of municipal property not within the corporation.” (Matter of Village of Delhi, 201 N. Y. 408.) How
That act has been construed by the Court of Appeals in Matter of City of New York v. Mitchell (183 N. Y. 245), and by this court in People ex rel. City of New York v. Neville (183 App. Div. 799); and in each instance the construction given was broad in accord with the language. Thus our opinion written by the presiding justice said: “ Thus the lands to be assessed and taxed are specified as those taken for ‘ storage, reservoirs, or for other constructions necessary for the introduction and maintenance of a sufficient supply of water in the city, or for the purpose of preventing contamination or pollution.’ ” (183 App. Div. 802.)
It seems to me manifest that the constructions here involved come within the fair scope of the expression “ for other constructions necessary * * * for the purpose of preventing contamination or pollution; ” and that, therefore, they are assessable and taxable.
It seems to me, moreover, that the reasoning or argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is faulty in that he is mistaken in his view that the city has constructed and is
I conclude, therefore, that the learned justice at Special •Term took the correct view of the matter. Hence I advise that the order appealed from be affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.
Jenks, P. J., Rich, Putnam and Kelly, JJ., concur.
Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.