2 Barb. 282 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1847
By the common law of England a new7 trial could not be granted bn the merits, by any court, in a case of felony; nor by an inferior court of limited jurisdiction, in any criminal case. (1 Ch. Cr. L. 532; 3 Bl. Com. 388, Christian’s note; 6 D. & E. 625, 638 ; 13 East’s Rep. 416, n. 6 ; The People v. Comstock, 8 Wend. Rep. 549.)
No colonial law was cited, on the argument, nor have we been able to find any, changing the rule which we have mentioned. There were undoubtedly courts of oyer and terminer in the provinces. We have very slight and imperfect accounts of their proceedings; but in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is fair to presume that they adhered to the common law rule of the mother country. Neither has our state legislature passed any act conferring the power of granting new trials, on the merits, either upon the oyer and terminer, or general sessions, in which tribunals our criminal prosecutions are prin.cipally conducted.. Whenever it has been designed to confer that power upon any tribunal subordinate to the supreme court, the grant has been express; as in the case of the common pleas. .(2 R. L. of 1813,141, § 3; 2 R. S. 208, § 1, sub. 2;) and of the superior court of the city of New-York, (Act of March 31,1828, § 5.) The powers of the general sessions have been defined with great precision; but nothing is stated from which an intent to confer the right to grant a new trial upon that court can be inferred; although the statutes relative to such court have been revised twice (2 R. L. 150, § 2; 2 R. S. 208, § 5) since it was decided by the supreme court that the general sessions1^ could pot grant a new trial on the merits, after verdict. (The People
The decisions of the late supreme court, on the question now under consideration, have not been uniform, and we are at liberty to adopt such rule as we think the law requires, without a material departure from the principle “ stare decisis.” Notwithstanding the change which has taken place in the organization of this court, rve feel every disposition to abide generally by the decisions of our predecessors; both from the high respect which we entertain for their judicial character, and from our regard for the principle. But the ablest and best men may err; and if we occasionally overrule an extreme case, we but follow the example of those who have gone before us. In the case of The People v. Townsend, (1 John. Cas. 104,) a new trial was ordered on the merits, in a case of felony. The cause had been tried before the oyer and terminer, and the verdict rvas against the opinion of the judge Avho presided on the trial. A certiorari had been issued from the supreme court, but the papers had not been returned, and the case rvas not before the court so as to make its decision compulsory. It rvas merely advisory; although such is not the purport of the language used in the report. In the case of The People v. Stone, (5 Wend. Rep. 39,) it was decided, expressly, that the oyer and terminer bad the power to grant a new trial on the merits, in a case of felony. As we cannot concur in that decision, it is proper that we should state
In England, the oyer and terminer is so entirely subordinate that their commission is “ absorbed and determined,” when the king’s bench, which is the principal court of criminal jurisdiction known to the laws of that country, sits in the same county. (4 Bl. Com. 262; Jacob’s Law Dict, tit. King’s Bench. II.)
The supreme court has uniformly asserted and maintained its superiority over the oyer and terminer, by the removal of cases by certiorari, and the subsequent trial of them at the circuit court. The practice is now sanctioned by statute. (2 R.S. 732, §§ 82,83,84.) In the case of The People v. Comstock, (8 Wend. 549,) the late supreme court, in effect, overruled their decision in The People v. Stone, and followed the common law rule. That being the latest decision on the subject, is of course entitled to the greatest weight.
If the oyer and terminer is an inferior court; then the rule
There are several reasons why the power to grant new trials, on the merits, should exist in civil, rather than in criminal, cases. In civil actions verdicts are rendered for either party when a reasonable satisfaction as to the truth is produced upon the minds of the jury. The scales of justice are equal; the plaintiff, as well as the defendant, has a right to move for a new trial; as the controversy generally relates to property only, promptness of decision is not generally absolutely essential to effect the ends of justice. And, in cases where the verdicts are against the Weight of evidence, if a new trial could not be had for that cause, the Unsuccessful party would be remediless ; as the appellate courts can only review decisions on points of law. But in criminal cases, the accused cannot be convicted where there is a reasonable doubt, however strong the weight, or decided the preponderance, of the evidence may be against him. The presumption at the outset is in favor of' his innocence ; the court are his counsel, and in the benign manner of administering our laws, all doubtful questions of law and fact are decided in his favor. Hence there are few convictions against the weight of evidence. In a practice of twenty years, as public prosecutor, I do not now recollect one. In criminal cases, too, if the accused is acquitted, however conclusive the evidence against him may have been, the public are precluded by a provision of the constitution from obtaining a new trial. (Const, of 1847, art. 4, § 5.) If the defendant had that privilege it would not be mutual. It is very essential to the due administration of criminal law that merited punishment should be prompt, and reasonably certain. The obstacles in the way, existing under our present rules, (although perhaps necessary,) give great encouragement to criminals. There is a constant hope of escape, either from the difficulties in the way of detection, or through the want of a valid indictment, the indistinct recollection of the witnesses, or the mistakes of the court oí
Upon the whole, our opinion is that the court of oyer and terminer has no power to grant a new trial on the merits; and our advice to the court below is to proceed to sentence the accused, pursuant to his conviction.