*1 730, 732-733; 243 F. 58 C.J.S., sec. Monopolies, p. 1142.
The indictment here under consideration was not without detail. terms; It defined its named all of the defendants, both individual and described them corporate; in the offense co-conspirators described the charged; nature of the involved; trade and commerce asserted the offense and that it violated charged section (1)a Act; Illinois Antitrust and further detailed scope, and effect of the purpose and maintain fixing, controlling of beer sold at ing price wholesale the defendants in Macon We believe the County. indictment adequately informed the defendants of the them. charges against
For the above, reasons stated judgment circuit court of reversed, Macon and the cause County remanded for further inconsistent with proceedings the views herein. expressed
Reversed and remanded.
(No. 45143. THE SALEM, ex Petitioner, PEOPLE rel. CITY OF McMACKIN, II,
CHARLES L. Mayor, Respondent.) Opinion December 1972. filed *3 SCHAEFER, J., dissenting. PFAFF,
ALFRED S. of the firm of & MILLER PFAFF, Attorney, PITT, Salem City AND (BORGE PITT, GEORGE P. CARLSON, CHARLES of counsel), for petitioner. ALBRIGHT,
ROBERT D. Salem, for respondent. MR. DAVIS delivered the opinion JUSTICE court:
This mandamus action, original filed pursuant leave of court VI, Const. (Ill. art. sec. 4(a); 110A, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. par. 381), compel respondent, mayor Salem, certain sign bonds and a lease authorized under the provisions Industrial Revenue Project Bond Act called (hereinafter “Act”). ch. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 11-74-1 pars. *4 The through 74—13.) constitutionality Act is in this challenged proceeding. is to attract industrial designed developments
to Illinois communities. It provides means or method whereby funds may be raised to out carry is “to in the Act. Its declared vested them purpose in the rehabili to aid relieve conditions unemployment, the increase veterans, to tation of encourage returning the evils State, this industry thereby reducing within 11 — 74—3. Par. attendant unemployment.” upon of the Act 11 — 74—4 municipalities Section grants additional powers: following construct, purchase, acquire by gift or To “(1) reconstruct, any industrial improve, or extend better partially or project or without within municipality, in but no partially or without from the territorial boun- event further than 10 miles by gift municipality, and to or daries of such in in land connection therewith. purchase rights lands or part in finance in or To its bonds to whole (2) issue construction, purchase, acquisition, cost of reconstruction, or extension of improvement, betterment body of the munici- project. governing industrial such all cost and pality determining cost include bonds, engineer- all cost of the issuance such estimated expenses, interest inspection, legal fiscal and ing, during is estimated will accrue construction which it money for months thereafter on borrowed peripd and pursuant to this it is be borrowed or which estimated will Division 74. project To rent or such industrial
(3) lease manner rents industrial concerns such project be fixed charged for the use of the industrial shall produce income time to so as to and revised from time prompt provide sufficient and revenues under this upon all bonds issued payment interest pay the sinking fund to Division and to create due, provide for the principal of such bonds when project industrial operation and maintenance of such depreciation account in connection adequate therewith. of bonds punctual payment pledge To to the
(4) 74 and interest thereon authorized under this Division income and revenues to be received from such industrial project (including improvements, or exten- betterments sions thereto suffi- acquired) thereafter constructed pay they cient such bonds and due interest become and to create and maintain reasonable reserves therefor.
352
(5) To mortgage such project industrial in favor of the holder or holders of bonds issued therefor.
(6) To sell convey such project, industrial including without conveyance limitation the sale and subject thereof to mortgage provided as this Division 74, for price such and at governing body such time as the municipality may However, of the determine. sale no or conveyance such project of industrial shall ever be made impair such manner as rights the or interests of the any holder or holders of bonds issued for the construc- tion, purchase, improvement any or extension of such project. industrial
(7) To issue its to refund in part, bonds in whole or bonds by theretofore issued such municipality under authority of this 74. Division
Property acquired by any municipality pursuant the provisions of exempt this Division 74 shall from imposition of collection taxes thereon while municipality, owned of but use such subject paid occupant to taxation to be the lessee or provided in section of the 26 Revenue Act of 17, 1939, May filed as now or hereafter amended.” of a under the Act and implementation project the authorization bonds to fund the necessary vote of the project require only majority corporate then in authorities office. The not bonds bear interest may to exceed mature 7% after date. may up years However, issue unless bonds (Par. may 74—5.) 11 — the affirmative vote three fifths of approved authorities. Par. 11 — 74—6. The covenants which be contained in bonds may any are set forth in the Act. The due under the payments bonds be secured on the industrial by mortgage The bonds are a lien project. (Par. 74—7.) upon rentals from the industrial Par. 11 — 74—9. project.
