147 N.E. 492 | Ill. | 1925
The county collector of Cook county made application to the county court of that county for judgment and order of sale against lands upon which the taxes for the year 1923 were delinquent. The Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company filed objections to a portion of the highway tax levied by Cook county and to portions of the taxes for free text books and school playgrounds levied by the city of Chicago. The objections were sustained and judgment was refused by the county court. The county collector prosecutes this appeal.
With reference to the county taxes, it was stipulated that the ordinance by which they were levied was passed *412 by the board of commissioners of Cook county on May 7, 1923; that the county clerk extended the taxes after the first day of December of that year; that in making the extension he included for the county highway tax a rate of .044228 on each $100 assessed valuation in addition to the statutory maximum of fifty cents thereon for general county purposes, and that the county had prior to May 7, 1923, issued bonds for hard road purposes and levied a tax therefor. Apart from certain specific taxes not here involved, the board of county commissioners on May 7, 1923, possessed the power to levy and collect, annually, taxes for all county purposes at a rate not exceeding fifty cents on each $100 valuation. The county highway tax was included in this maximum rate. (Smith's Stat. 1921, sub-sec. 6 of sec. 25, p. 529.) By an amendment to this sub-section, which became effective on July I, 1923, the county board was authorized to levy the county highway tax in addition to the maximum of fifty cents on each $100 valuation. (Smith's Stat. 1923, p. 562.)
Concerning the school taxes, it was stipulated that the ordinance for their levy was passed by the city council of the city of Chicago in February, 1923; that among other educational purposes it provided for the levy of taxes for free text books and school playgrounds; that the county clerk in extending the school taxes after December I, 1923, included a rate of 1.92 for educational purposes, and in addition thereto a rate of .041948 for free text books and the same rate for playgrounds. In February, 1923, when the school tax levy was made, the city of Chicago had authority to levy taxes for free text books and school playgrounds, but it was not authorized to levy these taxes in addition to the maximum limitation of 1.92 for educational purposes. (Smith's Stat. 1921, sec. 189, p. 1804; ibid. sec. 2, p. 1823.) By amendments to these statutes, which became effective on July I, 1923, levies for free text books and school playgrounds in addition to the maximum levy for *413 educational purposes were authorized. (Smith's Stat. 1923, sec. 189, p. 1920; ibid. sec. 2, p. 1942.)
Appellant contends that while the county highway, free text book and school playground taxes exceeded the maximum rates fixed by the applicable statutes at the times of their respective levies, yet the rates at which those taxes were extended were authorized, at the time of their extension, by statutes then in force, and that therefore the taxes are valid and the objections thereto should have been overruled. On the contrary, appellee insists that the validity of a tax is to be determined as of the time it is levied and not by any subsequent event, and that the amendments, which became effective on July I, 1923, had no retrospective operation and did not authorize levies prior to that date in excess of the maximum rates permitted when the levies were made.
The power to tax is a legislative power. The levy of a tax, whether State or local, is a legislative act, which determines that a tax shall be laid and fixes its amount. Local taxation involves two distinct acts of legislation: First, that by the State giving the power to tax; and second, that by the local legislative or quasi legislative authority laying the tax under the power so given. (3 Cooley on Taxation, — 4th ed. — secs. 1012, 1013.) Public or municipal corporations must have express authority, under the constitution or by acts of the General Assembly, to levy and collect taxes for local purposes, and they have no power to levy taxes at rates exceeding the limitations fixed by the constitution or by statutory enactments. (People v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St.Louis Railway Co.
But it is argued by the appellant that the amendments to sub-section 6 of section 25 of "An act to revise the law in relation to counties," (Smith's Stat. 1923, p. 562); section 189 of "An act to establish and maintain a system of free schools," (Smith's Stat. 1923, p. 1920,) and section 2 of "An act to provide for the control, maintenance and operation of playgrounds by boards of education in cities having a population exceeding 100,000 inhabitants," (Smith's Stat. 1923, p. 1942,) all effective July I, 1923, authorize the several taxes here involved as extended by the county clerk. An act of the General Assembly will not be given a retrospective effect unless the legislative intent to give it such effect clearly and unequivocally appears. (People v. Chicago and Alton RailwayCo.
On May 7, 1923, that part of the county highway tax extended in excess of the maximum rate of fifty cents was invalid. (People v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co.
The judgment of the county court must therefore be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. *416