As to absence of any obligation upon part bonds, the monies due on any municipality pay section 11 — 74—10 of the Act provides:
“No any holder of bonds issued under this Division compel the right any has of taxing exercise municipality pay or the interest the bonds thereon, and the do bonds not constitute an indebtedness municipality or a of credit thereof loan meaning any statutory provision. constitutional It shall be plainly stated on the face of each bond that it has provisions been issued under the this Division it does not constitute indebtedness or a loan of credit thereof within the meaning provision.” statutory constitutional or be set so that they the rentals shall It provided due, interest and are all bonds and sufficient to when pay, *6 main to all of including operation, provide expenses tenance, Par. 11 — 74—11. and depreciation charges. the the which Act
It is further provided powers in addition and confers are supplemen upon municipalities laws, the other and that tal conferred by affect the powers therein shall not limitations imposed not to any other law. The Act does apply conferred by home-rule unit. is a 74—13.) which (Par. unit. not a home-rule It that the Salem is City is agreed Act, the council of the city Pursuant provisions an create a resolution of the of Salem adopted it of which would under the terms industrial project to be a construct new plant manufacturing Co.; bonds secured by pledge leased to Beatrice Foods to be were on the rentals and property mortgage a lease $1,000,000; in the total sum issued rentals which to be provided was signed, agreement in reliance was done retire the bonds. This sufficient the parties. by a preliminary agreement signed upon lease the bonds and Thereafter, refused to mayor sign this action. agreement, precipitating authorized
The bonds and lease were duly agreement and the authorities by signature act. these instruments is ministerial mayor purely Mandamus is an form of under these action appropriate circumstances. ex rel. v. Lewis People Ogilvie 476, ex Ill.2d rel. City Chicago Heights People 272, 7, 273. Richton Ill.2d 26 claims that petitioner (City Salem) is to be determined constitutionality under 1970, Illinois constitution of and not that of 1870. The 1970, Illinois constitution of ratified on Decem although 1970, 15, ber did effective until not become July generally 1, 1971. The Act here us enacted before was 29, 1971, General not on but was Assembly signed June into law until 1971. As Governor September noted the Act was enacted City, obviously of the constitution of because of its anticipation reference those are home-rule municipalities units, a to the constitution possibility existing prior 1970. We have heretofore held that such is to be legislation constitution, tested under the new so and particularly when the enactment not become a law until after does date effective of the 1970 constitution. July ex rel. v. Lewis 49 Ill.2d 482. People Oglivie Act, It is that the a scheme for urged establishing to a ultimately leasing conveying property tenant, is not enactment for thus public purposes contravenes section of article VIII 1(a) funds, constitution, which “Public provides: assume,, credit shall used We only public purposes.” *7 without that funds or in some deciding, public involved, manner be and that “public purpose” test must met.
Section Act, 11 — 74—3 of the declares that its purpose is: to reduce conditions of and the evils unemployment thereto, attendant and to of increase encourage within the State. industry
We recognize recitation aof self-serving public a purpose enactment legislative is not conclusive of existence of such Rose purpose. (See: mont Inc. Ill. v. Trust Bldg. Supply Highway Authority 243, 45 Ill.2d However, (1970), we stated in 245.) People ex rel. Adamowski v. Railroad Terminal Chicago Authority 230, 14 Ill.2d at (1958), “Such page 235: legislative 236, aside,” and at is not to be set page declaration lightly “ a static is not we further stated: ‘Public purpose’ to meet flexible, It is expansion concept. capable that were not within conditions of a society complex of the framers of our constitution. contemplation [Cita- ” tions.] if the We have held on a number of occasions enactment in principal purpose objective given nature, in it that there will be does not matter public interests. ex rel. incidental benefit private (E.g., People Adamowski v. Railroad Terminal Authority Chicago 236; 14 Ill.2d ex rel. Gutknecht v. People 612; 600, 611, v. 414 Ill. Poole City Chicago (1953), Kankakee 406 Ill. Cremer Peoria Authority Housing 591-592.) While we that there is a benefit acknowledge private interests in the under the industrial financing projects Act, we hold that principal purpose objective Therefore, Act is in nature. it does not matter public that there will be an incidental benefit interests.
In Cremer v. Peoria Housing Authority (1948), Ill. at for the we what is recognized public are, what are the first good purposes public instance, determine; for the General Assembly questions discretion; that the that its is vested with a large consideration; determinations are entitled to full and that courts are not warranted in aside such an enact setting ment unless it evasive clearly contrary constitutional We find no clear evasion of a prohibitions. constitutional relative to the Act prohibition meeting standard. public purposes
It that as this time the courts of appears approxi- have found that States mately industrial-project- revenue-bond statutes serve public purpose. Legislatures have 48 States provide adopted legislation financing have date, of this To court decisions in 5 States only type. held such invalid. legislation
356 other courts to of
Typical
approach
legislation
v.
Mt. Pleasant
us are Green City
of
now before
the type
N.W.2d
256 Iowa
City
Pipestone
N.W.2d
Madsen
In the court City also held Pipestone, initial what responsibility ascertaining public determine; is for the General Assembly purpose discretion this legislature granted large making determination; aside its enactments be set may if courts evasive of or only clearly contrary constitutional prohibitions. 273, 298, 378 Mich.
In Gaylord, 460, 469-470, N.W.2d court, upholding it, from Harrison v. before Claybrook legislation quoted P.2d and stated: “The consensus of (Okla. 1962), modern is to broaden the legislative judicial thinking of activities which be classed as scope involving *** It reaches extent its broadest public purpose. perhaps under the view that the economic welfare is one of the main concerns State and Federal city, govern- ments.” however,
In the final analysis, validity statute must tested under our constitution and our decisions. Both our our courts have judicial obviously adopted concept “public expanding Thus, in the area of economic welfare. we have purpose” for the establishment of a railroad approved legislation terminal with railroad terminal authority ex rel. facilities lease to railroads (People *9 v. Adamowski Railroad Terminal Authority Chicago 14 Ill.2d district regional port (1958), 230); Chicago with facilities and to sell and lease improve port ex such facilities rel. Gutknecht v. (People Chicago Port Dist. 4 Ill.2d a land-clearance Regional (1954), 363); areas, commission with land in power acquire blighted clear such land and sell it for whose purchasers plans had been ex rel. Gutknecht development approved (People 600; v. 414 Ill. City Land Chicago (1953), Chicago of Clearance Com. v. White 411 Ill. Cremer v. Peoria 399 Ill. and Housing Authority (1948), 579); legislation authorized municipalities facilities for lease to a parking private operator (Poole Kankakee 406 Ill. In of all the 521). of instances, and other similar foregoing, many particular interests, has legislation benefited economically but private has been served, motivated and by, more compelling interest. public
In v. Small the Hagler court had before it the of validity legislation providing compensation for The veterans. raised principal was whether the question taxation for a imposed or public purpose benefit. court, on 474 and set forth pages guidelines
for this determination: “In whether such deciding purpose is courts public must be private, influenced by largely the course and of usage for government, object which taxes and have been and appropriations customarily course of made, levied long legislation and and what have been objects considered to the necessary support *** for the use of the proper government.
the State to is expend public moneys public purposes not limited, to be alone, to the narrow lines of necessity, but the of wise principles demand that those statesmanship which subserve the things general society wellbeing shall happiness meet the prosperity people consideration of the State, legislative body though If call for the money. ofttimes
they public expenditure it seen that to be obtained is can be the purpose sought benefit, one and the elements of contains public public benefit derived thereby how much question *** one courts. In public legislature whether or not the sovereign taxing power determining interest, used in the public judgment clear that the is to in the absence of a showing accepted is but evasion and purported purpose public is, fact, purpose private.”
We believe that conditions unemployment and need no documentation. State are well known and their to alleviate these conditions intended Legislation interest. is in the New inherent problems certainly public *10 State in communities within the industry expanded for those who not work and only provides opportunities who but also others would be directly employed, in who live work and services to those goods provide the The of financing contemplated by community. type for small and the well a means Act struggling provide to economic The poten- communities attract development. State, our tial economic development impetus lost to other States with which otherwise might interest. serves the of this likewise type, public financing is from the Act incidental benefit resulting private served, and there and benefit to be the public purpose in of the constitution this no regard. contravention the issuance the contends that The respondent Act, sale of and the ultimate under the bonds leasing all constitute interests the industrial project private clause loan of a violation due-process credit city’s of 1970 I of Illinois constitution of article section 2 to the United States fourteenth amendment constitution. under the State constitution
Our decisions credit which extending, specifically prohibited Const. subdivision any corporation any political (Ill. IV, art. sec. the due- (1870), 20), encompass here process raised v. Board Educa question (Schuler tion lead us conclude (1938), 109), We have contention without merit. respondent’s indicated that there is no constitutional prohibition against the use of funds the benefit of which inure to public interests, for a so as the is utilized long money constitutional public purpose. only prohibition as a State debts against surety guarantor contracting and, essence, Ill. its credit to others. Continental loaning Nat’l v. Bank Illinois State Toll Com. Highway 385, 403; Ill.2d Fairbank v. 14 Ill.2d Stratton (1958), Poole Kankakee 531. Ill. In Bowes v. Howlett 24 Ill.2d we held the Illinois Industrial Authority Development fail must because its was entirely implementation depend ent fund to be raised from the upon by appropriations General The fund could exist Assembly. not without The fund was to cost of debt appropriations. pay was, service hence, from sale of It bonds. resulting State credit and unconstitutional. In pledge passing, we noted that issuance of bonds from payable solely revenues derived from use of a has become a facility method of popular and has been municipal financing interpreted courts of our State to be subject many constitutional restrictions imposed upon taxation. obligations at 549. payable by 24 Ill.2d *11 Under the Act in there is no fund question, guarantee there and is no credit or funds. The pledge public bonds constitute a lien the rentals to be the upon received from user, industrial the and bonds secured a involved, mortgage but that does not a constitute loan of the credit. No is municipality’s right to a thereby under given compel any municipality, circumstances, to use its revenues to retire the debt. The Act a such result the expressly and recites that prohibits bonds do not of, constitute either an indebtedness a from, the
loan of credit municipality. 74—10.) (Par. 11 — and not conclusive While this declaration is self-serving Trust Inc. Illinois Supply, Highway (Rosemont Bldg. is Ill.2d it Authority patently 245), an accurate intent and is expressive legislature’s the results under the Act. statement of attained there The cases cited the indicating respondent the illustrate actually due under Act denial of process it is a cases state that his to be The argument inapposite. for money any due violation of process appropriate Motor Club v. Kinney in a law. purpose (Chicago Peoria 329 Ill. Cremer v. Housing there is We that hold Authority 586.) finance the of a money neither taking taxpayer’s used are in nor the funds question contemplated project, for a private purpose. is, there sub-
The respondent’s suggestion officials stance, because city a use of money taxpayer’s out must amount of time carrying devote substantial documents merit. contract without project trustee demonstrate respon- amply and collecting the bond proceeds, sible disbursing interest due rents, paying principal distributing bonds, on handling ensuing litigation. enact the resolution authorities must sign municipal existence, but into the documents bring project construction, operation payment subsequent in the attendant thereto is financial primarily obligations of others. charge is the contentions akin to
Closely foregoing of a debt the Act imposition permits argument section in excess of that permitted municipality Code of the Illinois 8 — 5—1 Municipal (Ill.Rev.Stat. before, the specifically As noted ch. par. 5—1). exercise compel prohibits right We or interest. the bond pay principal taxing power from directly that bonds have held payable previously *12 361 of a revenues such as one before us now do not project constitute debts of the ex rel. municipality. (People Gutknecht v. Port 4 Dist. Ill.2d Regional Chicago (1954), v. Illinois Toll Com. People Highway (1954), Ill.2d ex rel. v. Gutknecht 228;People City Chicago 600, 619; 414 Ill. (1953), Krause v. Peoria Housing Authority In each of these 370.) cases we have held that when the is to be obligation paid from the income solely derived from the pur property chased bonds, the use of the by no indebtedness municipal is incurred. A the fact that the fortiori, bonds are secured so does not property create purchased municipal indebtedness. Hairgrove City Jacksonville Ill. 176-178.
Nor, is there a denial of due under the process theory that the of the at conveyance the termination of property the lease to the private at nominal sum is a industry donation of public does property. municipality invest its funds for the of the Private purchase property. bondholders have invested their funds. The indus private try, to a to it prior conveyance under section 11 — 74—11 Act, will have for what it receives paid way rentals, or, in the event of sale under section 74—4(6), it will have as paid purchase determined required price to the municipality, subject outstanding mortgage, and the Act that no sale or ever provides shall conveyance be made in such manner as or interests impair rights of the holder or holders of the bonds which are issued.
In Cremer v. Peoria Authority Housing Ill. the court of the contention disposed that there was a donation of to a property by municipality private corporation by stating agreement to undertake the corporation development consideration for the project represented transfer adequate to it. It stated that the constitutional prohibition against donation to a making private corpora tion did not bar the from into a entering
transaction there where was of consideration exchange between Ill. at We conclude that parties. (399 594.) there where, here, likewise is no denial due process *13 the tenant has entire cost of agreed pay project otherwise, rental before there can be through payments, a transfer of the to it. that a referendum
The also contends respondent of under Act for the issuance bonds this necessary the Illinois of section 8 — 4—1 of reason of provisions 24, 1971, ch. Code Municipal par. 4—1). (Ill.Rev.Stat. 8 — concedes that section 8 — 4—1 generally petitioner of be submitted the authorization bonds that requires thereto and that enumerated electors exceptions It that there do not include suggests question. on the of legislature have been an may oversight part bill, as because such failing provide exception that considered, contained requiring originally provision be submitted the bonds question approval However, amended the voters. the bill was subsequently be and, enacted, bond issues may that provides fifths the affirmative vote of three approved by section authorities. Additionally, 74—6.) (Par. 11 — that 11 —7 4—13 of the Act specifically provides “ *** *** bonds be issued under this Division with restrictions, limitation out to the requirements, regard other law.” or other contained in provisions any [sic] Code, which Section the Illinois 8 — 4—1 of Municipal 1, 1971, 11 — 74—13 became effective and section July Act, which became effective the Industrial Project should, if 1971, are materia and in pari September to render them be construed so as possible, together v. Board Education consistent. (1960), (Richards 113; v. Metro ex rel. Adamowski 21 Ill.2d People Section 14 Ill.2d Dist. 283.) Sanitary politan issue the bonds may 11 — 74—13 provides specifically other than law to the any without regard requirements therein that the Division 74 and powers contained in are to the conferred in addition and supplemental conferred other We believe that law. pointed are from other law expression provisions exemption to amend what would otherwise adequate by implication 4—1, be the in that an section imposed requirements enactment, from an the terms and results implied repeal cannot be harmonized with necessary operation the terms effect of an earlier act. Under such circumstances, the later since it cannot expression prevails intended to enact laws presumed which are Rosehill Lueder Co. v. contradictory. Cemetery 466; 458, 465, 406 Ill. Klemme v. Drainage District No. 5 380 Ill. also see: City of Lawrenceville v. 467-468. Hennessey (1910), also contends that because of its respondent limitation to industrial or and to plants manufacturing non-home-rule Act violates municipalities, equal- *14 protection clause of section of article and I constitutes 2 under special section 13 of article IV of the legislation Illinois constitution of 1970.
A statute will not be construed as denying equal of the law protection unless classifications complained of are and not based a rational difference of arbitrary upon condition or situation in relation to the legislative purpose. 570; Stein v. Howlett 52 Ill.2d Fanio v. W. (1972), John 368; 366, Breslin Co. 51 Ill.2d v. (1972), King Johnson 47 Ill.2d v. Industrial (1970), Com. Begich 42 Ill. 2d 35. In Hotz 51 Ill.2d we Bridgewater considered the and of section 13 provisions requirements of article IV of the constitution, and at 110 we page concluded that review although scope judicial no legislation “section enlarged thereby, requires in our definition of a change when law is and ‘general ” uniform,’ or ‘local.’ ‘special,’ In ex rel. Vermilion Conservation Dist. People County v. Lenover 43 Ill.2d we held that that a law mean laws does not special prohibition against alike, in and the State must affect every place every person and we stated: and at pages “It means that a law shall operate simply in all localities State uniformly throughout and and on all in like circumstances persons conditions. [Citations.] a classifications
“Establishing primarily Classifications function. legislative [Citations.] not be made need logical, legislature harmonious, accurate, even scientific or provided are and will they accomplish legislative design if it can be said not arbitrary. Only [Citations.] and that the classification unreasonable clearly the statute will court declare arbitrary palpably in invalid. And ‘A distinction [Citations.] if state of facts can is not arbitrary legislation sustain be conceived that would reasonably it, ***.’ Summarizing, legislative [Citations.] founded upon classification is sustainable where or condition rational difference of situation or objects persons upon existing rests, there where is a reasonable class [sic] the classification in basis for objects light ” purposes accomplished. [Citations.] to industrial In this course of limiting financing reasonably might manufacturing plants, suffered by harm have determined that the competitive service business of another local commercial presence than offset employment would more gain Act. *15 intended under otherwise economic development Also, customarily investment required the amount of to com- or opposed industrial manufacturing plants, establishments, a basis rational mercial presents communities in those We classification. agree economic develop- and lack are rural in character presently ment, employment the first towards providing step is most to be found in growth apt industrial establishing base from which service and commercial may enterprises follow.
While the Act to non-home-rule munici applies only we do not believe that its palities, necessarily language means that such vehicle for economic development unavailable to home-rule Section municipalities. 6(a) article VII of the constitution of 1970 sets forth the inherent of a home-rule unit: Section,
“Except as limited this a home rule unit any power exercise perform any function pertaining to its government and including, affairs but not limited to, power to regulate protection for the public health, welfare; license; tax; safety, morals and to incur (Emphasis debt.” added.)
Subsection states: (m)
“Powers and functions of home rule units shall be construed liberally.”
The constitutional to home-rule grant to be of municipalities sufficient appears breadth and to authorize such scope entities to this vehicle for adopt economic and if so, choose to development; do they for the precise procedures of such result accomplishment would be left to the determination of the units. respective Bloom, S. Inc. v. (See: Korshak 52 Ill.2d We 56.) that the Act grant before the court in this case permits which are municipalities to it to or subject gift land to ten miles purchase outside of their up territorial boundaries. ch. (Ill.Rev.Stat. par. 74—4(1).) However, the constitution does not that home-rule suggest units would be unable to land outside their purchase territorial units. of land is not an acquisition by purchase gift
exercise of a it is an governmental act power; nature. Where not proprietary expressly prohibited, real estate municipal corporation may outside of purchase its limits for (Ill. legitimate municipal purposes. Power Co. v. Ill.2d Jacksonville
366 491, Ill. 621; 98 v. Harmon (1881), Champaign of ed. 494-495; (3d 10 Corporations Municipal McQuillin, However, between there is distinction sec. 28.05.) 1966), of limits outside its corporate right acquire property over such of exercise sovereignty and the rights power 180 v. City Chattanooga (1944), property. (McLaughlin of 823; Palo Alto 638, v. City 177 Baker Tenn. S.W.2d of 425, 754, 744, 12 Cal. 2d Rptr. 190 Cal. App. of Salem the city the Act Under question, 430.) under over the property exercises no sovereignty rights Also, various statutory recognize consideration. provisions outside land purchase municipalities rights See: limits purposes. their territorial appropriate 11-76.1-1; Ill.Rev.Stat. 1971, 24, ch. Ill.Rev.Stat. par. 500.6. ch. par. the constitution in grant power language as to units raise some to home-rule may questions beyond corporate extent of to exercise sovereignty Home Baum, A Illinois Survey limits Tentative (see: Rule Ill. U. L.F. but (pts. 1-2), 559), does not warrant inference that a home-rule language is unable in a to act municipality proprietary capacity its limits. To the constitu beyond corporate contrary, tion rule states “a home unit exercise any power function to its perform any pertaining government Act, affairs.” munici to non-home-rule applicable only does not confer to exercise palities, authority govern mental to real with beyond respect such limits of It only municipality. provides such a or such land by municipality may gift No to act in other than a purchase. right proprietary capacity given. neither
Since the Act nor constitution question a home-rule enact- unit from similar prohibits adopting ment, do not a denial of due we find process equal law, nor do we find special legislation protection from have the Act. we Additionally, repeatedly resulting held if there is a doubt as to the construction to a enactment the doubt must be resolved given legislative in favor of an its interpretation validity. S. supports Bloom, v. Inc. Korshak Ill.2d Huckaba Cox Ill.2d 131. Next, contends that violates respondent in that it authorizes a public policy engage *17 in the in real-estate business with competition We find an this to be unreal enterprise. analysis results under the Act. The function of the principal is to means method municipality provide whereby funds be raised to industrial facilities through the issuance of revenue bonds. The does not municipality real sense any Suitable land owned operate project. by is for any private person The prospect purchase. lease by more than subsequent municipality nothing of the method of integral part financing making available. We find no contravention of in this public policy regard. Sections 11 — 74—11 and of the Act 74—4(3) 11 — that rentals under
provide lease are be sufficient to bonds, fund for the provide of all payments and principal interest, and maintenance of the operation and project, for depreciation. claims that under the respondent lease in the rentals are sufficient to question, pay maintenance and operating, depreciation charges.
It is true are rental charges only adequate for the debt service on the provide bonds and pay However, trustee’s fees. under the terms of the lease all of and maintenance operation expenses ownership are assumed the tenant. In directly our this opinion satisfies the Act, there is no need requirements that the be an for the provide intermediary of these We payment find that the substance of charges. of the Act in this is met requirements respect of the lease. provisions Act, contends that under also respondent
personal property, consisting machinery equipment, taxation, from and that such exempt results exemption in an classification. Section 11 — 74—4 of the Act improper provides machinery equipment may acquired in connection with the industrial Section project. 74—4, other among things, provides:
“Property acquired by any municipality pursuant provisions of this Division exempt 74 shall be from imposition and collection of taxes thereon while owned the municipality, but the use of such subject paid by taxation to be occupant the lessee or provided 1939’, in Section of the ‘Revenue Act of May filed as now or hereafter amended.” The 1969 amendment to section of the Revenue of 1939 ch. (Ill.Rev.Stat. was par. 507) held to be invalid in Korzen, Dee-El Inc. v. Garage, 2d and the provisions leasehold interests in taxing as contained in section before tax-exempt property, amendment, the 1969 were therein held to remain in section, force. however, This to the taxation applies only of a leasehold interest real estate and does not relate to the taxation of We do not read section personal property. *18 to mean that the taxation is limited to the 74—4(7) 11 — leasehold interest in real property. portion quoted section that 74—4(7) provides “property acquired” 11 — shall be from taxation but that the use thereof exempt shall be taxed as section of the Revenue provided by Act, Inc., and under Dee-El such reference is to Garage, section as it existed to the 1969 We amendment. prior believe that in the term legislature using “property referred to the real-estate acquired” only interest which is leased, and that subsequently in any personal property cluded with such interest in along the real estate would be in taxation manner same as all subject other personal property. further contends that financing
The respondent is not a “corporate industry industrial projects Code, which Section Municipal 8 — 1—2 purpose.” 16, 1970, became effective that provides corporate June authorities money only appropriate 24, ch. While purposes. (Ill.Rev.Stat. par. 1—2.) 8 — we do not the bond and rental regard proceeds payments as if even assume appropriations by we petitioners, were, that we believe that our decision in they People is sufficient Chicago answer this contention. We there for a upheld appropriation civil defense a fund for valid corporate purpose, stating
that the words a are not “corporate purpose” given narrow construction and use of funds in a rigid manner which will promote general prosperity welfare of the is for municipality proper “corporate Ill. at section purpose.” (413 Additionally, 87-89.) Act, 11 — 74—13 of the which effective became September 7, 1971, states that specifically Act provisions are in addition and conferred supplemental any other law. Under rules construction heretofore referred to relative to the contention that respondent’s referendum was for the issuance of bonds under necessary Act, we find this final contention to be without merit. conclusions,
In view these we hold that the writ mandamus should be awarded.
Writ awarded. SCHAEFER, MR. dissenting: JUSTICE In my fails in its effort to sustain opinion majority the last constitutionality sentence of section 11 — 74—13which that the “does Act provides apply a home rule unit.” Rev. (Ill. Stat. ch. because this And par. 74—13.) severable, follows, can not be characterized as it provision entire is invalid. my opinion, sentence munici- forbids home-rule question exercise palities has granted *19 all other first this municipalities. majority justifies discrimination on the that the line is which drawn ground other municipalities home-rule and
between municipalities of the Act. The to the is related reasonably purpose “The said to exist because: type is necessary relationship the Act well may provide by financing contemplated to attract small communities means for and struggling “in those and also because economic development”, in character and are rural communities which presently toward economic the first provid- lack step development, is found in most to be apt employment growth ing service and base from which industrial establishing follow.” commercial may enterprises first rests This two upon assumptions: justification (1) the Act is attract industrial that purpose State, rural the more areas development (2) is a that whether a or home-rule municipality city village its Neither true. determined by assumption population. of the Act stated General Assembly purpose to aid “to relieve conditions unemployment, veterans, encourage rehabilitation returning State, this increase thereby industry reducing evils attendant upon unemployment.” (Par. 74—3.) to attract There is no suggestion any legislative purpose are to “those rural communities industry presently economic or to in character and lack development,” a means small and communities “provide struggling economic The further attract assumption development.” non-home-rule line home-rule between is also unfounded. depends municipalities upon population VII, The constitution secs. provides (art. (b)) 6(a), town, or its any city, village incorporated regardless itself, referendum, determine may population, whether not it or will be a home-rule unit.
This statute with the of choice that interferes freedom the constitution has to the of a people given saying “You have this municipality, power granted unit”, if status a home-rule act only you give up your “If unit become a home-rule must you conversely, you *20 the this act.” In the give up power granted by my opinion lacks the interfere the with authority of freedom choice the constitution by by granted imposing conditions of kind. this the
Finally, seems to that the limitation opinion say stated in section 11 — 74—13 is and therefore meaningless, does not affect the IAct. can not validity agree unit, status, a home-rule virtue its of home-rule solely by has the to other this power granted municipalities by limits, statute to land to ten its miles outside purchase up or that the of such a is not the exercise of making purchase a or function. governmental power
To of existence such support power majority these, relies two decisions of this court. In one of upon Illinois Power v.Co. 18 Ill.2d City Jacksonville had been of 618, the power question specifically granted other, In the legislature. Champaign Harmon the court said only thing with reference to the of a power municipality purchase land outside its boundaries was this: “Under general real grant and hold it buy property, understood hold such municipal and corporations may buy limits, property, be corporate may necessary even and hold real corporate purposes, may buy estate limits, beyond for the location of corporate cemeteries, houses, and other connected pest purposes with the condition of the sanitary 98 Ill. at municipality.” 494-5.
In court, addition to those two decisions of this relies a distinction which it as to the majority draws upon kind of be exercised authority by municipality over which it outside its owns boundaries. To property this a Ten- distinction relies support upon the opinion nessee decision. That case involved an express legislative to the grant authority city Chattanooga land outside its limits for an corporate airport.
statement relied was upon concerned with majority Tennessee, State the borders
land beyond lying McLaughlin limits. land and not with beyond city (See 638, 643, 180 Tenn. v. City Chattanooga (1944), General the Illinois which S.W.2d The authority 825.) to all Illinois municipalities has Assembly granted statute: in the following expressed municipality, by a (1) owned property which “All municipality, corporate limits of lies (2) outside the limits of within the lie (3) does ordinances, control, to the municipality, subject shall respects municipality all jurisdiction as the owned same *21 Stat. thereof.” Ill. Rev. corporate limits
lies within 24, par. ch. 7-4-2. as to the mistake than majority’s More serious has Assembly granted that the General nature of power outside which own they over to municipalities to the is made with that limits, respect their is the mistake to home-rule municipality of a constitutional power author- its borders without legislative beyond land ity. Convention
The the Constitutional proceedings home- that make it clear it not intended that was quite pro- rule authority. article should majority grant follows: was as Committee Local Government posal a chief executive Any county which has “3.1(a) county any by the officer elected voters 20,000 municipality population has a of more than limits, any power and may, corporate its exercise any pertaining government perform function to its affairs (Emphasis ***.” added.) Proceedings, Record of Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention [herein- after cited as Proceedings]. of the committee minority would have substituted the following majority proposal: Any city, incorporated “Section 3.1(a) village, and limits, may, town corporate any within its exercise perform any function to pertaining government its affairs ***.” (Emphasis added.) 7 Proceedings 1866. as he debates Elward stated that
During Delegate read the have would no authority proposal to home-rule extraterritorial grant municipalities any He said: power.
“Well, may respectfully I in the suggest absence statutory existing of constitutional backing any authority, attempt by Assembly pass General municipalities power statute outside the giving boundaries and, think, open I would be serious 4 Proceedings substantial constitutional attack.” 3040.
Both the chairman and the vice-chairman of the Local Government Committee stated that there was nothing either the General from proposal prevent Assembly additional Chairman Parkhurst granting powers. stated: powers “The granted in powers section 3 are not of statute. by way come It is not —these are autonomous powers that home rule units can exercise within their limits regard statutory enablement, without point 1. Point there nothing any in this article that
way prevents the legislature granting from additional powers government unit local other than the that are granted constitutionally.” Proceedings 3040. stated:
Vice-Chairman Carey Assembly from nothing prevent “There is the General city any municipality, either acting outside the limits *22 being that minority report, in this or the and the reason city the limits. And I don’t powers we seek are within any what the General think that there’s doubt but to Assembly now has and will continue have —without legislate for right it into the to putting constitution —the powers.” Proceedings 3040. extra-territorial the constitution had not that Mr. Elward argued outside over territory home-rule units should power give Rather, that the he had language their boundaries. argued home- from would giving prevent legislature proposed at rule extraterritorial Proceedings units power. (4 he and the amendment shown by This clearly 3040-41.) Gertz proposed: Delegate Any county
“3.1(a) which has a chief executive county any elected officer the voters and 20,000 population a more than has may, corporate within its limits and such additional areas law, as been or provided by any have shall be exercise power perform any pertaining and function to its govern- ment and affairs ***.” (The amendment would have added the words.) Proceedings italicized 3072.
This amendment did not to additional any purport give to home-rule units but powers merely preserve extraterritorial authority legislature grant power them, Elward stated: clearly Delegate you say “All the before does is that amendment power, rule counties and the cities can have this home not limits, only their but in such additional past Assembly given in the General has them areas as as the them power Assembly give General power Proceedings in the future.” 3074. defeated, but amendment was proceedings its that both its Convention show proponents the extrater- were
opponents complete agreement were to be ritorial of home-rule municipalities from the constitution. from the derived constitution, section of article VII By 6(a) exercise any home-rule unit perform “may ***.” In and affairs its function pertaining government relieve condi- of this Act —“to my purposes opinion rehabilitation to aid tions of unemployment, veterans, the increase and to encourage returning matters within this State” —are pertain industry become affairs” of State. They “the government and affairs of to the matters government pertain not, home-rule or only pursuant whether municipality, General Assembly. from the of authority delegation